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The thesis's objective is to describe the relationship between inland capture fisheries 
management and the welfare of the poor in Bangladesh. Existing economic models of 
fisheries management do not address issues of income-distribution, concentrating instead 
upon rent-maximisation. The thesis therefore aims to develop new models of the 
distributional impact of management interventions, based upon a qualitative and 
quantitative understanding of the social, institutional and economic processes whereby 
fishery incomes are created and distributed.
The study site is Hail Haor, a 13,600 ha floodplain in N.E. Bangladesh. Descriptions of its 
physical ecology, fishing technologies and fishing communities are given. There follows 
a detailed explanation of the social, institutional and economic transactions whereby 
fishing incomes are distributed between fishing labour, lessees, sub-lessees, government 
officials and the government.
Estimates of yields, sales and employment levels are presented on a per hectare basis. 
Sales are divided between labour income, fishing costs and tolls. Tolls are in turn 
apportioned to the various groups of recipients. Fishermen's access to profitable fishing 
activities is shown to be a function of religion and social and economic status. Poor 
fishermen tend to operate with low-yield, labour-intensive gears, in shallow water and 
during the flood season. They therefore do not perceive themselves to benefit from 
policies that enhance the dry-season, capital-intensive fishery.
Simulation and analytical models demonstrate how current policy interventions benefit 
rich people at the expense of poorer fisherfolk. They raise rents, which accrue to rich 
people, by reducing employment, upon which the poor depend. They also postpone the 
catch from the labour-intensive flood season fishery to the capital-intensive dry-season 
fishery. It is concluded that existing policy is regressive and that fisheries assessments 
should address the issue of income-distribution as well as that of rent-maximisation. 
Appropriate assessment methodologies are proposed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: the challenge of floodplain fisheries management in 
Bangladesh
Contrary to popular belief, Bangladesh is not among the poorest of countries. At an 
equivalent of US$1,160 p.a., its mean per capita purchasing power is higher than India's 
or Zambia's and more than twice as high as Tanzania's, Niger's, Mali's or Malawi's (World 
Bank 1993, p.296). Bangladesh does have, however, a large number of poor people. 45% 
to 60% of the population does not consume sufficient calories to maintain a healthy life 
(Rahman and Haque 1988) and 60% of children under 5 are malnourished (World Bank 
1993 p.292).
Moreover, the number of Bangladeshis in search of a livelihood is growing rapidly. The 
increase in Bangladesh's population between 1981 and 1991 was more than the entire 
population of Malaysia. Even on the optimistic assumption that population growth will 
fall to replacement reproduction only by 2015, Bangladesh’s population is set to rise by an 
equivalent of four Malavsias by 2025. This is in a country which already has a population 
density of 741/km2, over three times higher than India's.
Over the next 30 years, therefore, the challenge to development in Bangladesh will be to 
provide better livelihoods for the half of the population that is currently hungry and then 
to make new livelihoods for the four new Malaysias that are on the way.
Over a third of Bangladesh's surface area, or around 14.5 million hectares, is under fresh 
water for at least part of the year. Bearing mineral-rich alluvium from the Eastern 
Himalayas, these waters support one of the world’s most productive freshwater food- 
chains. At the top of this chain sits the Bangladeshi population, extracting around 
600,000 tonnes of fish and shrimp per year. Inland fisheries may be divided into three 
types: aquaculture, riverine capture fisheries and floodplain capture fisheries. Although 
most policy and research attention has focused until now upon aquaculture, the floodplain 
fishery, which is this study's concern, is also of huge importance, being responsible for 
around half of inland fish production (BBS 1992, p.221).
The Government of Bangladesh and its donors have adopted as their floodplain fisheries 
management policy a combination of artificial stocking, effort controls and property 
rights reform. Upon this policy's effectiveness, however, there has been very little formal 
research. This is partly because inland capture fisheries have only recently become a
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fashionable research topic for social scientists and partly, perhaps, because there has been 
no lack of unsubstantiated assertion upon the subject.
This conjunction of population growth, a huge resource and an untested management 
stance therefore poses an important policy problem: is the current floodplain fisheries 
policy environment beneficial to the rural poor? More generally, how can the floodplain 
fisheries of Bangladesh be managed so as to sustain as many livelihoods as possible? The 
purpose of this study is to use empirical observation and economic analysis to evaluate 
current and alternative fisheries management policies.
Chapters 1 to 4 will set out the study's aims and methodological approach. Chapter 2 
reviews our existing understanding of Bangladeshi rural development in general and of 
inland fisheries in particular. It finds a lack of information upon fishery economies and 
the distributional impact of fisheries policy. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical literature 
upon fisheries management and concludes that the established approach to fisheries 
assessment does not take account of distributional issues. Chapter 4 describes how this 
study plans to analyse the economics of a floodplain fishery, placing emphasis upon the 
practical difficulties of collecting reliable primary data.
Chapters 5 to 7 will explain how value-added is created and distributed in the Hail Haor 
fishery of N.E. Bangladesh. Chapter 5 describes its physical ecology and fishing 
technologies. Chapter 6 introduces the fishing communities and discusses their social 
systems. Chapter 7 covers the social, institutional and economic transactions whereby 
factors of production are brought together to create and allocate fishery benefits. They are 
described in some detail because the analysis of fisheries policy will eventually be based 
upon them.
Now that the resource flows have been described, chapters 8 to 10 will quantify and 
analyse the outcome. Chapter 8 estimates production, sales and employment on a per 
hectare basis and allocates net sales between various factor shares. Chapter 9 shows how 
fisherfolk's incomes are determined by their social and economic position. Chapter 10 
builds upon chapter 9 to identify the particular position of poorer fisherfolk in the 
fishery, concluding with an account of their perceptions of fisheries policy.
Chapters 11 to 13 use micro-economic theory to analyse the distributional impact of 
fisheries policy. All the models are based upon the preceding qualitative and quantitative 
description of the Hail Haor fishery. Chapter 11 presents two simulation models of 
artificial stocking, closed seasons and effort limitation programmes. Chapter 12 describes 
three micro-economic theorems upon the effects of artificial stocking. Chapter 13 is a 
model of income distribution by factor share under different property right regimes.
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Chapter 14 brings the thesis's conclusions together. It argues that current policy 
interventions in inland capture fisheries are regressive, tending to benefit rich rentiers at 
the expense of fishing labour. On a more positive note, it proposes some poverty-oriented 
methodological approaches to fisheries assessment.
Bangladesh's fisheries were fascinating to study. Muddy, crowded, beautiful and often 
violent, Hail Haor was a colourful illustration of many key debates in economic 
development. Is there a trade-off between growth and equity? How do social structures 
and markets inter-relate? How should renewable natural resources be managed? Why 
does poverty persist? Hail Haor's fishermen are acting out these issues daily among the 
gill-nets and water-hyacinths and it is hoped that the reader will pick up some of the 
fishery's drama between the lines of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh: a policy-oriented research 
framework
This section starts by reviewing the existing social science literature upon inland capture 
fisheries in Bangladesh. It finds an absence of work upon the micro-economic and social 
relations surrounding the fishery. It reviews the preoccupations of current inland fisheries 
policy and identifies specific policy decisions that should be guided by a micro-level 
study of the fishery.
Existing social science publications.
Although the literature upon various aspects of aquaculture or pond fisheries is 
comparatively abundant, little has been published upon the economics, sociology or 
anthropology of freshwater capture fisheries in Bangladesh. This in part reflects 
officialdom's lack of interest in inland capture fisheries until the mid-1980s, when the 
growing interest in environmental resources, exasperation with the performance of 
agriculture and donors' interest in marginalised communities led to the "discovery" of 
inland capture fisheries. In fact, whilst none of the literature upon inland capture fisheries 
in Bangladesh referenced in this study was published before 1985, no fewer than 4 
economists are currently preparing Ph.D. theses on the subject with UK universities 
alone!
Rural society in Bangladesh
Starting with Bangladeshi rural society in general, the social sciences literature is 
unanimous in highlighting social and economic inequality as its outstanding feature. 
Rahman (1985) finds that a household’s future life-chances are determined by its current 
wealth-holdings, that the distribution of assets tends to become more concentrated over 
time and that the lowest strata of society have become poorer. He concludes that 
Bangladesh's rural classes may be delineated in terms of ownership of the means of 
production, principally land. Hartmann and Boyce (1979 and 1983) concluded from a 
period of participatory observation that an elite appropriates the rural surplus by means of 
rents, interest, trading margins and plunder whilst the poorest 85% of the population 
grows poorer. Jansen (1987) argues that a high ratio of labour to productive resources 
induces households to compete for rents rather than create productive assets. He shows 
how land moves from poorer to richer households and predicts that economic polarisation 
will be exacerbated by population growth. He forecasts that before the century’s end
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Bangladesh will contain more than 20 million unemployed landless paupers, dependent 
upon charity and crime for their livelihoods.
Whatever their ideological standpoint, many writers studying social structures in rural 
Bangladesh have observed strong vertical segmentation and an absence of horizontal co­
operation, an outcome that Scott (1976) considers typical of peasant societies. Wood 
(1981) writes of class-formation in Bangladesh, "Vertical solidarities of the patron-client 
type become the form of class relations under conditions of agrarian development in 
Bangladesh." Maloney (1986) argues that the patronage system has behavioural origins: a 
craving for bounty from others is inculcated in Bangladeshi children from birth. Jansen 
(1987) finds wealthy "elites" maintaining factions through patronage in the form of credit, 
physical protection and political support in return for mortgaged land and votes. He 
suggests that the nature of factional politics ensures that patronage services are supplied 
monopolistically: "The rural landscape can easily be conceived of as a place where many 
patrons, with their separate groups of clients, can co-exist and live next to each other and 
only clash over limited and specific events" (p. 149). Herbon (1988) seeks co-operative 
institutions but finds an atomistic, segmentary rural society with diffuse patterns of 
leadership and collectives managed by the elite for the elite.
Neo-classical economics suggests that competitive capital markets can mitigate income 
inequality by allowing poorer households direct access to the means of production. 
According to this model, borrowers as a group receive from their investments the average 
revenue product of capital but pay as interest in a competitive capital market the marginal 
revenue product of capital. They thus receive a "consumer surplus" as users of capital. A 
body of writers has questioned whether this occurs in rural Bangladesh. Ahmed (1989) 
argues that the short-term, low-value credits required by poor rural households are 
rendered inaffordable in the formal sector by high transactions costs. Rahman (1992) 
finds that informal lending covers 2/3 of the credit market by value. Where the lender 
takes his income as interest the modal rate is 10% per month. McGregor (1988, 1989a 
and 1992) shows credit to be part of the patronage system. Within the village, informal 
moneylenders restrict credit to their own political supporters, creating "monopolistic 
credit fiefdoms" (my phrase). The same moneylenders use bribes and political influence 
to appropriate the supply of formal-sector credit. The consensus of these writers is that 
access to credit is wealth-related and does not therefore tend to mitigate pre-existing 
disparities in economic status.
The Bangladeshi state, which concerns us as the fisheries manager, is seen as the upper 
part of the patronage chain. Its "Development Policy" aims to satisfy the demands of rural 
patrons rather than the needs of the rural poor. Jansen (1987) shows how the patrons of 
the rural poor are in turn the clients of the state, supplying bribes and political support to
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government officers in return for state resources and legal judgements. McGregor (1989a) 
shows how patrons compete for state aid for their own factions. Hartmann and Boyce 
(1979 and 1983) show that foreign aid and co-operatives are managed by the elite in their 
own interests; their solution is revolution. The Like-Minded Group (1990) and Kramsyo 
and Wood (1992) argue that development aid in Bangladesh should therefore concentrate 
upon the distribution, rather than the productivity, of resources: "Interventions which 
have been advanced as a means of combating poverty have, in practice, usually failed to 
recognise that poverty is grounded in a lack of access to resources... Without tackling 
these issues, an increased supply of resources in itself will be of little help to the poor 
because the poor have no access to them" (Like-Minded Group 1990, p. 199.). Substitute 
the phrase "fish stocks" for the word "resources" and one has the basis for a critique of 
fisheries management policy.
Sectoral studies offreshwater fisheries
The World Bank (1991) reviews Bangladesh's fisheries at the sectoral level. The number 
of professional fishermen has risen from 0.8 million to 1.25 million since 1972. With 
population growth at 2.4% p.a. (1987-9), real GDP per capita growth of 1.2% p.a., an 
income elasticity of demand for fish around unity and an increase in production of 1.8% 
p.a. (1983-8), the terms of trade of fish against rice have risen by 75% in 12 years (1979- 
91). However, output from inland fisheries is falling by 2.7% p.a. (1983/4-1987/8). This 
is attributed to pollution, siltation, over-fishing and flood control. (Aguero 1986, Planning 
Commission 1991, World Bank 1991). The World Bank recommends artificial stocking 
to restore yields and a shift from leasing to licensing (i.e. the New Fisheries Management 
Policy) to redistribute incomes away from middlemen in favour of fishermen. One could 
argue, however, that the value of these recommendations is contingent upon the 
economic and social relationships that govern the fishery at micro-level, a topic not 
addressed in the World Bank's review.
Many writers are concerned about the effects of flood control measures upon the inland 
fisheries sector. Ali (1989) estimates that flood control reduced total floodplain area by 
814,000ha to 1985 and that a further 2,000,000ha will be lost by 2005. Sklar (1992) 
warns that planned flood control embankments will block fish migration routes. 
Majumder and Durante (1993) fear that 800,000 fisherfolk stand to lose all or part of 
their livelihoods as a result of flood control. In their analysis, floodplains are an open- 
access resource, "open to anyone with a net", so the poorest of the poor stand to lose from 
flood control.
On the consumption side, conference papers quote as a matter of course the proverb 
"Mach-e bhat kai Bangalee" (Bengalis eat fish and rice). The World Bank (1991)
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emphasises the nutritional importance of the inland fisheries sector with the oft-quoted 
statistic that fish provides 71% of the country's animal protein. Contrary to popular belief, 
however, fish are not a particularly important part of the average Bangladeshi's nutrition. 
Rahman and Roy (1990) and FAP17 (1993) estimate that fish contributes only 12% or 6% 
of total protein consumption. Official statistics (BBS 1992 p. 592) show fish to provide 
2% of calories, 7% of protein and 4% of fat intake. One suspects that the 71% figure is 
cited so often by the fisheries lobby in order to strengthen the case for development aid.
The income elasticity of demand for fish is around unity for all groups (Rahman and Roy 
1990) with per capita daily consumption of 18g and 28g for landless and "high income" 
households respectively (FAP17 1993).
Fishing and socio-economic class
Huq and Huq (1985), Ullah (1985), Rahman (1986) and Jensen (1987) are pre-occupied 
with the economic stratification of fisherfolk. Huq and Huq report that labour and capital 
use accounts for more than 50% of variation in floodplain fishing revenues. They and 
Jensen concur that more than 80% of fishermen's income is produced by fishing. Ullah 
classes fishermen as protocapitalist, upper artisanal or lower artisanal according to their 
expenditure upon labour hire and rents. Rahman argues that fishermen are an underclass 
associated with landlessness and powerlessness, a prey to political bosses and 
exploitative credit contracts. Jensen describes fishermen as separated from the rest of 
society by a caste identity and a disparaging attitude to agricultural work. Economic 
status within the fishing community is related to gear-ownership.
Profitability studies
Several authors have attempted to estimate actual or potential fisheries rents from 
freshwater fisheries.
Ullah (1985) finds that all classes of fishermen produce a high rate of return upon capital. 
His explanation is that the lessee incurs sunk costs by acquiring the lease and employing 
water-bailiffs. He is therefore confident of retaining the lease for several years and 
restricts effort so as to maximise its long-run profitability. Ullah's argument has three 
weaknesses: first, a lessee has no incentive to conserve fish stocks if  fish move between 
lease units; secondly Ullah high rates of profit may be normal profits rather than rents 
depending on the opportunity cost of capital; thirdly, Ullah does not show why the 
fishermen, rather than the rational lessee, appropriate the resource rents.
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Rahman (1989) uses survey data to calculate the profitability of inland fisheries. Rahman, 
observing positive profits and a 6-month payback period, concludes that the leasing 
system prevents the dissipation of fishery rents. Another possible reason is that Rahman's 
imputed costs were well below market rates: an opportunity cost of capital of 10.5% p.a. 
instead of 10%-15% per month and a shadow wage of 15% of the market wage for casual 
labour.
Aguero and Ahmed (1990) compare rates of return on capital under different 
management regimes. They conclude that licensing is superior to leasing although only 
three water-bodies per regime were studied and the summary table of results shows no 
regime to be clearly superior.
Ahmed (1991) has created a programming model of effort restriction riverine fisheries in 
Bangladesh. He argues that the government should tax fishing effort to maintain fishery 
rents. The analysis contains important flaws: it assumes that the Government of 
Bangladesh has the bureaucratic capacity to tax fishing, omits to mention existing effort- 
limitation by leaseholders and does not take account of the biological constraint upon fish 
production (p. 60).
The socio-economics o f fishing
Anthropologists Blanchet and Talukder (1992) offer a tantalisingly brief insight into the 
social and economic relations that surround the Shanir Haor fishery in N.E. Bangladesh. 
Professional and subsistence fishermen contract and compete with the leaseholder for 
fishing rights. The leaseholder makes massive profits by charging tolls during the flood 
and restricting fishing to his own "corporation" during the dry season.
Resume
The sociological literature upon inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh is largely 
preoccupied with class; either it is trying to define fisherfolk's class status within rural 
society as a whole or trying to sub-divide fisherfolk themselves into economic classes. 
Such an approach, however, is of little use to fisheries managers who want to predict the 
economic effects of different regimes upon the fisherfolk. Indeed, if fishing communities' 
response to project interventions is expressed, not through Marx's "class for itself', but 
through vertically-aligned factions, then the horizontal class-based analysis has little to 
say about the political economy of fisheries management either.
The economics literature, on the other hand, assesses inland capture fisheries according 
to whether they produce economic rents or not. What these profitability studies have in
18
common is that they make rent-maximisation the implicit policy objective. This casual 
assumption is of devastating importance. The choice of rent-maximisation as opposed to 
employment has clear regressive distributional implications in a society where many poor 
people depend upon the sale of their labour and most resource rents flow to the wealthy.
Given the recent surge of interest in the sector, one might assume that the "grey" literature 
generated by projects for internal use would contain analyses of the economics of 
fisheries management. Unfortunately for the fishermen, and fortunately for my Ph.D. 
prospects, this is not the case. Micro-economic studies were not used for project 
preparation and policy-formation, at least two fisheries development projects are 
currently subject to a government "gagging" order and, with the exception of the Third 
Fisheries Project, no ex-post policy or project evaluations have been performed.
In brief, the existing literature tells a pessimistic tale. Bangladesh's inland fisheries are set 
into an unequal, patronage-bound society where the tendency is towards greater 
inequality and worse poverty. Writers lament the power of the leaseholder and also note 
economic stratification within the fishing community itself. Formal capital markets are 
closed to the poor and informal capital is too expensive to be a means of advancement. 
Development policy works for, not against, the patronage system. The number of people 
dependent upon inland fisheries is increasing but output is falling. Professional fishermen 
form a distinct group that derives most of its income from fishing and are therefore 
presumably vulnerable to a drop in production.
With one exception (Blanchet and Talukder 1992) the literature does not describe the 
micro-economic and social relations that surround the fishery itself. Without 
understanding these relations, however, one cannot predict the effect of policy 
interventions upon income, employment and income distribution.
Inland capture fisheries policy
From a reading of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (Planning Commission 1991), the official 
version of the state's development policy, it appears that inland capture fisheries are the 
"poor relation" of the fisheries sector. Although they produce around half of the annual 
fish catch by weight, they rate only 2 out of 27 paragraphs in the Plan's sector-by-sector 
discussion (pp5-8) compared with aquactulture's 16. The Plan envisages that the "main 
research thrust" should be into fish and shrimp culture (p. 9).
The Plan's strategy for inland capture fisheries may be summarised in 5 words: "stocking, 
effort-controls and licensing." The stocking of inland open waters, it is claimed, will raise
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the beel, haor and floodplain catch by one third from 208,000t to 305,000t between 1990 
and 1995. Effort controls, consisting of a "vigorous implementation of the Fisheries 
Protection and Conservation Act" and "heavy penalisation to the users of current jal" 
(monofilament gill-nets) are to maintain fish-stocks (p.5). Licensing is to ensure "the 
biological management of jalmohols (lease units) by providing fishing rights to the 
genuine fishermen and gradual replacement of existing leasing system" (p. 5). On paper at 
least, the official policy could be described as biological intensification with social 
redistribution.
In practice the Government of Bangladesh, foreign donors and NGOs have initiated the 
following policy interventions that will affect the inland fisheries sector directly or 
indirectly:
Fishing right allocation
Bangladesh's fisheries were established as a source of government revenue under the 
British Raj by the Permanent Settlement Regulation 1 (1793). Lands and waters were 
registered as "mohols" or "sairat mohols" in the name of zamindars (landlord-cum-tax- 
farmers), who paid annual tribute to the British Indian Government. The zamindar would 
obtain a profit by leasing them to jotedars. The mohols were re-assumed by the 
government under the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act (1950) and re-codified in the 
Estate Manual (1958). They are now leased out by government. Only ponds and a very 
few small water-bodies, the property of private individuals (maurasi jalkar) or Hindu 
temples (deboltar), are exempted.
The leasing system was designed and is maintained as a source of revenue, no! as an 
instrument of fisheries development. It gives the Ministry of Land alone an estimated 
Tk90 million p.a. (US$3.6 million) (Ali 1993). Apart from 1980-3, when the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Livestock administered the leasing system, the government officers that 
allocate fishing rights have been those responsible for revenue collection and not for 
fisheries development. The jalmohols were created according to administrative, not 
ecological, criteria. Similar lease auctions raise revenues from agricultural land, market­
places, bridges, ferries, boulder-collection, sand-collection and car-parks.
Current regulations are as follows:
i) Private agricultural land becomes de jure an open-access fishery if it is flooded. In 
practice, however, landowners are increasingly claiming exclusive fishing 
rights over their flooded fields.
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ii) Fishing rights in permanent water and flooded government (khas) land are vested in 
the government. These waters are divided into some 13,000 leasing-units (jalmohols). 
Leasing arrangements are defined by Ministry of Land (1991) and described by Ali 
(1992):
- Jalmohols under 20 acres, around 70% by number, are administered by the Thana 
(previously Upazila) Parishads of the Ministry of Local Government. 1% of lease revenue 
is paid to the Ministry of Land and the remainder is collected by the Thana Parishad.
- Jalmohols over 20 acres are administered by the Deputy Commissioner (DC) for the 
Ministry of Land. The lease is awarded by a Tender Committee consisting of the DC, 
Additional Deputy Commissioner, District Fisheries Officer, District Co-operatives 
Officer and Revenue Deputy Collector. The Committee should only award leases to 
registered Fishermen's Associations but they may waive this rule if a 25% increase upon 
the previous year's lease price is not forthcoming. 50% of revenue is taken by the 
Ministry of Land. The remainder is distributed by central government to the Thanas.
The lease to each jalmohol is sold by auction in the Bengali New Year (April-May) just 
before the onset of the monsoon. Riverine jalmohols and non-riverine jalmohols are 
leased for 1 and 3 years respectively. A Ministry of Land order (Ministry of Land 1991) 
made it possible to leases of 4-10 years to be awarded to a prospective lessee who 
produced a written "production-oriented development plan." This option was little-known 
until it was officially encouraged for lease year 1993-4. At the time of writing nobody in 
the DOF's Head Office was able to say who should approve the plan and according to 
what criteria. It is likely that the power to award 10-year leases will fall to the Ministry of 
Land, "because they have the power, the manpower and the money" (Mokhomel Hussein 
per s.comm.).
Auctions were supposed to be conducted in public until 1992. Closed bids were then 
adopted on the grounds that the previous system encouraged public disorder. The 
successful bidder should pay 50% of the lease price on announcement of the auction 
result and the remainder within 7 days.
iii) In 1973 the new Bangladesh administration replaced jalmohol leases with fishing 
licences. The old system was re-adopted in 1976 because of administrative difficulties 
and ex-leaseholders' control over the licensing process. Under the New Fisheries 
Management Policy (NFMP) of 1986 fishermen were again to be licensed. The official 
aim of the NFMP is to transfer the lessees' income to the fishermen by giving them direct 
access to the water ("jal jaladar" - "water to the fisherman" - was the slogan).
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Under the NFMP fishing licences (<adhika patro) are awarded directly to fishermen. 
Fishermen's eligibility is determined by the Thana Nirvahi Committee, consisting of the 
Thana Fisheries Officer, a representative of the JMS (the official national fishermen’s 
association) and the Thana Revenue Officer. (One notes that the alliance between the 
Fisheries Association bosses and the Revenue Office that undermined the licensing of 
1973-6 has been incorporated into the Thana Nirvahi Committee.) Licence fees were 
initially to maintain the average of the previous three years' lease revenues and to rise by 
10% per year thereafter. Adhika patro fees were to be collected by the Department of 
Fisheries, not by the Ministry of Land.
It was envisaged that BKB (Bangladesh Krishi Bank, a state-owned agricultural bank) 
would lend to licensed fishermen for Adhika patro costs. Few loans materialised; the 
Department of Fisheries blames fishermen's lack of collateral and low repayment rates.
At the time of writing it was enlisting 4 NGOs to supply credit to fishermen's groups in 21 
NFMP jalmohols.
The Ministry of Land opposed the NFMP from the start. It (Ministry of Land 1988) 
modified the NFMP in 1988, transferring control of NFMP jalmohols to the Thana 
Nirvahi Officer (TNO) instead of the Thana Fisheries Officer (TFO). It also decreed that 
NFMP license revenues should be credited to the Land Revenue Account of the Ministry 
of Land. The NFMP scheme was then frozen in 1991 after only 264jalmohols had been 
transferred to it. (Another 36 await the resolution of legal disputes.) Moreover, officials 
of the Department of Fisheries (DOF) in Dhaka revealed in September 1993 that the 
Prime Minister had decided to abolish the NFMP. The DOF protested against this 
decision but does not expect it to be reversed because of opposition to the NFMP from 
the Ministry of Land.
Despite the NFMP's moribundity, it continues to excite donor interest as a possible future 
alternative to leasing. The Ford Foundation/DOF's Experiments in New Approaches to 
Management of Fisheries (ENIMOF) project (1987-9) attempted to evaluate the success 
of the NFMP. It was succeeded in 1991 by the Improved Management of Fisheries 
(IMOF) project which intends to evaluate the NFMP in 19 jalmohols, of which 10 will 
receive NGO support.
A compilation of discussions of the New Fisheries Management policy was published in 
1989 (ed. Aguero, Huq, Rahman and Ahmed 1989). Naqi (1989) compares the NFMP 
with the leasing system and concludes that middlemen dominate both arrangements in 
equal measure. Siddiqui (1989) applauds the NFMP's intentions but observes increased 
illegal fishing and over-fishing in the absence of a lessee's supervision. This contrasts
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with the popular assertion (e.g. Ali 1993, Haque 1993) that leasing leads to the over­
exploitation of fish stocks because of the lessee's rapacity.
Fisheries legislation
The Protection and Conservation o f Fish Act (1950) authorises the government to 
regulate fishing in the interests of stock conservation. It is forbidden under this act:
- to catch major carp shorter than 9 inches (23 cm) between July and December (the 
growing season)
- to catch snakeheads (Ophicephalus spp./Channa spp.) between April and June inclusive, 
their breeding season
- to use barrier nets across rivers or monofilament gill-nets. Monofilament gill-nets are 
banned "because they are invisible in the water and entangle everything that touches 
them."
- to catch boal catfish (Wallago atu) shorter than 12 inches (30 cm)
- since 1985, to use any net with a mesh size lower than 4.5 cm
- to catch fish by dewatering
The law prescribes confiscation of gear and a Tk500 fine for the first offence and one 
year's imprisonment for subsequent offences. However, the Thana Fisheries Officers, who 
are charged with enforcement of the Protection and Conservation o f Fish Act, are not 
empowered by law to confiscate gear or make arrests. In reality, the regulations are 
enforced as and when political pressure is placed upon local officials.
The Tanks Improvement Act (1937), Fish and Fish-Products Ordinance (1983) and 
Marine Fisheries Rules (1983) cover aquaculture, quality control and marine fisheries 
respectively and are therefore not of relevance to this study.
Open-water stocking
Open-water stocking has been promoted as a means of countering the perceived fall in 
fish recruitment resulting from over-fishing, siltation and flood control.
The Third Fisheries Project (TFP) and the Second Aquaculture Development Project 
(ADPII) are currently stocking open waters with the fry of major carps in the west and 
east of Bangladesh respectively. The TFP has stocked three water-bodies totalling 
53,680ha annually since 1991. Project documents envisage that 50% of the costs of 
stocking will be recovered via the leasing system, that 50% of incremental yields will be 
caught by "part-time fisherfolk" and that stocking will cover 100,000 ha. The project 
hopes to produce an ex-post economic evaluation of stocking.
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The ADP stocks "nursery beels" at the start of the monsoon and relies upon the rising 
floodwaters to disperse the fry. It has attempted ex-post evaluations of its stocking but 
they are weakened by a lack of baseline data and of a reliable method for distinguishing 
between stocked and wild carps. The Government of Bangladesh has forbidden the ADP 
to release information about its work.
Both the TFP and the ADP have been accompanied, in the words of the TFP’s Director, 
by a "vigorous application of the Fisheries Act." This forbids the catching of major carps 
during the six months to December. The stocking programmes have also prompted the 
banning of current ja l , nylon monofilament gill nets.
An evaluation of the TFP (Leterme and Chisholm 1993) found that poor professional 
fishermen and subsistence fisherfolk lost 36% and 54% of their fishing incomes 
respectively, probably as a result of stocking. The main causes were a reduction in stocks 
of non-stocked species, increased controls on fishermen by officials and landowners and 
an increase in the number of landowners' kuas (trap-ponds). In one water-body, kuas took 
90% of the catch of stocked species. The DOF's official line, however, is that, "The 
NFMP is taking care of equity aspects" (Director TFP, pers. comm.), meaning that the 
moribund NFMP will transfer profits from lessees to fishermen.
Despite open-water stocking's poor performance, there is pressure for it to continue. First, 
many fisheries experts in donor agencies, being fisheries biologists by training, remain 
impressed by the rate of biomass growth on offer. Secondly, it is an open secret that 
senior officials in the Department of Fisheries have made personal profits from the 
procurement of fry.
Flood control and drainage
Flood control and drainage (FCD) schemes have long been an integral feature of the 
Bangladeshi landscape. The official arguments for such schemes are two-fold. There is 
the economic argument, as in the case of USAID's Coastal Embankments Project, that 
they increase rice production by converting floodplain into irrigated paddy land.
Secondly, there is the humanitarian argument, that they prevent death and damage to 
property from flooding. Until the late 1980s there was little interest in the effects of flood 
control upon freshwater fisheries.
Then, in 1988, a heavy monsoon produced an abnormally high flood. Whilst its economic 
impact is still under debate, donor organisations adopted a plan in 1988 itself to prevent 
its recurrence by canalising rivers and empoldering floodplains. The resulting vast
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programme, known as the Flood Action Plan, is split into more than 20 component 
projects. Most are funded by bilateral agreements with foreign governments. FAP 17, the 
fisheries component, has set itself the task of estimating ex-ante the effects of flood 
control and drainage works upon the fisheries sector. A team of biologists is collecting 
length-frequency data and studying fish life-cycles in order to assess how flood control 
will affect fish recruitment. A socio-economic research programme intends to describe 
the effects of flood control by comparing conditions inside and outside existing polders. 
However, the FAP has been phased in such a way that much engineering work will 
already have been planned by the time that FAP 17 and other appraisal components 
produce their recommendations.
NGO group-formation
Starting with relief operations in the post-liberation period after 1971, NGOs, or private 
development organisations, have become a distinctive part of the aid sector in 
Bangladesh. Supporters of NGOs argue that, by working directly with the rural poor, they 
avoid having their assistance appropriated by patronage networks, which is the fate of 
official aid. Others (e.g. Kramsyo and Wood 1991), more radically, see in NGOs a force 
that could lay the foundations for social revolution by weaning the rural poor away from 
the patronage networks and instilling class-consciousness into the rural proletariat, 
making a "class for itself'. The NGOs' coverage, however, is limited by their recurrent 
costs and flexible bureaucratic style. Maloney (1986) notes that they reach less than 2% 
of the population and doubts their capacity for rapid expansion.
A recent survey (FAP 17 1993) found that 100% of NGOs working in Bangladesh were 
involved with the fisheries sector. Their involvement in capture fisheries, however, is 
recent and restricted; 57% of NGOs have no involvement in capture fisheries at all. 
BRAC, Bangladesh's largest NGO, only has 4% of its fisheries Area Officers working in 
capture fisheries (Choudhury 1993 pp. 6,7).
The NGOs' standard mode of intervention, whatever the sector, is first to form "target 
groups" of poor people, next to encourage them to create a development plan and a group 
savings fund and then to provide the credit, training and political support to put the plan 
into action. Choudhury (1993), Rahman (1993), and FIVDB (1993) describe how this 
approach has been transferred to the capture fisheries sector. Capture fisheries target 
group development plans tend to focus on gear purchase, lease acquisition and the 
development of non-fishing activities, predominantly aquaculture.
When choosing how to use their access to NGO credit, capture fishermen groups show an 
overwhelming preference for gear purchase. For example, Proshika, one of Bangladesh’s
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largest NGOs, manages a Revolving Loan Fund for target groups; 72% of its capture 
fisheries disbursements were for boat, engine and net purchase (Rahman 1993, p. 10).
A special case of NGO involvement in capture fisheries is the Beels and Baors project, 
implemented by BRAC with funding from IFAD and DANIDA. Under this project BRAC 
organises target groups in the standard manner but with the specific aim of managing a 
NFMP baor (ox-bow lake). The group uses a BRAC credit line to acquire fishing licenses 
for the baor, to stock it with major carps and to fish it.
Fishermen have received net incomes of around Tkl 5,000 per head per year when the 
scheme has operated as planned. Encouraged by the project’s success, BRAC is 
expanding its coverage, assisting other groups to acquire leases for non-NFMP baors.
Policy-oriented research needs
Policy-makers in the Government of Bangladesh and donor organisations are therefore 
committed to adjusting fishing activity by means of eumetric controls, gear restrictions, a 
transfer from leasing to licensing, artificial stocking, flood control and credit promotion. 
A review of past research (and the "grey" literature), however, reveals a lack of 
information upon the relationship between fishing activity and economic welfare. In an 
unequal society this relationship is two-sided, as a household's economic status 
determines which fishing activities it can practice and a household's fishing activities 
generate the income that determines its economic status. In order to predict the likely 
effects of these policy instruments, therefore, it is necessary to know the transmission 
mechanisms, that is how economic status determines fishing activities on the one hand 
and how fishing activities sustain economic status on the other.
Figure 2.1 illustrates this analytical framework. Economic status determines access to the 
fishery and use of fishing technology. Fishing technology in turn generates the income 
that determines economic status. Policy-makers who adjust the conditions of access and 
the range of available technologies (the Policy Domain on the left-hand side of the 
diagram) need to predict how they will affect households' economic status (on the right- 
hand side).
Figure 2.1. The determination o f  fishing incomes
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Referring specifically to current fisheries policy, a policy-oriented micro-economic study 
of inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh could answer the following questions:
a) What are the effects o f effort management upon incomes, employment and the 
distribution o f income?
b) Licensing is intended to transfer fishing rents from the lessee to the fisherman. 
Does this occur? Is the lessee's current share high enough to justify the programme 
administrative costs?
c) To what extent does leasing encourage or prevent over-fishing?
d) What are the effects o f artificial stocking upon incomes, employment and the 
distribution o f income?
e) If flood control embankments reduce the area o f the floodplain, how will this 
affect fishing income and employment?
f) What role could NGOs' Target Group approach play in fishery development?
g) Lastly, procedures for the assessment of marine fisheries are already well- 
established. But what research procedures are appropriate for a policy-oriented 
assessment o f an inland open-water fishery in Bangladesh?
This study aims to investigate and answer the policy questions above. Various qualitative 
and quantitative methods will be used to examine the linkages between fishery and 
household. It will then explore how the household might be affected when the 
instruments of fisheries management are applied and thus evaluate the efficacy of current 
fisheries policy. The study's theme and principal conclusion will be that government 
policy increases fishery rents at the expense o f fishing labour's welfare.
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Chapter 3
Fisheries management: a review of the social sciences' contribution.
This review has two goals. It attempts to summarise as briefly as possible the social 
sciences' insights upon fisheries management and then to assess the extent to which they 
illuminate the decisions faced by the managers of freshwater fisheries in a country like 
Bangladesh. Of course, every detail of fisheries management theory cannot be described 
within a single chapter. It is possible, however, to identify which broad approaches to the 
question of fisheries management have been addressed and which have not. Indeed, it is 
the central theme of this review that the social sciences have picked over one issue in 
minute detail whilst leaving another equally important theme almost untouched.
For ease of exposition, the literature has been grouped into two broad schools. The first, 
the economic modelling approach to fisheries management, attempts to use neo-classical 
micro-economics to identify the optimum pattern of fishing effort for fisheries managers 
to enforce by regulation. The second school, the Community Resource Management 
approach to fisheries management, aims to build upon the observation that local 
communities can manage renewable resources effectively themselves.
The core argument of this review chapter is that neither of these two approaches 
addresses the problem of how fisheries management can alleviate or aggravate poverty - 
which is the key problem of fisheries management in Bangladesh. The economic 
modelling approach and the Community Resource Management approach both 
concentrate upon the issue of increasing economic efficiency in the fishery by controlling 
levels of fishing effort. This goal of economic efficiency is certainly related to the goal of 
poverty-reduction but, as this thesis will eventually show, it requires a completely 
different approach to fishery analysis and policy-formatioa
The economic modelling approach to fisheries management
In the 1950s, Gordon (1954) and Schaefer (1957) established an enduring paradigm for 
the economic study of fisheries. In their analysis, rent-maximisation was the objective 
and rent-dissipation, produced by unrestricted effort, was the problem. This analytical 
framework was refined by later writers, but has never been discarded and is probably still 
what most people understand by the phrase "fisheries economics." Models of the 60s, 70s 
and 80s added price effects, labour scarcity, discounting, lags, stochasticity and 
computerised algorithms, but did so largely in order better to identify the same two 
points, rent-dissipation under open-access and rent-maximisation under regulatory
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control. If models of the fishery have been restricted to descriptions of fishing effort, it is 
unsurprising that models of fisheries management have concentrated upon analyses of 
effort reduction. Similarly, empirical economic studies of the fishery have attempted to 
identify the shortfall of observed rents below potential rents.
Within this framework, the fishery economist's task is twofold:
i) Diagnosis, the identification of the potential economic gain from effort management 
and
ii) Optimisation, ensuring the pattern of effort required to maximise rents.
We will start by looking at the economic theory of these two operations.
Diagnosis - identifying the potential gain from management
The application of neo-classical economic theory to fishing, and with it the emergence of 
the discipline of fisheries economics, began with H. Gordon (Gordon 1954). His intention 
was to derive a theory of economic behaviour "applicable generally to all cases where 
natural resources are owned in common and exploited under conditions of individualistic 
competition" (p. 124). He complained that the debate about the advisability of fishing 
controls had hitherto been conducted entirely in biological terms without any reference to 
human values or human behaviour and argued that one should therefore identify the 
economic gains to society from management and then work out the interventions most 
likely to produce them.
Gordon's bio-economic model of the fishery is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The cost of 
fishing (MC=AC) is a constant multiple of the amount of fishing effort. Revenue from 
fishing, however, is a positive function of fishing effort with a negative second derivative. 
The revenue curve possesses this property because of a biological limit upon total yield. 
The optimum level of effort from the point of view of allocative efficiency is represented 
by x, where marginal value product (MVP) is equal to marginal cost and resource rents 
(total revenue less total cost) are at a maximum.
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Under open access, however, positive factor rents are unsustainable. The existence of 
factor rents will induce fisherfolk to increase the level o f  effort applied to the fishery, and 
this increase will continue until y is reached, where all rents are dissipated as costs. This 
state o f affairs is frequently referred to as "The Tragedy of the Commons", a phrase first 
used in Hardin's (1968) lecture on population growth. Gordon concludes that the only 
fisherman who becomes rich is one who makes a lucky catch or one who participates in a 
fishery that is put under a form of social control that creates restricted property rights.
Schaefer (1957) also analysed fisheries exploitation under open access, but did so on the 
basis o f a more realistic depiction offish ecology. He notes Ricardo's reference to rents 
generated by the "original and indestructible powers of the soil" and remarks that the 
reproductive powers o f fish, by contrast, are highly destructible. More specifically, the 
growth of a fish population is a function of the current fish population. When the 
population is extremely low, population growth is zero or negative, owing to scarce 
spawning capacity and the difficulty o f finding mates. When fish population approaches a 
certain level, population growth is also low, owing to a lack of supplementary food and 
habitats. Beyond this ecologically-determined maximum, population growth is negative. 
For population levels between zero and the ecologically-determined maximum 
population, however, there is a positive natural rate o f population growth.
Schaefer derived the following model o f natural fish population growth from 
experimental fisheries data:
f(P) = k jP  (M - P)
where:
P is the fish population 
f(P) is fish population growth
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M is the zero-growth fish population 
kj is a constant.
and
L = k2EP 
where:
L is landings 
E is fishing effort
k2 is a constant, the "catchability coefficient."
In equilibrium, the fish population is neither growing nor decreasing. In other words, 
landings are equal to population growth:
L = f(P)
By substituting for P into the first equation, one obtains equilibrium landings as a 
quadratic function of effort. This model agrees with Gordon’s description of the fishery, 
but not with his diagrams, where the total product curve is always upward-sloping.
L = k2E (M -k2E /k 1)
So long as the demand for fish is elastic, total revenue is always a positive function of 
landings. It is therefore maximised at the level of effort that maximises total landings. If 
not, there is a possibility that total revenue will exhibit two maxima with respect to effort. 
Usually, however, one biological stock is a small portion of the total market supply, so 
one is justified in assuming demand for the stock to be elastic.
The resulting bio-economic model is specified as follows:




a  is equivalent to k22/kj
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b is equivalent to M(Kj/K2). It is the level of effort 
that reduces population growth to zero.
B is the price of fish 
y is a constant representing marginal cost
Further useful expressions may be derived by combining the basic equations:
Catch per unit effort (average product) = a(b - E)
Value per unit effort (average value product) = Ba(b - E)
Marginal value product = bBa - 2BaE
From this point Schaefer's argument corresponds exactly to Gordon's; an allocative 
optimum exists where marginal value product equals marginal cost, but the open access 
equilibrium exists where average value product equals marginal cost. He noted that the 
privatisation of fisheries may lead to an allocative optimum, since a private owner would 
attempt to maximise resource rents.
Bell's (1972) model of the U.S. northern lobster fishery is frequently cited as evidence 
that Schaefer's surplus production model can be applied in practice. Bell calculated that a 
50% reduction in lobster-pot days would equalise marginal costs with marginal revenues 
and that this would raise CPUE by 2.4kg/lobster-pot and concluded "the only solution to 
the market failure is government intervention" (p. 157). Conrad (1989) attempted a similar 
exercise for the bowhead whale, but without the benefit of empirical catch-effort data. 
Conrad concluded that the current catch quota for bowhead whales was well below the 
maximum sustainable yield and therefore too low.
Copes (1970) relaxed Schaefer's assumption of perfect demand elasticity to show that the 
supply curve for fish from a specific fishery would be backward-bending for a certain 
range of price levels. His derived cost function is illustrated in Figure 3.2. A certain level 
of effort (a) generates both a certain cost (b) and a certain yield (c). If the marginal cost 
of effort does not decrease with respect to effort and the catch/effort function is the 
inverted-U described by Schaefer, then the yield/total cost function will bend back, giving 
two values of total cost for some levels of total yield. Copes then goes on to adopt 
Gordon's statement that under open access effort will be increased until total cost is equal 
to total revenue, which is also when average cost is equal to price. Referring back to the 
north-east quadrant of Figure 3.2 one can see that the quantity supplied will first increase 
and then decrease with respect to average cost, which is indicated by the gradient of a ray 
from the origin to the curve. Under open access average cost is equal to price, so supply 
will first increase and then decrease with respect to price. This gives rise to the possibility 
of a spiralling destabilisation of the market for fish. If the market is on the backward-
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bending portion of the supply cun/e, an exogenous shock in the form of a rise in demand 
or a fall in the fishery's productivity can create an unstable disequilibrium: demand is 
greater than supply, leading to a rise in price. The rise in price induces fisherfolk to apply 
more effort to the fishery. The increased effort reduces the productive capacity of the
fishery, leading to a further fall in supply, a further rise in price and so on. Copes
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rents in a single time-period in which the fishery is in equilibrium. Clark and Munro, 
however sought to define the management rule which would maximise the present 
discounted value of the stream of fishery rents from the present onwards.
T U p  f U f i  m h i  i + i t r a U f  n f t r n  n t i x  r o  o v r v r a r o i  ■
l i l t '  d i i iV c u  u t  u iv  l i i i u i u  a t u u v u v v  v A p i^ o o iu n .
dr = a [p-c(x)] (Clark 1976, p.42) 
dx
where:r is equilibrium, long-term fishery rents 
d is the discount rate
P ic thp nnpp nf fioVi A o vi.lv/ p i  1VV \ / l  i io i i
c(x) is the cost of catching fish with fish population x 
x is the fish population
This expression says that the fisheries manager can maximise rents by running down the 
fish stock until the incremental annuity from investing the proceeds of one more fish 
(right-hand side) would be cancelled out by the stock-depletion effect upon profits (left- 
hand side). If the discount rate is infinite, then the open-access solution of zero rents is 
optimal. If the discount rate is zero, then it is optimal to maximise recurrent annual 
profits. The real life optimum, Clark (1976) argues, lies between these two extremes.
Copes (1972) identifies another divergence between Gordon's (1954) rent-maximising 
solution and the social optimum. He states Gordon's position as being that a private 
owner would maximise social welfare at the same time as private profits, by equalising 
marginal private income and marginal private costs. Copes' disagreement is that a number 
of divergences between social and private costs and benefits arc likely to exist. If the 
fisheries owner is a monopolist, his marginal benefits are given by the marginal revenue 
function, whereas social benefits are related to output by the average revenue function, or 
demand curve. If fishermen command quasi-rents because of the scarcity of their skills,
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then the private marginal cost of employing fishermen is higher than the social 
opportunity cost of taking them out of alternative employment. Copes concludes that a 
privately-owned fishery will tend to be under-exploited.
Although Schaefer's stock recruitment model has dominated theoretical economic 
analyses of fisheries management, it is necessary to describe an alternative model, the 
"yield per recruit model" (Beverton and Holt (1957), Tyler and Gallucci 1980). Although 
it is mathematically more complex than the Schaefer model, it is based upon observable 
biological parameters such as natural mortality and growth rates, and modem 
microcomputer technology permits it to be used for rapid fishery simulations.
The number of hatchlings, or recruits, to the fishery in question is determined outside the 
model by environmental factors such as water temperature and currents. It is not 
dependent upon the existing fish population as in Schaefer's model.
The model starts with the Von Bertalanffy Growth Formula for fishes:
L, = Loo (l-e’Vt-t*))
where:
Lt is fish length at age t.
Loo is the putative maximum length that the fish would attain if  it lived for ever, 
t is the fish’s actual age.
k is a constant
t* is a putative "age at birth".
This expression may be simplified to:
Lt -L ® (l-e‘kt)
In words, the fish is approaching its maximum length asymptotically. The fish's weight is 
a simple cubic function of its length.
wt = wL3
where:
Wt is fish weight at age t. 
w is the "weight for age" constant.
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In words, the fish is the same shape irrespective of its size.
The Baranov catch function describes a fish population that is being thinned out 
simultaneously by fishing and by natural mortality. The total mortality rate is given by:
Z = ( I -  e'(F iM ))
where:
Z is the instantaneous total mortality rate 
F is the instantaneous fishing mortality rate 
M is the instantaneous natural mortality rate
The instantaneous rate of fishing mortality is itself a function of fishing effort:
F = 1 - e 'f  
where:
f  is the level of fishing effort
Since total mortality is the product of the total mortality rate and fish population, and 
catch is fishing mortality's share of total mortality:
C = F (1 -e (F+M))N
F+M
where:
is me Caum 
N is the fish population
The model may now be made operational by simulating the yield of an age cohort across 
its multi-period lifespan with fish size, total mortality rate and catch in each time-period 
determined by the equations above. It is usual for this to be done by means of micro­
computers (Pauly 1980). Economists such as Lipton and Strand (1992) and Onal, McCarl, 
Griffin, Matlock and Clark (1991) use the yield=per=recruit outputs to identify the 
Gordon/Schaefer divergence between the rent-dissipating and rent-maximising loci.
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Flaaten (1983) presents a variation upon the yield per recruit model that is of particular 
relevance to Bangladesh's inland open-water fisheries since it describes a fishery with 
seasonal growth but no linkages between consecutive seasons. The fishery's rate of 
biomass growth is a function of time. Under open access, there is no fishing until biomass 
reaches the level at which average revenue reaches average cost. Any tendency for 
biomass to rise above this level thereafter is immediately countered by an increase in 
effort. Under optimal management, the manager will only exploit the fish stock when it 
no longer generates a rate of growth superior to the discount rate. The onset of fishing 
therefore occurs later and the fishing season is shorter and more intense than under open 
access.
Allen and McGlade (1987), Beddington and May (1977)and May, Beddington, Clark,
Holt and Laws (1979) introduce lags, stochasticity and predator-prey relationships to 
show the importance of dis-equilibrium analysis. Schaeferian equilibrium oniy exists 
when the biomass growth curve has been unaffected by ecological or economic variation 
throughout the lifespan of the fish, which is normally 8 to 12 years in temperate maritime 
fisheries. This is effectively impossible. On the economic side, fisherfolk base their 
actions, not only upon current profits, but upon the expected actions of other fisherfolk.
Allen and McGlade (1987) produced a stochastic simulation of the Newfoundland 
haddock fishery. Without any ecological variation, it took their model around 40 years to 
settle upon a bio-economic equilibrium "for all reasonable parameter values." When 
ecological variation was represented by variation in fish reproduction, it was found to be 
amplified by the lagged effort adjustments of fisherfolk. The fishery no longer tended 
towards equilibrium, but flip-flopped between levels of high and low catch. The writers 
concluded that bio-economic equilibrium is a worthless concept which should be 
abandoned in favour of computerised simulations.
Beddington and May (1977) explore the inter-action between ecological variability and 
management. If biomass growth is an inverted-U function of population plus a noise term 
and an increase in effort leads to a fall in population, then the variability of biomass will 
increase with the level of effort. Higher levels of effort are also associated with lower 
rates of biomass growth and therefore with longer recovery periods after a stochastic fall 
in biomass. If quotas exist a second "amplifier" is built into the system, since fisherfolk 
will respond to a stochastic fall in biomass by increasing the level of effort. The authors 
conclude that maximum sustainable yield quotas are not tight enough to prevent a 
collapse of fish stocks due to overfishing.
May, Beddington, Clark, Holt and Laws (1979) consider the predator-prey relationship 
within a fish population. If species A predates on species B, fishing for B will reduce
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yields of A for any level of effort. Fishing for A will increase yields of A and of B up to a 
certain point, after which it will reduce yields of A and still increase yields of B. When 
political and economic considerations are admitted "the consequences and management 
implications defy crisp summary" (p.275).
Welcomme (1985, pp.212-227) argues from multi-country empirical data that freshwater 
multi-species fisheries are relatively immune from over-fishing. As effort increases, large, 
valuable species are fished out and their ecological niche is taken by "r-selected" species. 
These tend to be small, with high fecundity, high productivity and a short life-span. 
Therefore, although a single species may collapse as effort rises, the fishery as a whole 
will produce similar yields for a high range of effort levels. This is most likely to be true 
for fisheries (such as a Bangladeshi floodplain) where large nutrients are abundant at 
lower trophic levels. Welcomme's ecological hypothesis provides an important challenge 
to fisheries policy; if total output is invariant with respect to effort then the accent of 
fisheries policy can be shifted away from yield-optimising effort management towards the 
redistribution of the benefits from a fixed yield.
The aforementioned models are based upon stock externalities, the negative effect of one 
fisher's effort upon another fisher's catch via a reduction in fish stocks. One should note, 
however, the existence of crowding externalities, whereby one fisher’s effort interferes 
physically with another fisher's gear. Examples of crowding externalities would be the 
tangling of nets, the frightening of fish or congestion in fishing ports. Crowding 
externalities are likeliest to be of importance in fisheries, such as Bangladesh's inland 
waters, with a high density of fishers per square kilometre. The effect of crowding 
externalities is to create an upward-sloping marginal cost of effort curve for the fishery 
as a whole; one extra unit of effort creates ever increasing interference costs for all gear- 
users.
Optimisation: ensuring the pattern o f effort required to maximise rents.
The theories of the fishery above described the gains to be obtained from managing 
fishing effort. Whether surplus production or yield per recruit models, they posited the 
existence of a stable or fluctuating inverted-U relationship between effort and catch.
Given a positive relationship between effort and costs, there is a divergence between the 
open-access result, to which fisherfolk are supposed to tend, and the optimum, to which 
the manager is supposed to wish to return them. All implicitly assume the fisheries 
manager to be able to control the level of fishing effort. This effort control is analysed by 
another body of theory.
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Hartwick and Olewiler (1986) set privatisation aside as impractical for most fisheries and 
review the remaining range of management instruments available. They list unallocated 
quotas, allocated quotas, catch taxes, effort taxes and co-operatives. Under an unallocated 
quota regime, the authority monitors total landings and declares the fishing season closed 
when they reach the pre-set quota. Under an allocated quota regime each fishing unit, 
usually a boat, is given the right to catch a certain amount. This quota is usually tradable. 
Under a co-operative regime, a fisherfolk's association determines the level of effort to be 
applied.
Hartwick and Olewiler’s (1986) Schaeferian exposition of catch taxation is presented in 
Figure 3.3. The open-access equilibrium without taxation is defined by the intersection of 
the total cost (TC) and gross total revenue (TR) curves at a level of effort AA. This 
outcome produces zero rents. The manager, however, knows that rents could be 
maximised at a level of effort BB, where the TC and TR (gross) curves are parallel. The 
manager therefore imposes a tax on fish sales, depressing the total revenue curve to TR 
(net). Fisherfolk are driven to reduce the level of effort from AA to BB. It should be 
noted, however, that the fisherfolk are no better off. Their total revenue is still equal to 
their total costs. The government is the beneficiary.
A Schaeferian model of effort taxation is presented in Figure 3.4. Before the tax, 
fisherfolk expand effort until total costs (TC) are equal to total revenue (TR) at aa. This 
outcome produces zero rents. The manager knows, however, that rents could be 
maximised at a level of effort bb, where the TC and TR (gross) curves are parallel. The 
manager therefore taxes fishing effort, raising the TC curve. Fisherfolk are driven to 
reduce the level of effort from aa to bb. Once again, however, the open-access regime 
denies fisherfolk the newly-created rents.
Panayotou (1982) argues that unallocated quotas are invariably worthless. Under open 
access, fisherfolk will always apply inputs until rents are exhausted. This remains true 
when a global quota exists. In effect, fisherfolk, knowing that time is restricted, will 
substitute other inputs for time until total cost equals total revenue. This argument is 
repeated by Hartwick and Olewiler (1986).
Karpoff (1989) analyses the economics of an allocated quota regime. He describes fishing 
licenses as an option. They permit, but do not oblige the holder to fish, so their value is 
always positive. If one knew the mean and pattern of variation of fishing profits one 
could estimate the present value of the permit. He evaluates a permit's expected net 
present value at the time of allocation as:
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t=t* 
V = E 
t=0
[
{EflR^RjX)} x P(Rt>0) 
 ]
( l + r )>t
Where:
V is the value of the permit 
t is time
t* is the time of expiry of the permit
E is the expectations operator
Rt is fishing profits for one licence-holder
P is the probability operator
r is the rate of discount
One could moreover derive from this analysis the observation that, if fishing permits are 
being traded in a perfect market, where the price is equal to V, all the expected benefits 
of the permit system will accrue to the original holder. Subsequent holders will pay V for 
an income stream with net present value V and thus earn no fishing rents.
Panayotou (1982) notes that governments have frequently attempted to raise fisherfolk's 
incomes by following the opposite course, subsidising fish prices and effort. He argues 
that such policies are counter-productive. Under open-access fisherfolk will simply 
expand effort until private profits are exhausted. Moreover, he could have added, total 
social costs are now higher than total social benefits, making the fishery of negative value 
to the economy as a whole.
Pessimistic reviews of the effectiveness of effort controls have been written by Scott 
(1979), Wilen (1979) and Panayotou (1982). All three writers argue that effort control is 
ineffective because fisherfolk react to the control of one element of effort, for example 
boats, by increasing another, for example time, to produce again a rent-negating level of 
effort. Meary (1979) observed this process in the W. Australian crustacean fisheries. Scott 
(1979) draws upon the North American experience to argue that exclusion clauses 
concentrate fishing revenues within a smaller population without altering the degree of 
overfishing. Rather than effort controls, Scott (1979) recommends "eumetric" controls, 
regulating mesh size and setting aside closed seasons and areas for breeding. However, 
both Wilen (1979) and Panayotou (1982) doubt that government regulation can ever raise 
fisherfolk's incomes. Wilen puts this down to it being the nature of fisherfolk to exhibit 
"share-focused behaviour", seeking to improve individual, rather than group, incomes. 
Panayotou (1982) recommends that governments wishing to aid fisherfolk should 
promote non-fishing employment in fishing communities.
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Campbell and Lindner (1990) show, however, that Scott, Wilen and Panayotou's assertion 
that effort regulation will always be ineffective is an over-simplification. Figure 3.5 
illustrates their model of effort control. The graph plots revenue and costs against effort. 
The initial marginal cost of effort is represented by the line MCE1. Fisherfolk have 
unrestricted access to the most efficient factor combination so marginal cost does not rise 
with effort; it is always equal to average cost. Under open access, fisherfolk adjust the 
level of effort until marginal cost (MCE1) is equal to the average revenue product of 
effort (ARE). When effort applied is at a, they have no further incentive to adjust. At this 
point the fishery is generating zero rents; the dead-weight loss from over-fishing is 
represented by the triangle avz. The fisheries manager then attempts to increase rents by 
restricting the use of one input, for example time. Fisherfolk substitute other inputs for 
the restricted input, and an upward-sloping marginal cost of effort curve (MCE2) is 
generated beyond the point where substitution becomes necessary (v). Fisherfolk 
approach a new equilibrium level of effort (c) where the new marginal cost of effort 
(MCE2) is equal to the average revenue product of effort (ARE). This adjustment reduces 
the dead-weight losses from overfishing (by axyz) but a new dead-weight loss is created 
by the use of inefficient fishing technology (vwy). The authors conclude that effort 
restrictions are likely to prove most beneficial if there is inelastic substitution for the 
restricted factor; under these circumstances effort will be greatly reduced and only a 
small amount of inefficiently-composed effort will be applied to the fishery.
Weitzman (1974) questions the supposed welfare benefits from controlling effort, noting 
that labour, as a variable factor of production, will always be better off under open access 
than under a controlled regime. He proves this by assuming rising marginal labour costs 
and falling marginal returns to labour:
d2C






C is total cost
x is employment of the variable factor (labour)
R is total revenue
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These two relationships logically imply that for any potentially profitable fishery (where 
R can be higher than C) rents (R-C) are maximised by a level of x lower than that 
employed under open access (C=R). Although apparently trivial, this result should make 
one question the Common Property School's assertion (see below) that community 
management will tend to be equitable as well as efficient. It confirms Charles' (1988) 
observation that models of fisheries management need to be multi-dimensional; they 
should predict the effects of intervention upon output and employment because fisheries 
managers are responsible for both.
Johnson and Libecap (1982) note that fishermen are the first io oppose the effort 
restrictions that economic theory since Gordon (1954) has stated to be in their interest. 
They then ask why effort restrictions arc so resented. They find the answer m the 
heterogeneity of fisherfolk. Figure 3.6 illustrates their analysis. (Their article uses other 
more complex diagrams to make the same point.) The horizontal axis shows effort per 
fishing unit, assuming with Johnson and Libecap no variation in the number of fishing 
units. The curves TCI and TC2 represent the total costs of efficient and inefficient 
fishermen respectively. If the fishery were composed entirely of efficient fisherfolk, the 
rent-maximising level of effort would be b, where a line parallel to TCI (Tl) can be 
tangential to the total revenue curve (TR). Similarly, if the fishery were composed 
entirely of inefficient fishermen the rent maximising level of effort would be a, where T2 
is tangential to TR. If the manager chooses a compromise level of effort, however (c). the 
efficient fisherfolk will consider it excessive and the inefficient fisherfolk will consider it 
too lax - the restriction will be opposed and possibly collapse. Johnson and Libecap 
conclude that the only solution is to apply differential quotas, which are difficult to 
elaborate and politically unacceptable. They concede that self-regulation is superior to 
regulation by government, but only because fishermen "will internalise the cost of 
regulation"; in other words, they will choose a low-cost administrative regime because 
they are paying for it themselves.
Anthropologists Emmerson (1976) and Acheson (1981) echo Johnson and Libecap's 
pessimism. Fisheries management, Acheson argues, always produces disputes because it 
always produces losers as well as winners. Emmerson concludes from a study of a 
management dispute in Indonesia that any redistribution of benefits is likely to offend 
local people's attachment to the status quo.
Adasiak (1979) provides a detailed account of the performance of effort control through 
licensing in Alaska. In brief, although effort controls by no means created an efficient 
fishery, they achieved their political objective, which was to preserve the identity of 
traditional fishing communities. Gear-specific permits, substitution away from boats
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towards fishing time, substitution away from limited towards unlimited fisheries and a 
possible bias in license allocation towards older fishermen may all have allowed Alaskan 
fisheries to be technically inefficient, but the programme was adjudged a success 
inasmuch as it prevented social disruption. Adasiak notes, however, that the licensing 
scheme was seen by many to be unjust, creating a "rich man's club."
Studies of community resource management.*
Gordon's (1954) analysis of over-fishing assumed that fisherfolk did not co-operate when 
determining the level of effort to be applied to the fishery. Their individual profit- 
maximising decisions led to the total dissipation of fishing rents. As preceding sections of 
this review have shown, fisheries economics literature tends to analyse the divergence 
between this open-access equilibrium and a putative societal optimum; fisheries 
management economics literature tends similarly to analyse how regulation could shift 
the fishery from the former state to the latter.
However, a number of writers have challenged the assumption that the only alternatives 
to rent-dissipating open access are private ownership and regulation. They have argued 
that a fourth option is logically conceivable, theoretically predictable and empirically 
observable. This fourth option is variously referred to as "self-regulation", "common 
property" or "community resource management". All these terms refer to a situation in 
which those who exploit the natural resource manage it collectively without government 
regulation. It should be noted that this debate uses the terminology of environmental 
management to restate an ancient concern of political philosophy, the question of whether 
coercion is required to establish social harmony, with Plato's Republic and Hooker's Laws 
of Ecclesiastical Polity having posited the same enlightened co-operation as a possible 
solution. The Common Property School's case may be broken down into the following 
arguments:
a) The empirical argument that local communities are observed to manage renewable 
resources effectively
b) The cultural ecology argument, that societies must manage renewable resources 
effectively or become extinct
c) The populist argument, that it is right for local people to manage resources themselves
d) The micro-economic argument, that co-operation can be the outcome of rational, 
egoistic decision-making
* A note on terminology: The phrase "common property" tends to mean "not private property" when used by 
economists and "communally-managed property" when used by social anthropologists. This review therefore 
uses the terms "open access" and "community resource management" to avoid confusion .
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e) The institutional argument, that Community Resource Management is admi ni stratively 
efficient
These will be described in turn below.
a) The empirical argument
Several writings (Berkes, Feeny, McCay and Acheson 1989, Feeny, Berkes, McCay and 
Acheson 1990, Gibbs and Bromley 1989, Grima and Berkes 1989, McGranahan 1991, 
Ostrom 1987) present an identical line of argument. They start by considering the over­
exploitation of resources under open-access known, since Hardin's (1968) lecture on 
population growth, as "The Tragedy of the Commons". They then state that government 
regulation and private property are not the only alternatives to open-access, common 
property being a fourth possibility. They go on to describe observed examples of common 
property management systems (see below) and suggest that they are both more efficient 
than regulation or open access and more equitable than private property. They do not, 
however, offer hypotheses as to why human decision-makers might not act in the 
individualistic manner described by Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968). Neither do they 
substantiate the pleasingly optimistic notion that local communities create equitable 
outcomes.
h) The cultural ecology argument
Norgaard (1984) provides a concise exposition of a "cultural ecology" explanation of the 
efficiency of community resource management; societies evolve to manage their 
environment in a sustainable manner. Those that do, survive. Those that do not, die out: 
"...information with considerable survival value becomes incorporated in culture as 
traditional knowledge in ways which individuals do not understand or even perceive." 
(Norgaard 1984 p.875). Since this hypothesis proposes that local people are successful 
environmental managers, it follows that the strengthening of "community management" 
systems would constitute a promising fisheries management policy. One weakness of the 
"cultural ecology" hypothesis, however, is that it does not explain how individuals are 
motivated to act in the interests of "society". Another is that it cannot be applied to 
communities whose natural or socio-economic environment has recentl y changed, i.e. to 
most societies of the late twentieth century.
Buck (1989), however, describes culture as an exogenous variable. In this analysis 
"organisation" and "view of nature" are the aspects of culture of relevance to 
environmental management. A society's level of "organisation" is in turn defined in terms 
of the degree of group cohesion and the complexity of its cultural prescriptions. For 
"community resource management" to be feasible a society must have a high degree of
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group cohesion and an understanding of nature's limits. Buck therefore concludes that an 
enquiry into the likelihood of successful "community resource management" should 
begin, not with an enquiry into incentive patterns, but with ethnographic studies.
c) The populist argument
Rather than restricting the case for "community resource management" to the quality of 
the community's management systems, Redclift (1992) asks bluntly for whose benefit 
natural resources should be managed. He states that they should be managed for the 
benefit of local people and that local people should manage the resources themselves 
because they are more likely than outsiders to attend to their own needs. Redclift's 
approach differs from that of other Common Property School writers in that it stresses 
that some people, in this case outsider capitalists, will lose from "community resource 
management."
d) The micro-economic argument
None of the theories above explain how egoistic individuals might be motivated to co­
operate. Another body of writing uses micro-economic theory to show how the egoistic 
decision-making of rational individuals could produce a degree of collective action.
Olson (1965) applied the analytic tool of Nash-Coumot equilibrium to demonstrate that 
egoists would contribute to collective action because they received a share of the 
resultant marginal benefits. The larger the group, the smaller any one individual's share of 
the marginal benefit from collective action and therefore the greater the tendency to 
under-cooperation. Sandler (1992) expanded Olson's basic model to allow for a wider 
range of scenarios. He separates the agent's utility function from the technology of public 
supply, by which resources are transformed into public goods, allowing both to vaiy and 
uses leader-follower (Stackelberg) equilibria as well as Nash-Coumot equilibria. In 
Chapters 3 and 7 he applies the resulting models to a range of real-life problems. One of 
these is the case of open-access fishing, which is represented by the basic Olson/Cournot 
model. Fishers over-exploit fish stocks because they only receive a share of the marginal 
benefit of stinting. The exception is where there is only one resource-user, the case of 
private ownership, where the marginal benefit of stinting is fully internalised and 
therefore provides an allocatively efficient incentive. Sandler analyses two second-best 
cases, where oligopoly or risk-aversion could lead to under-fishing and the open-access 
fishery's tendency to over-fishing exerts an allocatively efficient corrective influence. The 
significance of these theories is that they show limited collective action to be a possible 
outcome of uncooperative selfishness. Unfortunately, however, this result only applies to 
resources with a quite small number of users.
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A parallel strand of literature has used game theory to show how cooperative develops 
out of egotism. Sen (1967) distinguishes between two types of game, the "isolation game" 
and the "assurance game". In the isolation game, an individual is always better off if he 
pursues an unco-operative strategy. The "Prisoners' Dilemma", "The Tragedy of the 
Commons" and Gordon's (1954) model of overfishing are examples of unsatisfactory 
outcomes produced when egotists play this type of game. In the assurance game, an 
individual is better off co-operating so long as at least a certain number (critical mass) of 
other players do likewise. For an individual egoist to co-operate he only needs to be 
assured that others will do likewise. Runge (1986) applies this distinction to natural 
resource management, arguing that communities often create resource management rules 
to transform the pattern of incentives from an isolation game into an assurance game. 
Runge again makes the romantic assertion that local communities will manage resources 
equitably. Axelrod (1981) used computer simulations of a Prisoners' Dilemma to explore 
the survival rates of different strategies in competition. An ALWAYS DEFECT society 
resisted invasion by a TIT-FOR-TAT ("do unto others as they did to you last time") 
individual, but succumbed to a group of them. In other words, a critical mass of TIT- 
FOR-TAT created an incentive structure that turned an isolation game into an assurance 
game.
Ostrom (1990) views community resource management as a modified Prisoners'
Dilemma. The original Dilemma assumes no communication between the participants. 
Ostrom argues that communicating participants can create a different game by binding 
themselves by new rules. The game then becomes a "meta-game" in which participation 
in the game leads inevitably to the co-operative outcome; the only remaining decision is 
then whether or not to participate. Ostrom infers from a review of case-studies that 
players move from the non-co-operative to the co-operative equilibrium by a process of 
incremental change; the new rules cannot be implemented instantly because nobody 
believes that others will obey them. Players must first communicate that they are 
mutually unhappy with the present situation and then agree a "constitution", a set of rules 
that determines how operational rules will be determined. The trust that will eventually 
permit co-operation is created during this period. Ostrom's review of the empirical 
literature upon community resource management confirms this prediction.
e) The institutional argument
A further group of writings, however, argues that a society's choice of resource 
management regime is, or should be, driven by the relative costs of property-right 
enforcement under different systems. They follow Becker's (1968) thesis that a law 
should not be enforced unless the benefits of the deterrent effect outweigh the costs of 
enforcement. Alchian and Demsetz (1973) go on to argue that a society will tolerate open
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access so long as private ownership is too expensive to enforce. According to this 
analysis, the "Tragedy of the Commons" can be an efficient outcome; it is permitted to 
exist because the gains from restricted access are less than the cost of the restriction.
Field (1985) and Bromley (1989) use graphical methods to define the conditions under 
which private property is superior. In Field's analysis, exclusion costs and resource rents 
are increasing convex-downwards and decreasing convex-upwards functions of the rate of 
exclusion respectively. The optimal commons is located by maximising resource rents 
less exclusion costs. However, although this literature has posited the importance of 
enforcement costs, it has only applied its insights to a choice between open access and 
private property; the costs of enforcing common property are not considered. More 
importantly, it has not shown how individuals might be motivated collectively to adopt 
the low-cost solution.
Empirical studies of Community Resource Management
The case for community resource management may therefore be summarised as follows: 
it prevents over-exploitation, it is somehow equitable, it is cheap to implement, it is 
sensitive to the local environment and it serves the interests of local people. Publications 
advocating community resource management tend to cite a common pool of empirical 
studies. They will be briefly reviewed below as illustrations of the key issues.
Netting (1976 and 1978) analysed the land management systems of Torbel, an Alpine 
village in Switzerland. Low land, held as private property was under cereals and fruit.
The uplands, not private property, were grazed. The first paper argues that "land use by 
and large determines land tenure" (Netting 1976 p. 137); private tenure was appropriate to 
the lowlands because it rewarded tree-planting, manuring and irrigation, but inappropriate 
to the high pastures because it would have entailed high fencing and surveillance costs. 
The second paper (Netting 1978) concentrates upon the regulation of access to the upland 
pastures. Netting explains that outsiders had been excluded from Torbefs pastures since 
1483 and they were only permitted to graze as many animals during the summer as they 
could maintain during the winter with hay from the lowlands. Competition for land was 
mitigated by opportunities for outside employment, first in mercenary regiments, then in 
road construction and now in tourism.
Although Netting's observations have been used in support of the case for common 
property, they also illustrate its limitations. The resource was sustained, but in an 
economy where alternative sources of income were abundant. Villagers' access was not 
equitable. It was a function of their ownership of lowland meadows. Presumably land­
owners gained at the expense of seasonal fatteners. The Torbel example does not 
therefore suggest that common property will benefit the poorer members of a labour-
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surplus society. It does demonstrate, however, that common property is a means by which 
the powerful may comer a resource without incurring the costs of privatisation.
Forman (1967) studied the raft-fishers of Coqueiral on the north-east coast of Brazil. 
Fishers found good fishing sites by a combination of triangulation and spying. Forman 
argued that over-fishing did not occur because information about fishing sites was not 
shared, individualistic behaviour fortuitously producing a successful outcome. This study 
should not, therefore, have been adduced in support of communal resource management.
Bromley and Chapagain (1984) discuss the forest of Nepal. They argue that 
nationalisation in 1957 created a situation of open-access. Villagers were interviewed. 
Two-thirds of respondents claimed that if control over the forests were transferred to their 
village they would stint for the common good. The authors conclude that the transfer of 
the forests from government to community ownership would lead to an equitable and 
sustainable use of the resource. Their argument is weak; even if the two-thirds stinted as 
they said they would, one wonders whether they would continue to do so when the one 
third failed to do likewise.
Ruddle (1989) described the Fisheries Collective Associations (FCAs) of Japan. Japanese 
law had codified tradition in 1901 by conferring control over coastal fishing upon the 
authorities of the nearest village. Control was officially transferred from the village to the 
FCA in 1949. Disputes within the FCA are resolved by the FCA. Disputes between FCAs 
are resolved at prefectorial level. Ruddle concludes that traditional management, backed 
by the state, ensures that the "Tragedy of the Commons" does not occur. Ruddle finds 
noteworthy, however, the cohesion of the FCAs. Decisions are almost always reached by 
consensus and fisherfolk are prepared to join waiting-lists of up to 30 years for FCA 
membership. The question of the system's replicability hinges on whether its success is 
attributable to the state's support or to the specific character of Japanese society.
Moorehead (1989) describes how, since the arrival of the French in 1893, the "Dina" 
system of resource management of the Peul Empire of Macina has been supplanted by the 
Malian state. Under the Dina, the Niger's inland delta was parcelled out between 
pastoralist Peul clans. Non-Peuls paid tribute in return for access to agricultural land and 
fisheries. Moorehead argues that the state has destroyed the Dina without providing a new 
source of authority and that this has led to resource degradation. He argues moreover that 
elites are now in a position to appropriate the best resources. However, one could say the 
same of the "Dina" under which one ethnic group, the Peul, levied tribute from other 
ethnic groups, the Bozo and Songhai. Indeed, Toulmin (1991) has argued that slave-wars 
and tributes, rather than collective management, were the Malian village's pre-colonial 
resource control strategies.
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Fikret Berkes has studied community resource management in fisheries. In 1976 the right 
to fish for whitefish and crisco in certain parts of Hudson Bay was allocated to the Cree 
Indians. Berkes (1977) measured catch per unit effort and found that the resource was not 
over-exploited. Effort was restrained inasmuch as the Cree were only fishing for 
consumption. Berkes concluded that community self-regulation had created a well- 
adapted system. However, the publication does not show whether effort was restrained by 
social control or by the unprofitability of increases in effort. Berkes' observation that 
fisherfolk left the fishery when CPUE was low suggests the latter; as Gordon (1954) 
outlined, the individual's decision as to how much effort to apply was made on the basis 
of the average return to effort. This is turn implies that the "adaptedness" of the fishery 
might have been fortuitous, a general possibility emphasised by McCay (1978).
By contrast, Berkes' (1986) study of five Turkish coastal fisheries produced concrete 
instances of successful community resource management. The Turkish government 
leased the Ayvalik/Haylazi lagoon to a co-operative. The co-operative only admitted 
wageless people who had lived in a local village for six months or more. By restricting 
access to 100 fishermen it maintained fishing profitability. A local businessman created 
the Tasucu Bay fishing co-operative. By banning dynamite fishing, restricting access to 
the bay to 140 fishermen and enlisting political support against illegal inshore trawling it 
again ensured fishing profitability. The fishermen of Alanya prevented competition for 
fishing spots by defining territories and rotating them amongst themselves. In the Bay of 
Izmir and Bodrun fisheries, however, self-regulation did not prevent over-exploitation. In 
each of these cases, it was possible to create co-operation between users of the same gear, 
but not between users of different gears, an outcome predicted by the theory of Johnson 
and Libecap (1982).
Watson (1989) and Chapman caution against an unquestioning endorsement of 
community resource management. Chapman (1985) calls the support of traditional 
practices a "New Orthodoxy". Her review of the literature upon traditional practices in 
the South Pacific, however, suggests that traditional custom only tends to be beneficial to 
the environment when the environment is extremely harsh; elsewhere tradition tends to 
control the distribution of benefits rather than the level of exploitation. Watson examines 
traditional swidden agriculture in Sarawak, Malaysia and finds that a combination of 
traditional agriculture and population growth has damaged the soil, the forests, fisheries 
and wildlife to the point that human welfare is impaired. Watson therefore calls for 
government to intervene against traditional land tenure systems in favour of private 
property. The common property school is accused of romanticism: "A Neroistic tendency 
among academics - perhaps combined with a reluctance to acknowledge that the actual 
functioning of traditional systems may not be as egalitarian or idyllic as is often portrayed
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- may contribute to the current fashion of promoting a return to traditional community- 
based management (p. 67)."
Conclusion
As this review has shown, writings upon fisheries management divide into two distinct 
schools of thought, which may be labelled the "control theory" and "community resource 
management" approaches. The control theory school seeks to create quantitative models 
of the fishery's ecology, specifying fishing effort as an exogenous variable. It then 
identifies the pattern of effort that produces the optimum (i.e. rent-maximising) outcome 
and seeks to bring about this pattern of effort through regulation. Implicit in this approach 
is the belief that unregulated fishermen would produce a sub-optimal pattern of effort. 
This assumption is rejected by the community resource management school, however, 
which has observed the sustainable management of fisheries by local communities. It 
therefore recommends the devolution of power over natural resources to the communities 
that use them.
The next stage is then to ask what use each approach is to fisheries managers in 
Bangladesh. The answer is: they do not address the distribution of benefits from the 
fishery, which is crucial to the design of policy and projects in Bangladesh. Existing 
control theory models of fisheries management only mention the issue of income- 
distribution as an obstacle to implementation, if at all. The control theory approach to 
fisheries management also assumes that fisheries managers have the power to identify 
and implement the optimal pattern of effort. In Bangladesh, however, their ability to do 
so is limited not only by the heterogeneity of the fishery but also, more importantly, by 
the lack of funds and the lack of a culture of impartial regulation. The community 
resource management approach, on the other hand, asserts that village society, left to its 
own devices, will produce a satisfactory outcome, which, for the purposes of this study, is 
defined as one which serves the interests of fishing labour. As will be shown, however, 
community fishery management in Bangladesh, reflecting the pattern of economic power 
in rural society, serves the interests of lessees rather than of fishing labour.
There is therefore a need for a third approach to fisheries management, one which takes 
the middle ground between the technocratic and community approaches. Unlike the 
technocratic approach, it should accept that the range of policy instruments is restricted 
and that those that do exist are not direct in effect but mediated through the economic 
decisions of the lessee and fishermen. Unlike the community development approach, it 
should accept the importance for fishing labour of external policy initiatives. If the 
technocratic model is a system wherein the policy-maker's decisions determine the
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pattern o f effort and the community development model is a system wherein local agents 
determine the pattern of effort, then the required model is a system wherein the policy­
maker affects the pattern o f effort by influencing the behaviour o f local agents.
To describe such a system, one first needs a qualitative understanding of the biological 
and economic processes that make up the fishery. The final policy model can draw upon 
the bio-economic models described above for its structure, but it should display 
additional features: First, differences between fish types, gears and seasons will be shown 
to be crucial features of the fishery and must therefore be disaggregated in the model. 
Secondly, as well as the government and fishermen o f the bio-economic models above, it 
must feature the lessee as a decision-maker. Thirdly, it should make the benefits accruing 
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It is an unfortunate fact that aid organisations, with the exception of the relatively 
powerless NGOs, are systematically misinformed about the nature of the development 
process in Bangladesh. The author's own interviews with fisheries officials and donors in 
Dhaka corroborated the Like-Minded Group's (1990) analysis of the sources of mis­
information: firstly, foreign "experts" import inappropriate fisheries development models 
from countries whose access to resources is less skewed and, secondly, official 
government statements "have paid lip-service to the critical importance of rural 
development and poverty elimination since well before independence" (Like-Minded 
Group 1990 p. 113), whilst actual interventions have continued to support the patronage 
system.
There is therefore a need in Bangladesh for social scientists to shift information from the 
fishery, where the reality of development policy is known, to the aid community, which is 
acting from a standpoint of ignorance. Many writers have attempted such an "information 
shift" for rural society in general. The previous chapter noted Hartmann and Boyce (1979 
and 1983), Wood (1981), Jansen (1987), Herbon (1988), McGregor (1988, 1989a and 
1992), the Like-Minded Group (1990) and Kramsyo and Wood (1992), and they doubtless 
constitute a small part of the whole; Jansen (1987) had counted 25 English-language 
village-level anthropological studies published up to 1983 alone.
This study's purpose, then, is to tell the aid community what those who deal in fisheries 
management, from the fishermen to the Director of Fisheries, probably know already. It is 
a modest task, inasmuch as it involves shifting, rather than creating, information.
The research agenda
The aim of this study was first to understand the socio-economics of a floodplain fishery 
and then to evaluate current fisheries policy in the light of what had been learnt. What 
then was the knowledge requirement - the research agenda?
The Marshallian neo-classical theory of the firm assumes a particular stylised production 
function. The Schaeferian theory of the fishery assumes another. The floodplain fishery, 
of course, will have its own special technological characteristics, changes in the water- 
level, fish movements, fish growth and so on. It is therefore necessary to work out from 
first principles what is the form of the technical production function of the floodplain
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fishery. Even if it finally proves impossible to put numbers to the parameters, the form of 
the production function will tell much about how it will respond to policy interventions.
The scope of an economic policy research project should depend upon the social system 
which it is studying. An economist looking at a developed western economy can make 
certain implicit assumptions about the economic system: that property rights are 
maintained, that the state obeys and enforces the law and that economic decisions are not 
influenced by non-economic considerations. The economy in this case consists of a 
network of voluntary contractual exchanges, the free market as described by orthodox 
economics. This study, however, cannot assume ex ante that the Bangladeshi floodplain 
fisheries’ inputs and outputs are allocated in a free market. It must first observe and 
describe the system of allocation. This is not to say that one needs a full anthropological 
study of Bangladeshi society; as Jansen (1987) writes, there are plenty of them already. 
All that is necessary is an understanding of how Bangladesh's own particular system of 
resource allocation, as described by earlier writers, applies to the floodplain fishery.
The floodplain's particular production function and Bangladesh's particular allocative 
system combine to produce a specific floodplain economy. An important element of this 
study will be a quantitative description of the economic outcome.
Lastly, in order to make predictions about the likely effects of fisheries policy, one needs 
policy models. The specific economy of the floodplain fishery will determine the 
appropriate form of its own specific models.
The knowledge requirement therefore includes four elements:
a) The fishery's physical environment
b) Social, economic and institutional relationships in the fishery
c) The form, value and distribution of value-added in the fishery
d) An understanding of how policy interventions will affect (c).
One could describe this research agenda as a "production line" approach. The "raw 
materials", the first principles, are a knowledge of the technology and markets in a 
Bangladeshi floodplain fishery. With technology and the markets together making the 
floodplain fishery economy, the first stage of refinement is a quantitative analysis of that 
economy. With fisheries policy changing the floodplain economy, the second stage of 
refinement is to model their operation. The final product is then an evaluation of current 
fisheries policy.
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Methodological options and constraints
In choosing a research methodology, the principal concern was not intellectual but 
logistical, of making 14 months and one interpreter stretch to a study of a major fishery in 
all its seasonal variety. To this were added the difficulties of working at a distance from 
Dhaka, the project's source of funds, communications, unadulterated fuel and vehicle 
spares. The monsoon season presented an extra challenge, cutting roads and transforming 
villages into islands.
The sample questionnaire survey has traditionally been the research method most 
commonly favoured by sociologists and economists in developing countries (Casely and 
Lury 1981). Various random sampling techniques can be used to ensure that the 
respondents are representative of the population at large. A panel survey, in which several 
repeat visits are made to the same respondents, enables the researcher to follow the 
population's activities over an extended period. Panel surveys are particularly useful when 
key variables follow a seasonal pattern.
One disadvantage of questionnaire surveys is their inflexibility. The fixed, pre-specified 
questions cannot probe subtle qualitative issues. The responses can only incorporate the 
issues that preoccupied the researcher when the questionnaire was framed. It is therefore 
advisable to launch a questionnaire survey after obtaining an understanding of the key 
qualitative relationships by some other means. A second disadvantage of questionnaire 
surveys is their cost. Census data may be unreliable, communications may be poor and 
developing country respondents rarely follow a predictable routine, all of which makes 
contact with a representative sample a time-consuming and precarious task. If one takes 
resource-saving short-cuts, the representativeness of the sample may be compromised, 
negating the supposed superiority of the questionnaire survey.
One resource-saving research technique that has recently achieved respectability is Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (RRA). It recognises the time and resource costs of research and aims for 
"optimum ignorance" rather than "academic rigour" (Carruthers and Chambers 1981). By 
means of focused interviews with "key respondents" and village groups the RRA 
researcher can obtain an accurate impression of the study area's physical, social and 
economic environment. The principal advantage of RRA is that it offers high coverage 
for low cost. Like an anthropological study, it obtains local people's perceptions. Like a 
sample survey, it can cover a wide geographical area. However, one mission typically 
takes only 5 to 20 days, consuming only a fraction of the manpower of a full-blown 
anthropological study or sample survey.
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Unfortunately, the nature of local society is such that RRA is iess productive in 
Bangladesh than in many other countries. There are several reasons for this;
a) The social science literature upon Bangladesh is awash with unsubstantiated 
assertion. The reader may have difficulty recognising the superiority of RRA 
reports over such low-grade material.
b) Villagers see access to the interviewer as a means of access to external aid 
More powerful people exclude less powerful people from the dialogue. Members 
of one faction exclude members of the opposing faction. The researcher therefore 
meets an unrepresentative sample of respondents.
c) Respondents bias their responses in the hope of receiving more aid. One 
general tendency is to exaggerate their own poverty and the wealth of others. 
Another is to explain their own behaviour in terms of the official development 
rhetoric (collective action, co-operatives, conservation) and to exaggerate the 
misdemeanours of others (violence, bribes, over-fishing).
d) Public discussions are frequently disordered, noisy and confusing.
e) RRA often interprets the recommendations of the respondent as beneficial to 
society; this is "participatory' evaluation". In Bangladesh, however, where there 
are many zero-sum conflicts over access to resources, the recommendations of 
one respondent are frequently detrimental to another party who has been excluded 
from the dialogue (see b above). Zero-sum recommendations are likely to be 
especially frequent in the fisheries sector, where output appears already to be 
close to its biological limit.
f) The state is regarded by many poor people as a hostile, threatening force, 
known more for its exactions than for its services. They are not likely to be candid 
with an outside interviewer, who will automatically be identified with the 
government service.
There is a complementarity between RRA and questionnaire surveys: RRA can reveal the
structure of the fisherv economv but is verv unlikelv to oive an unbiased account of its    “ - - -   -  ^ * «/ ■ ■   ..........
dimensions. Questionnaire surveys cannot show the fishery's qualitative aspects but can 
give a representative picture of the size of the resource flows. Moreover, a bonus of 
sample surveys in Bangladesh is that sampling provides an introduction to informal 
interviews with those who were systematically excluded from the RRA.
This study therefore made eclectic use of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
For ease of exposition, one can divide the research into the series of operations below:
a) A Literature Review covered Bangladeshi rural society, sectoral studies on 
inland fisheries and policy interventions in the inland fisheries sector.
b) A Reconnaissance RRA studied the ecology, geography and allocation 
systems of the Hail Haor fishery.
c) Opportunistic Interviewing subsequently provided further information upon 
the same topics
d) A Preliminary Survey prepared the way for a year-round panei survey and 
provided initial information upon the fishing population.
e) A Catch, Effort and Cash-flow Survey provided a quantitative picture of 
resource flows for one year.
f) Ancillary Data Collection validated the Catch, Effort and Cash-flow survey. 
The field research methods are described in detail below.
Reconnaissance
Hail Ha or was chosen in October 1992 as the orincinal study site Tn selecting a water­
body, the following criteria were used:
- to aid comparison with the project's sites in Thailand and Indonesia, the water­
body had to be a seasonally-flooded depression ("beel" or "haor") of at least 2,500 
ha, with some permanent water.
- to facilitate a bio-economic assessment of the water-body, it had to be clearly- 
defined, even during the flood. Many of Bangladesh's fisheries merge at this time.
- for regular survey work to be possible, the fishing communities on the water­
body's shores had to be accessible for most of the year by four-wheel drive vehicle 
or poled boat.
- the water-body should be within an hour of reasonably comfortable 
accommodation and a reliable supply of electricity for the project's computer.
Hail Haor met these conditions. It should be admitted, however, that many water-bodies 
in Bangladesh do not and that this study's methodology' may therefore not be universally 
replicable.
At the start of the study in October 1992, no information was available upon Hail Haor's 
physical geography, fishing population, fish, fishing gear, social organisation or 
management systems. The first two months of the study were therefore devoted largely to 
informal discussions upon these topics with fishermen, both individually and in groups, 
with lessees, sub-lessees and government officials and project officers. Bearing in mind 
that the study's goal was to describe a Bangladeshi open-water fishery in terms of a model 
relevant to the issues facing policy-makers, these discussions served three distinct 
purposes:
a) They provided a good understanding of the ecological, social, economic and 
institutional relations surrounding Hail Haor.
b) They indicated which kinds of survey would and would not prove practical and 
valid.
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Monsoon and dry-season areas under water were calculated from the study's own map.
For this purpose it was necessary to choose a northern limit to the Haor. The 200m 
"bottleneck" adjacent to Pachaon village was selected because it is an obstacle to fish 
migration, is known to all fishermen and is easily recognised from the satellite image.
The phrase "Hail Haor" in this study always denotes the water south of this point.
Opportunistic interviewing
The author conducted around 900 one-on-one quantitative data collection interviews with 
fishermen and it was common to wait 1-2 hours to meet a single respondent. The author 
had used waiting time for guided interviews in other countries. In Bangladesh, however, 
this proved difficult, for the reasons given earlier in the discussion of RRA. The waiting 
time was spent in informal conversation with other villagers which occasionally produced 
useful insights. Some of the best information, however, was obtained from boatmen 
during boat-trips around the haor, for the simple reason that it was physically impossible 
for other people to enter the conversation.
Preliminary survey
In order to assess the pattern of gear use and the distribution of the proceeds from fishing, 
the study was going to interview a representative sample of fishing households at 
fortnightly intervals around the year. However, no list or population estimate of Hail 
Haor's fishing households was available. The Agricultural Census and the Census of Non- 
Agricultural Activities were consulted, but neither covered fishing. A preliminary 
clustered sample survey of fishing and non-fishing households was therefore taken in 
November 1992.
The objectives of the exercise were as follows:
a) As preparation for the Catch, effort and Cash-flow study, to construct a 
sampling frame from which a sample of fishing households could be selected, to 
estimate the maximum practical sample size and to learn when, where and how it 
was most convenient to interview representatives of fishing households.
b) As a survey of fishing and non-fishing households together, to establish 
whether fishing households possessed any obvious economic or demographic 
characteristics which distinguished them from non-fishing households, to 
establish the extent to which fishing households engaged in other occupations and 
to establish the pattern of gear ownership around Hail Haor.
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A list of the fishing communities around Hail Haor was drawn up from the informal 
interviews of the previous month (see above). Time and a restrictive transport budget did 
not permit every community to be covered, especially in view of the need to start the 
collection of catch/effort data within three weeks of the start of the fieldwork so as to 
cover an entire year. Respondents' initial mistrust of the study made it moreover advisable 
to build a closer relationship with a smaller number of villages than to attempt total 
coverage. It was therefore decided that only six villages should be included.
The informal interviews had made it clear that the twin villages of Buruna and Hazipur 
dominated the fishery by virtue of the number of their fishermen, their access to deep 
water and their comparatively high rate of ownership of seine nets and gill nets. It was 
therefore decided that Buruna/Hazipur should be included"ex officio" in the survey. Four 
additional villages were selected by lottery. They were Monargaon, the twin villages of 
Alisherkul and Badialisha, Vimshi and Mirzapur. This selection gave the study a good 
geographical spread, since Buruna, Hazipur and Monargaon are on the Haor's eastern 
shore, Alisherkul/Badialisha is to the south, Vimshi and Mirzapur are to the west and the 
northern shore has no permanent communities, being subject to flooding. The sample 
included three Muslim and three Hindu fishing communities.
After some negotiation and persuasion, the District Electoral Office at Moulvi Bazar 
made available the sample villages' electoral rolls for the 1991 General Election. These 
lists had been compiled by local schoolteachers in 1990 and were supposed to give the 
voter number, name, age, father's name, occupation and village of all residents aged at 
least 18 at the time of compilation. Male and female voters were listed separately. The 
voters' occupation was given, but this information was useless: under the heading 
"occupation", fishermen were labelled "farmer".
A GW-BASIC random number generation programme was used to select names from the 
male voter list. Duplicate selections were replaced. The numbers chosen were as follows: 
Buruna/Hazipur 60, Monargaon 27and Mirzapur 40. Each village was then visited in turn 
and village elders gave the name, father's name and age of the household head of each 
selected voter. Where the name on the voter list was fraudulent or the random number 
generator had selected two members of the same household, the elder chose another 
name from the same page of the voter list with his eyes shut. The resultant lists of 
household heads were adopted as the survey sample.
For Vimshi and Alisherkul/Badialisha, however, this procedure had to be abandoned. 
Vimshi's voter list contained another village and Alisherkul/Badialisha's fishing 
households constituted such a low proportion of the total population (approximately 1 in
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40) that a massive survey would have been required to turn up a statistically valid number 
o f fishing households. For these villages, therefore, village elders compiled a list o f 
household heads, their ages and fathers’ names. The Aiisherkui/Badiaiisha list oniy 
covered the fishermen's quarter (para). The survey sample was drawn publicly from a hat 
in the village itself by a small boy, to the delight o f all present.
Each household head within the survey sample was interviewed once. The responses 
were recorded on a standard form, checked and tabulated on paper, captured as a 
SUPERCALC4 spreadsheet, saved as an ASCII tile and analysed by means o f INSTAT1 
The entire procedure, from obtaining the voter lists to completing the statistical analysis, 
took three weeks.
Several limitations were imposed upon the survey by the need for rapid results. They are 
described below, as they are likely to have affected the quality of the data:
a) The number o f clusters (villages) in the sample was limited to 5. The initial 
informal interviews revealed significant between-village variation with respect to 
gear use, water access and income, an impression which will be confirmed by the 
data. The question therefore arises o f the relationship between the parameter 
estimates produced by the sample and the true population values. Confidence 
intervals for cluster-sampled parameters can m theory be derived by summing the 
within- and between- cluster sample variances (Casely and Lury 1981), but this is 
not recommendable in this instance, where the between -cluster variance is 
estimated with only 4 degrees o f freedom. The compromise approach taken by 
this study shall be to disaggregate survey data by village whenever appropriate 
When aggregation is required, as in the subsequent calculation of total catch and 
total effort parameters for Hail Haor, it is hoped that the forced inclusion of 
Buruna/Hazipur as the sole "strong" village will decrease the sampling variance by 
effectively stratifying the sample.
b) Mistrust of the interviewers is likely to have led to some false responses Where 
it existed, this mistrust stemmed from a suspicion that the sample was not the 
product o f a lottery but o f deliberate choice and that the study would report to 
government, which was cither planning an aid project2 or looking for illegal 
fishing practices. It is therefore likely to have led to the understatement o f assets 
and the concealment o f illegal gill nets. As the project's aims and programme 
were explained to each respondent, however, suspicion usually turned to co-
 ^ available from the University of Reading
2 We were dogged in several villages throughout the study period by the rumour that we intended to 
empolder Hail Haor, run it as a fish farm and take on our respondents as salaried employees Many non­
respondents begged us to put them on our list and one respondent, leaving Hail Haor to work in Qatar, 
begged repeatedly that his brother could replace him. Maybe a lessee was trying to discredit our research in 
the eyes of the fishing population or a middleman was trying to sell places on our sample list.
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operation. This positive response to familiarity confirmed that the selection of a 
small number o f study villages had been correct.
c) The sampling method described above introduced a systematic bias in favour of 
larger households, since the probability o f a household's being selected was 
directly proportional to the number o f males eligible to vote in 1991. The 
unweighted mean sample household size was 6.54. An unbiased estimate, 
however, obtained by weighting each observation by the reciprocal o f the number 
o f male voters, gives mean household size as 5.59. A correct response from the 
point of view of statistical validity would have been to draw a second sample from 
the exi sting sum pie, giving each household a corrective probability of selection 
proportional to the reciprocal o f the number o f male voters, and this procedure 
was used in selecting the sub-sample for the Catch, Fffort and Cash-flow (see 
below). Time, however, did not permit fne selection o f a corrected sample for fne 
initial survey. In order to assess the validity o f the survey data, therefore, it was 
necessary' to test it for correlations between key indicators and the number o f male 
voters. The results are displayed in Table 4.1 below. They indicate no apparent 
correlation between the number o f male voters and the economic status o f the 
household. There is no immediate reason, therefore, for rejecting the survey 
results as unrepresentative.
Table 4.1. Correlations between economic indicators and number of male voters.
Indicator r-squared
Participation in fishing(yes/no) .0012
School enrolment (%) .0075
Land owned (acres) . 1490
Gill net owned (yds) .0013
Luxury goods owned (no.) . 0989
Boats owned (no.) . 1418
Tin roof owned (yes/no) .0751
The distribution o f sample households by village and reasons for non-returns are given in 
tables 4.2 and 4.3 below. Overall, the response rate is high for a survey of inis nature, 
with an average contact rate o f 85% and the contact rate rising to 90% when those 
households that have left their villages since 1990 are excluded, ft should be noted, 
however, that 12 households, or 7% o f the sample, had still not been contacted after 3 
visits and were abandoned This gave rise to concern that the survey results might be 
biased away from full-time fishermen, whose occupation keeps them away from their
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viiiage, so in Buruna, Hazipur and Monargaon other viiiagers were asked to state the 
excluded household's principal occupation. In these 3 villages, 5 out o f 9 non-respondents 
were not fishermen. This permitted confidence in the survey sample.
Table 4.2. Preliminary survey - sample households.
Village H-holds Non-respondents Contact



















TOTAL 157 24 85
Table 4.3, Reasons for npn-responsv,









Catch, effort and cash-flow survey
Sampling
The household, defined as a group o f people eating together, was selected as the sampling 
unit. Local people are familiar with this definition. They frequently describe a village's 
population in terms of the number o f households (poribar), refer to a household head 
{proJam) and describe brothers as together in the same household (ekshunge) or separate
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{aladd). The fishing group had originally been intended as the sampling unit, but was 
rejected when the reconnaissance revealed how fishing groups were likely to coalesce 
and fragment as different fishing gears became appropriate. The individual was rejected 
because such a sample would have offered a smaller coverage for the same number of 
interviews and would have generated no meaningful information upon household 
incomes.
The Preliminary Survey had covered 133 randomly-selected households from 6 randomly 
selected villages. The next stage was to select from them a representative sample of 60 
fishing households who might serve as respondents for the collection of catch, effort and 
cash-flow data across a period of twelve months. (A ’’fishing household" is here defined 
as a household which admitted that at least one family member fished for sale, at any 
time, whether as the principal or a subsidiary occupation.) It was decided that the twin 
villages of Buruna and Hazipur formed a single geographic and social unit and could be 
treated as a single sampling pool, that 20 respondent households should be selected from 
them and that each of the other four sample villages should supply ten respondent 
households each.
It will be remembered that the initial sample from Buruna, Hazipur, Monargaon and 
Mirzapur was taken from the male electoral roll by means of random numbers. In 
Alisherkul/Badialisha and Vimshi, however, it was taken from a list of fishing households 
supplied by villagers themselves. For the first group of villages, therefore, the probability 
of inclusion in the initial sample was directly proportional to the number of males eligible 
to vote in the previous general election. There was thus a tendency for large households 
to be over-represented. So that this bias might be eliminated, a SUPER.CALC-4 
spreadsheet allocated probabilities of inclusion in the second sample that were 
proportional to the reciprocal of the number of males aged 20 or over. A GW-BASIC 
random number generator programme then made the final selection.
The names for the second sample in Alisherkul/Badialisha and Vimshi were again 
selected out of a hat by a small boy in public view.
Data collection
The sixty' households were visited twenty' times during the year December 1992 - 
November 1993, making a total of 1,200 interviews. Two visits were made per month, 
except during the monsoon months of June, July, August and September 1993 when 
travel was much more difficult and one visit had to stand for a whole month.
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Interviews were conducted face to face in fish markets or in the fishermen’s compounds. 
If the household head was not available, another adult male from the same household 
might be interviewed. It no suitable interviewee was available, another visit to the village 
was made.
A specimen interview form ("VISIT SHEET") is attached as Appendix 2. The form 
changed according to the requirements of the season. For example, three interview forms 
asked about household agricultural yields by crop and all forms for the first four months 
of 1993 had a section covering brush-pile fishing. Each form was identified by the 
respondent’s identification number, which was carried over from the preliminary survey, 
and by the interview date.
The interviews were generally conducted as follows. First the interviewee was asked what 
he and the household’s other workers did the previous day. The response was coded into 
the column "Activity x hours". For example, "Lx9(dol)" meant that the worker was 
serving as hired labour on a brush-pile for nine hours. If some cash income could be 
directly attributed to this work, which was usually the case for hired labour, fish-trading 
and crafts, the daily amount was written in the column "Income L/FT/C". If a hired 
labourer was given food by his employer, another Tk5/meal was added to this amount.
The household's fishing activity was then recorded under "D.". Each fishing group was 
recorded separately, as was each gear used by each fishing group. So, for example, if two 
household members fished with dori and faron in two separate groups, four lines would 
be recorded. Each line stated the type and quantity of gear, the hours it was set in the 
water, the number of household group members and the total number of group members, 
the principal species caught, the total estimated weight of fish caught in kg, the 
household's share of the proceeds and the income received by the household.
The household's fishing expenses were then recorded under "B.". "Lumpy" expenses 
included gear purchase, gear repair, boat purchase, boat repair and brushwood and 
bamboo for the construction of brush-piles. Respondents were asked to recall how much 
had been expended under these headings since the previous interview. This they did 
without difficulty, since the expenditure items invariably represented more than a day's 
earnings. "Daily" expenses included hired labour, boat hire, kerosene and batteries. 
Because such items were more difficult to sum over the previous fifteen days, 
respondents were only asked how much had been expended under these headings on the 
previous day. All expenses were recorded as the cost to the household, not as the cost to 
the fishing group.
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Fishing toll payments were recorded under "Permits:(since LAST VISIT)". Each cash 
transaction was given one line and each line recorded the cost to the household of the toll, 
the leasing area, the permitted gear, the month of payment ("monthstart") and the 
duration of the permit. Most permits were granted until the specified gear became 
unusable or until the end of the Bengali year. In this case the word "season" was recorded 
under the column "duration".
Finally, domestic fish consumption was recorded under "E.". Respondents were asked 
whether their household had eaten fish on the previous day, whether the fish was "caught" 
or "bought", what species they had eaten and the actual or estimated value of the fish in 
Taka. (Fishermen were able to state the value of caught fish without any hesitation.) 
Species that never exceed 5cm, such as puti, boisa, koia, chingree, darkina and chanda 
were recorded as "small" fish.
The "VISIT SHEET" differs from most rural survey forms by reason of its flexibility. It is 
standard practice for enumerators to record interview responses in row-and-coiumn tables 
or, as for this study's Preliminary Survey, response panels in structured questionnaires.
The responses can then be copied directly from the interview form into a data matrix for 
computerised analysis. However, a flexible questionnaire was better-suited to this survey 
for several reasons:
a) The range of appropriate questions was likely to change according to the 
seasonal pattern of respondents' activities.
b) With the raw effort and expense data being reported by fishing group and 
tabulated by household, they frequently had to be transformed before they could 
be tabulated; it was better that this transformation should be done after the 
interview since fishermen were often in a hurry to return to their boats.
c) The enumerator was skilful and accompanied by the team leader, so the 
discipline of a closed questionnaire was not required.
d) There was little risk of inconsistent interviewing because there was only one 
interviewing team.
Data tabulation
Interviews were recorded on an "attendance sheet" by household and reporting period to 
aid the planning of visits.
Responses were recorded manually as four data tables in preparation for computerisation. 
A Labour Use/Ineome/Expenses Table recorded labour use and cash-flow by occupation 
by household by reporting period, giving a total of 15,600 data points. A Catch/Effort 
Table recorded catch and effort by gear type by household by reporting period giving a
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total of 32,400 data points. Two Cost tables were created. One recorded leasing payments 
by household by month from May 1992 to December 1993 (1200 data points). A second 
categorised costs for the sample as a whole by type by month (84 data points).
It was necessary to transform some data between the "VISIT SHEET" and the data tables.
- Incomes from fishing and agriculture were not recorded under "A." and were 
derived from other parts of the form. Income from fishing was obtained by 
summing fish sales ("D.") and home consumption of caught fish ("E."). Income 
from agriculture was obtained by multiplying reported total yields by the current 
wholesale price. Yields were recorded m January 1993, June 1993 and November 
1993. In January 1993, respondents were asked to report yields of aman rice, this 
being the only major crop to come to harvest in December. In June 1993, 
respondents reported "all dry-season crops". In November 1993 they reported "ail 
crops harvested since the beginning of the monsoon," For all agricultural products 
the value of output was recorded gross of costs and gross of home consumption. 
For livestock, however, it was deemed too difficult to obtain an output measure 
and only gross sales were recorded.
- Fishing expenses were transformed into a daily estimate; "Lumpy expenses" 
were divided by fifteen and added to "daily expenses."
- When household members were fishing in a group, the number of household 
participants was expressed as a traction of the number of group members. The 
group's catch and effort units were multiplied by this fraction before being 
tabulated. The resultant totals could then be multiplied by the number of fishing 
households around Hail Haor and divided by the number of households in the 
sample to give an estimate of total catch and effort.
- Brush-piles (dol) produce large quantities of fish but are managed by a small 
number of fishing groups. There was therefore a risk of an unacceptably high 
sampling variance. It was therefore necessary to request a one-week recall for dol 
catches and divide the response by seven before tabulation.
The data was specified in this manner in order that the following analyses could be 
performed, both in aggregate and broken down by wealth class.
- Total gear use in Hail Haor by month.
- Total catch in Hail Haor by month.
- Catch per unit effort by gear.
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- Total employment by occupation by month.
- Total gross income by source by month.
- Division of catch value between fishermen's income, costs, government and 
lessees/sub-lessees/bribes.
- Total expenses by type by month.
Problems
The fishermen of Hail Haor prove hard to find. They may be away from dry land for 
periods of five to ten days, particularly when fish-trapping or gill-netting. Members of a 
fishing-group take turns to sell the catch, so a meeting with a specific group-member 
requires several visits to the fish-market. One solution to this problem might have been to 
replace the most elusive respondents. This option was rejected, however, because a 
principal objective of the study was to elicit the pattern of employment and a respondent's 
elusiveness is correlated with his occupation and choice of gear. Gill-netters and fish- 
trappers were therefore found by means of repeated visits to fish-markets. Other elusive 
respondents were interviewed by oil-lamp at night.
By the end of December 1992, after the first two rounds of data collection, most 
respondents appeared to accept that their responses were not going to bring them any 
impositions from the government on the one hand or any financial benefits on the other. 
Their responses, although offered sullenly by a minority, were therefore candid. More 
troublesome, however, were the fishing entrepreneurs and sub-lessees who wanted to be 
the focus of attention and wished to know what conspiracy had excluded them. The 
research team correctly devoted more time to informal chat and to explaining its aims and 
methods than to the research itself. However, with the male population of the survey 
villages exceeding 3,000, there was an stream of disgruntled enquirers throughout the 
fieldwork period.
It should be noted in passing that the Hindu Nomosudras and Sarkers were markedly less 
likely than the Muslim Maimals to perceive the survey as an opportunity for personal gain 
or avoiding government impositions. They were therefore more likely to respond 
candidly. Blanchet and Talukder (1992) observed similar behaviour on Shanir Haor and 
attributed it the importance of deference to one's hierarchical superiors in Hindu religion 
and culture.
One weakness of this catch-effort data collection method is that it produces only two 
observations per household per month. It therefore offers no meaningful estimate of day- 
to-day variation in catch per unit effort (CPUE). Also, although the estimates of catch and 
effort remain unbiased, their variance would have been lower with a higher number of
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observations. The recording of daily catch-effort data by the fishermen themselves was 
ruled out by their illiteracy. More frequent visits were ruled out by the project's budget. 
Longer recall of catch-effort data was ruled out on the grounds that it would create bias 
by increasing the scope for invention. Two catch-effort data points per household per 
month were therefore accepted as the "least worst" solution. The 30 observations per 
gear-type per month recommended by Tsai (1991) were unaffordable.
Biologically and financially, the fishery's year starts in May. This is when spawning and 
in-migration generate the year's fish stocks, when the previous year's sub-leases expire 
and the next year's leases are granted. By collecting data between December 1992 and 
November 1993, therefore, this study obtained an incomplete picture of two seasons 
rather than a complete picture of one. This impaired the analysis and interpretation of 
data in the following ways:
- Systematic seasonal variation could not be distinguished statistically from 
stochastic annual variation. This proved particularly important as 1992-3 gave a 
late flood and a high incidence of ulcerative fish disease whilst 1993-4 gave an 
early flood. The study therefore relied upon fishermen's accounts of seasonal and 
annual variation.
- A specific households' rate of return on investment for the year could not always 
be meaningfully calculated because some were earning income during the study 
from investments made before it or earning income after the study from 
investments made during it. The solution was to present instead case studies of 
selected fishing activities of selected households.
Ancillary data collection
Certain questions could only be answered by means of additional data. They were 
obtained from an ancillary data collection programme.
Fishing population estimation.
The catch-effort and cash-flow study followed a sample of 60 fishing households; in 
selecting the sample a "fishing household" was defined as a household that fished for 
sale, whether or not this was its primary occupation. So as to apply its results to Hail Haor 
as a whole, it was necessary to know the ratio of households fishing in Hail Haor to the 
number of households in the sample.
BBS (1990) reports the number of households in Srimangal Thana but the breakdown is 
by Mauza, an administrative unit with boundaries that link disparate communities and cut
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through villages. The voters' roll lists fishermen's occupation as "krishok" - farmer. 
Bangladesh’s two rural census series, the Agricultural Census and the Census ofNon- 
Agricultural Activities, make no mention of fishing as an occupation. The Thana 
Fisheries Officer and villagers themselves supplied estimates of the number of fishing 
households in each village around Hail Haor but such large discrepancies existed between 
the two that both were dismissed as unreliable. Official statistics being of limited use in 
this case, an ancillary study estimated the number of fishing households by village.
For the villages of Buruna, Hazipur, Monargaon and Mirzapur the following method 
(Method 1) was used. The Preliminary Survey provided estimates of the number of male 
voters per household and fishing households as a percentage of total households. The 
estimated total number of households was the number of male voters divided by the 
estimated number of male voters per household. The estimated number of fishing 
households was the total number of households multiplied by the estimated percentage 
that were fishing households.
For the villages of Alisherkul/Badialisha and Vimshi the number of fishing households 
was low enough for them to be listed directly (Method 2).
A Fishing Population Survey (Method 3) was implemented during the 1993 monsoon 
season. The electoral roll compiled in 1990 was obtained for the villages of Srimangal 
Busti (Lalbagh Para), West Baraura, Rustumpur, Bolashi, Bonabir, North Pachaun, 
Shohostri and Shulpur. Twenty male names per village were selected by means of a GW- 
BASIC random number generator. A meeting was then held in each village during which 
the project's work was explained and the household head of each sample name was 
identified. The twenty sample household heads were asked to report the occupations of 
their household members. If fishing was reported, the household head was asked to list 
the gears used during the fishing year May 1992 to April 1993. It was thus possible to 
estimate the ratio of fishing households to all households for each village and to assess 
whether the pattern of gear use in the six sample villages was representative of the 
situation in Hail Haor as a whole.
Every time the study team visited the village of Uttosur it was taken to a somewhat 
hostile local shopkeeper, possibly a lessee's "agent". It was clear that survey work in 
Uttosur would produce a low return to effort and it was therefore decided to extrapolate 
the estimated number of fishing households from the number of male voters (Method 4), 
using the mean of the ratios from the other villages.
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Catch composition estimation.
In the Catch-effort and Cash-flow Survey, fishermen were able to name the species they 
caught but not to apportion the catch by species. The catch composition was therefore 
estimated by direct observation at three landing sites, Buruna, Hazipur and Bilashirpar. 
Initial estimates were validated by means of a spring balance. Later estimates were made 
by eye alone. With weight of fish by gear reported by fishermen and species of fish by 
gear observed directly, it was then possible to estimate weight of fish by species.
Households fishing fo r  consumption only.
The Catch, Effort and Cash-flow sample only represented households that fished for sale; 
it excluded households that fished for consumption only. Moreover, households who 
fished for consumption only saw no reason to participate in the study's informal group 
interviews. In order to understand the importance of fishing for consumption only, all 
respondents in the Fishing Population Survey who never fished for sale were asked 
whether they ever fished for consumption. Some of those who did were followed up with 
an informal interview.
Conclusions
This chapter has explained the study's approach to the assessment of inland capture 
fisheries policy in Bangladesh. It is based upon a progression from a qualitative 
understanding of the fishery's technologies and relations of production, via the collection 
of quantitative data, to analytical models of the impact of policy interventions. By moving 
from field observation to micro-economic analysis, it was hoped to redress the tack of 
information upon how income-creation and -allocation that was identified in chapter 2 
and the lack of theoretical models of the distributional impact of policy that was 
identified in chapter 3.
A detailed description of the study's data-collection methods has been presented. This 
chapter showed how they were largely determined by logistical constraints and identified 
a number of ways in which the statistical power of the data was impaired by limited 
resources. Rapid Rural Appraisal was discussed as a possible means of reducing the 
resource-cost of data-collection but its application to a Bangladeshi fishery was found to 
be fraught with difficulties. The use of RRA in fisheries is a topic that will be expanded 
in chapter 14.
An important theme of this chapter was how the study's data-collection methods were 
determined by the social organisation of the fishery. Households were used as the
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sampling unit instead of fishing groups because they were more stable, the importance of 
familiarising fishing communities with the researchers meant that a small number of 
clusters was used for sampling, the different distributions of self-employed fishermen, 
brush-pile owners and people fishing for consumption only necessitated three separate 
sampling procedures and the village-based methods adopted by the study would have 
been impossible if migratory fishing had been practiced in Hail Haor. The finding of this 
study, which is backed up by the author’s experience in Thailand and Indonesia, is 
therefore that no single data-collection methodology is likely to be appropriate to a range 
of fisheries. The research protocol should be tailored to the fishery's social structures after 
they have been outlined by preliminary reconnaissance.
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Chapter 5
The Hail Haor fishery: topography, fish ecology and fishing technology.
This section, which describes the physical context of the Hail Haor fishery, shows how 
the environment, fish stocks and fishing gear combine to produce a saleable good. The 
neo-classical theory of the firm is based upon a standardised production function, a 
stylised description of how inputs are combined to make output. Similarly, this analysis 
of the economics of a Bangladeshi floodplain fishery will rest upon the fishery's own 
production function, where the inputs are fishing space, fish stocks, fishing gear and 
labour and the output is, of course, landed fish.
The Meghna Basin
Hail Haor lies in the north-east comer of Bangladesh. This region, sometimes referred to 
as "Greater Sylhet", is a triangular wedge of low-lying alluvial plain that protrudes into 
the foothills of north-east India. Rivers flow into the lowlands of Greater Sylhet from 
three sides, from Assam to the north, Meghalaya to the east and Tripura to the south. All 
of these rivers feed eventually into the River Meghna, which discharges into the Bay of 
Bengal at a peak rate of 5 million cubic feet per second, making it, with the Amazon and 
Orinoco, one of the world's largest rivers.
The climate of Greater Sylhet is sub-tropical, with a marked cool season from December 
to February. Rainfall in the Meghna basin's catchment area is heavy; Zafflong, 50km 
north of Sylhet town, records on average a staggering 12,700mm per annum. Table 5.1 
presents the more reasonable rainfall figures for Srimangal beside Hail Haor. There is a 
pronounced monsoon season, with 93% of rain falling between April and October.
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The Meghna Basin acts as a funnel for the monsoon run-off from Assam, Meghalaya and 
Tripura. The River Meghna breaks its banks, creating a patchwork of floodplains 
("haors") in the triangle between Sylhet, Habiganj and Mymensingh. These water-bodies, 
known collectively as the "Haor Belt", support one of Bangladesh's principal inland 
fisheries. Greater Sylhet contains 29% of Bangladesh's beels by area (DOF 1986) and 
contributed 14% of the beel and floodpiain catch in 1987/8 (DOF 1988). Fisheries 
provide around 2% of Greater Sylhet's Gross Regional Product (BBS 1992).
Hail Haor: physical geography
Hail Haor itself is on the southern edge o f the "Haor Belt", five miles north-west o f 
Srimangal town (24°23'N, 91°50'E), in Srimangal Thana (Sub-District) and Moulvi Bazar 
Zila (District). Figure 5.1 shows the Haor's principal features.
Hail Haor is on the northern edge of the Tripura foothills and is bounded to the east, 
south and west by low, lateritic hills. These are mostly wooded or under tea cultivation 
but recent years have seen increases in the area o f exposed soil, which the Thana 
Fisheries Officer (TFO) and Thana Nirvahi (Executive) Officer hold responsible for 
accelerated silt deposition in the Haor.
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Accounts of Hail Haor's area under water vary. FAP6 (1992) gives a dry season area of 
2,800 ha and a monsoon area of 9,400 ha whereas Srimangafs TFO gives a flooded area 
of 9,000 ha. This study estimates that Hail Haor covered 1,800 ha during the 1992/3 dry 
season and 13,600 ha at the height of the flood in June 1993.
Hail Haor's water-level during the flood season is around 4m above the dry-season 
minimum. Number 1 Beel, for example, was around 0.4m deep in February 1993, 4.5m 
deep in June 1993, 3.5m deep in September 1993 and 3.0m deep in October 1993.
Hail Haor is fed by at least 352 choras, creeks that drain the surrounding hills. Their 
banks are well-defined, cutting down as deep as 3 metres into the laterite. After rain they 
become rapid torrents and their water becomes cloudy with rust-coloured sediment. Hail 
Haor's most important feeder is the Gopla Nodi (or Lungla Nodi), a permanent river 
running through the depression from south to north. Its catchment area goes back into the 
hills of Tripura.
The haor only has one outflow, at its north-west edge, whence the Gopla flows through 
another haor, Manik Haor, towards the Manu River. The Manu joins the Kushiara River 
north of Moulvi Bazar and the Kushiara flows into the Meghna River.
The link with the main river system downstream is very narrow. As it leaves Hail Haor, 
beside Pachaon, the Gopla River passes through a "bottleneck". During the flood season 
this nexus is around 5m deep and 500m broad, narrowing to 200m between the Pachaon 
embankments. During the dry season the Gopla River is only 15m broad as it leaves Hail 
Haor.
The flow of water in Hail Haor is almost always from south to north. Flooding in the 
Kushiara only causes the Gopla River to back up into Hail Haor around one year in five 
and then only for three or four days. The outflow at Pachaon is imperceptible during the 
dry season and rises to around 2km/h during the monsoon. Hail Haor's water-level, 
however, reflects that of the Kushiara and Meghna. If, as in March 1993, there is heavy 
rain in the Gopla Nodi's catchment area alone, the water-level in Hail Haor rises, but falls 
to its original level overnight.
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Figure 5.1. Hail Haor.
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A number o f embankments have been constructed in Hail Haor. Many, protruding from 
dry land into the floodplain, serve to improve access to paddy land and the haor itself and 
are frequently used as fish landing sites. A large artificial embankment runs close to the 
haor's southern and eastern shores. It was constructed before 1947, possibly in order to 
improve access to paddy land. Fishermen, however, complain that it has accelerated the
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siltation of 62 Beel on its southern side. Local people have cut several openings through 
the embankment for boats to pass through and this no doubt eases fish movement.
The Gopla River has a levee on each side throughout its length. They are scarcely 
noticeable in the southern half of the haor but are as high as 3m adjacent to Mirzapur and 
Pachaon. Local people have made several cuts on the eastern levee to improve boat 
access to the beels.
During the flood season Hail Haor is an unbroken expanse of water. Between October 
and February, however, its features appear, first the south-eastern embankment and then 
the Gopla River's levee. By December a number of depressions, or beels, become 
apparent. By late February, only the Gopla River and the haor’s three largest beels, 62 
Beel, Number 1 Beel and Beri Beel, hold water.
Any water shallower than around lm supports water-hyacinths and water-lilies. By 
January only the Gopla River is not covered. The gradient on the eastern side is steeper 
than that on the western side. It is on the east, therefore, that there is most 
macrovegetation.
The land between the lines of maximum and minimum flood is used as paddy and pasture 
during the dry season. Land that appears before September may grow aus (floating rice) 
and/or aman (autumn rice). Land that appears between October and December may 
support boro (winter rice). Most rice cultivation is on the eastern side of the haor because 
of its shallower gradient.
The 1980s saw a rapid increase in the use of chemical insecticides on boro rice around 
Hail Haor. The Department of Fisheries and its donors have expressed concern about 
their toxicity to fish on a national level. FAP 17 has found low concentrations of pesticide 
residues in floodplain water but is uncertain as to their importance. (B. McCarton per s.
comm.)
Hail Haor: the study period
Running as it did from October 1992 to November 1993, the study period covered the 
second half of the 1992-3 flood season and the first half of the 1993-4 flood season. Both 
of these seasons were abnormal in different ways.
The 1992 monsoon was unusually late and dry. The FAP 6 project, responsible for flood 
monitoring in Greater Sylhet, described 1992-3 as a "one in ten year drought" (G. 
Bemaczek,pers. comm.). Between December 1992 and January 1993, moreover, a
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serious outbreak of ulcerative fish disease reduced stocks of Puntius spp. and snakeheads. 
If caught alive, infected fish could be sold, but only at a discount of around 50%. Fish 
catches and sales were therefore lower than average in 1992-3.
The 1993 monsoon was unusually early and heavy in Greater Sylhet and was described as 
"a one in twenty-five year flood." More than 90% of Hail Haor's aus rice crop was 
destroyed by the flood in June 1993. By the same month, however, fishermen and fish- 
traders were predicting an excellent fishing season. By late October 1993, high yields and 
the unseasonable appearance of large Labeo rohita in the catch made it clear that their 
predictions were correct.
Hail Haor: The fish
Table 5.2 shows the fish species found in the catch from Hail Haor. Dhaka dialect 
equivalents are given when the local fish name is different.
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Table 5.2. Species o f fish observed in the catch from Hail Haor. 1992-4
Local name Scientific name
baim M a sta cem b a lu s  spp. X
baliara, baila* G lo s s o g o b iu s  g i u r i s x x x
bera, mini* Nandus nandus XX
boal W allago  a tu
boisha C o l i s a  spp. xxx
carpo, carfu* C y p r in u s  c a r p io
chanda Chanda nama x xx
chingri,issa*,gungi shrim p x xx
darkina Rasbora  r a s b o r a xxx
go jar O p h ic e p h a lu s  (Channa) m a r u l i u s
gonia Labeo g o n iu s
kakiya, kaika* X en en to d o n  c a n c i l a X
kalbaush, kaliara* Labeo c a lb a s u
kalna, kangla* N o t o p te r u s  n o t o p t e r u s X
katla, katol K a t la  k a t l a
kawa* Chaca chaca XX
koi Anabas t e s t u d i n e u s X
koia C o l is a  spp. x xx
magur C l a r i a s  b a t r a r c h u s
mokha, mola Am blypharyngodon  spp. xxx
mrigal C i r r h i n u s  m r ig a la
pabda Ompok pabda X
potka C helenodon  f l u v i a t i l i s xxx
pupul O p h ic e p h a lu s  ( Channa ) b a rca XX
puti P u n t iu s  spp. xxx
rui, rohu Labeo r o h i t a
shing, shingi* H e te r o p n e u s t e s  f o s s i l i s X
silver H y p o p h th a lm ic h th y s  m o l i t r i x
shol O p h ic e p h a lu s  ( Channa) s t r i a t u s
taki, sheng*, lati* O p h ic e p h a lu s  (C h a n n a )p u n c ta tu s X
tengra M y s tu s  v i t t a t u s XX
* denotes regional name
x denotes small fish, usually caught at 10cm-20 cm 
xx denotes very small fish, usually caught at 5cm-12 cm 
xxx denotes tiny fish, usually caught at 2cm - 8cm
Scientific names from Rahman (1989)
In contrast to the huge literature upon aquaculture biology, very little is known of the 
floodplain fish species' life-cycles. (FAP 17's fish migration research will produce new 
results in m id-1994.) For the purpose o f this study, however, a few key points will suffice:
a) Most fish species spawn only at the start of the flood in May and June.
b) The snakehead species (Channa! Ophicephalus spp.), which are 
physiologically capable of spawning all year round, also produce most o f their 
fry at the start o f the flood.
c) At the start of the flood non-snakehead fish migrate upstream into the haor 
from the Gopla River.
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d) Between June and November, when Hail Haor is an unbroken expanse o f 
water, fish can move between auction units.
e) Fish growth is fastest during the flood.
f) Whereas small fish species are dispersed evenly across the haor, large fish 
species concentrate in deep water.
The bio-economic models will show how these aspects o f fish ecology inter-act with the 
leasing system and fisheries policy to determine the distribution o f fishermen's incomes.
Artificial stocking in Hail Haor
The Department o f Fisheries' Second Aquaculture Development Project (ADPII) stocked 
Hail Haor with Chinese and Indian carps in 1991, 1992 and 1993. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
show the stocking rates for 1991 and 1992 (32 tonnes o f carp fingerlings were stocked in 
1993).
The 1992 stocking was delayed until September by late rains and delays in the 
procurement of fingerlings. High temperatures, shallow water and low oxygenation (15 
ppm on the 21/9/92) led the DOF to abandon it before the programme was complete. The 
1993 stocking was again delayed until September, this time by delays in procuring fish 
poison for the removal o f predator species.
Table 5.3. Stocking o f Hail Haor 1991
Species % Survival rate (%) Mean sale weight(g)
Katla 10.7 13.5 705
Rohu 12.6 17.2 505
Mrigal 8.2 8 367
Grass Carp .8 .9 n/a
Common Carp 4.1 6 n/a
Silver Carp 63.8 14.1 430
Source: Aquaculture Development Project II
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Table 5.4. Stocking o f  Hail Haor 1992
Species Fingerlings (kg) (number)
Katla 2, 000 100,000
Rohu 4, 600 291,000
Mrigal 4, 400 299,000
Grass Carp 1, 000 82,000
Common Carp 400 18,000
Silver Carp 7, 000 490,000
Source: Srimangal TFO
The ADPII also stocked a pond in Hazipur village in 1992. The project cut a ditch from 
the pond to Hail Haor so that the fingerlings would enter the haor. However, a 
government officer closed the channel and leased out the pond to a private individual.
The stocked species, Chinese and Indian carps, are large, fast-growing fish and, with one 
exception, tend to concentrate in deep water. It is therefore relatively easy to enforce 
rights over them and to catch them with brush-piles and pumps. The exception is the 
Silver Carp (Hypophthalmichthys molitrix). Because this fish does not settle in deep 
water it is easily caught by poorer fishermen's faron traps and gill-nets as early as 
November. It was removed from ADPII's stocking programme in 1993 on the grounds 
that it was being caught too early.
Fishing gear in Hail Haor
The fishermen of Hail Haor use a variety o f nets, hooks and traps. Along with boats, they 
constitute the fishermen's capital stock. Their catching efficiency, cost, working-life, 
water requirements, boat requirements and labour requirements are factors that influence 
fishermen's choice o f technique and thus the pattern o f effort applied to the fishery.
1 Gill nets
Two types o f gill net (fash jal/fai jal) operate in Hail Haor, those made of spun nylon 
thread (sometimes known as "parachute") and the illegal current jal, made of nylon 
monofilament thread. Both come in stretched-diameter mesh sizes o f 3/4", 2" and 3". The 
mesh size determines the catch composition; large fish are more likely to brush off the 
smaller mesh sizes and small fish can swim through the wider meshes. Hail Haor's 
fishermen travel over 50km to Chadpur or Boirob to buy both nets.
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The study team estimated by direct observation that around 90% of the gill-nets used in 
Hail Haor are illegal current jals and of these 80% have a stretched diameter mesh-size of 
3/4". The price of current jal is approximately Tkl,000/lb, which covers 75 yards at a 
mesh size of 3/4". Current jals only last for six months after which the household may use 
it as fencing for poultry.
The price of the spun nylon gill net is Tk 340/lb for narrow mesh and Tk 240/lb for wide 
mesh, lib of this net stretches for 75 yards and 125 yards for narrow and wide mesh 
respectively. The fishermen of Buruna and Hazipur, who are relatively rich and therefore 
most likely to buy new nets, sometimes sell them by the mut (60 yards) onto a second­
hand market after six months or one year of use. The price is three-quarters and one half 
of the new price respectively. As gill-nets age and holes appear they lose their ability to 
catch large fish, although some repairs can be made. The spun nylon gill nets are said to 
be useless after two years.
Some fishermen set these gill nets for twelve hours a day, checking the net at four-hourly 
intervals. Others leave the net set for two or three days at a stretch, after which it is 
brought onto land for drying and repairs. The smallest gill net fishing team consists of the 
net itself, one person and a boat, but it is possible for up to 8 fishermen with gill-nets 
from different households to form a fishing group.
Migratory Siberian waterfowl visit Hail Haor between December and February. A small 
minority of fishermen stretch 2" mesh current jals above the water between bamboo poles 
and scare birds into them.
2 Cast net
The jhaki jal or ural jal is a cast net worked by one person. Its mesh size varies from 0.5" 
to 3". The advantage of a narrow-mesh net is that nothing escapes between the filaments; 
the advantage of a wide mesh is that the same throw covers a larger area. It is estimated 
that the stretched diameter mesh size of 80%-90% of cast nets is no greater than 1". Hail 
Haor's fishermen buy them cast nets in Srimangal or Moulvi Bazar, where a 3.5 yard net 
sells for approximately Tk 540. The metal weights attached to the rim of the net sell for 
Tk 40/kg and the net requires 5kg of weights to function. The net itself usually lasts for 




The bel jal is a net spread within a triangular bamboo frame and mounted upon a bamboo 
scaffold in shallow water. The frame pivots like a see-saw so that the fisherman can raise 
the net by climbing onto, or pulling a rope attached to, one comer of it, which he does 
every five to fifteen minutes. Two fishermen usually work a bel jal together; the work is 
laborious and more efficient if broken into shifts. A boat is often required to reach the net 
and transport the catch.
The net itself sells for Tk 3,500 to Tk 5,000 and lasts for three years if repaired after two 
years. Tk 300 of bamboo is required to construct the mount, but this quickly rots and 
must be replaced after 6 months. Fishermen explain that they can usually construct a bel 
jal in paddy land free of charge, but must pay a fee to construct one in one of the Haor's 
jalmohols.
The smaller dhormi jal is operated from dry land by a rope. It is therefore more suited to 
the steeper banks of canals, boro pits, ditches and rivers and was not observed in Hail 
Haor.
4 Hooks
Two hook-fishing techniques are used in Hail Haor. They are both called "hook-giving", 
but their catch composition and economics are very different.
Long lines are by far the most common hook-fishing technique. Fish hooks are attached 
to nylon threads around 10cm long which are in turn tied 3 to 5 yards apart on a coarse 
jute line that is usually more than 500 yards and can be up to 3000 yards long. The long 
line is set beneath the surface, either slung between bamboo poles or resting on natural 
aquatic vegetation. It takes around two hours to place, is set for between 2-8 hours and 
takes another three hours to lift. Long-liners usually follow one of two timetables: either 
they set the hooks in the late afternoon and lift them at dawn for the morning market or 
they set them at down and lift them in the early afternoon for the evening market. The 
catch composition is similar in each case.
Towards the end of the flood season, however, another practice occurs. Large hooks, 
baited with 3cm live-bait, are suspended in the evening from 10-20 metre lines an inch 
above the water’s surface. The bait's spasms attract large boal, shol and gojar. Bait 
purchase constitutes the major cost of this technique: the cost of snakehead fry is around 
half the value of the fish it will catch.
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The hooks come in various sizes and qualities. The small Korean hooks most commonly 
used in Hail Haor sell in Srimangal for Tk 14 per 100. They rust and break, however, 
after only 15 to 20 days. The hooks, nylon thread and jute line are sold in every fish- 
market and retail market around Hail Haor. Some fishermen buy a small amount every 
day. A boat is almost always necessary.
Earthworms and shrimp are the most common bait for long lines. Froglets and small fish 
(iChanda nama, Puntius spp.) are used for the larger hooks on long-lines. Adult frogs and 
snakehead fry are used for over-water hooks.
Male household members dig up the earthworms with hoes. If small fish or shrimp are 
used as bait, the fisherman either buys them from retail fish-markets or operates a small 
number (6-12) of dori traps. Male household members catch froglets and adult frogs in 
paddy fields with push-nets. The fishermen either buy snakehead fry from fish-markets or 
catch them themselves with push-nets.
It takes around 40 minutes to bait 100 hooks. Most fishing households bait their own 
hooks. Others hire men, women or children for this task at a going rate of Tk 5 per 100 
hooks. Female participation in baiting is noticeably higher in Hindu households.
5 Tana jal (mokha jal)
The tana jal (called a mokha jal on the N.W. side of Hail Haor) is a seine net, typically 45 
yards by 9 yards with a stretched diameter mesh size of 7mm-9mm.
During the flood season tana jals are used to encircle fish in deep water. Each end of the 
net is towed by one boat or, in rough weather, by swimmers. During the dry season, 
however, the water is often too shallow for the net to be dragged. The fishermen then set 
the net in an arc between 2 boats. 3 or 4 other boats lie about 10 metres distant on the 
concave side. At a given signal the outlying fishermen start circling the net, thrashing the 
water with their poles, shouting and banging metal pots to scare the fish into the net. 
Meanwhile the two inner boats come together and the catch is hauled.




A brush pile, or dol, or dol kata, is a type of fish aggregating device (FAD). Like pump- 
fishing, it is one of the most profitable and capital-intensive fishing techniques used on 
Hail Haor.
Brush-piles are constructed in deep water between November and December. First, a 
rectangular area of up to 0.5ha is marked out with bamboo stakes around 8m apart. Then 
brushwood is submerged within the rectangle and pinned to the bottom mud with 
bamboo. Water-hyacinths are brought to float above the brushwood. The resulting 
artificial fish habitat attracts fish, especially the larger species such as carps, Channa 
striatus and Channa marulius.
The dol is fished between January and April in an operation that lasts between two and 
ten days. First, the brush-pile is enclosed by a seine net (dol jal) attached to the bamboos 
on its perimeter. The dol jal's stretched diameter mesh size is 1/2" below the water and 2" 
above the surface. Then, starting at one side of the brush-pile, the brushwood is removed 
and the net is moved up against what remains. When all the brushwood has been taken 
out, the dol is fished out by repeated tana jal passes.
Sometimes the dol jal is not tightened at the end of the day after the day's brush has been 
removed. The dol-owner may then use a practise known as "tepwal" or "tepi" whereby a 
cast-net fisherman fishes in the part of the dol without any brushwood. Tepwal cast- 
netting is said to help the dol-owner by scaring fish back into the brushwood whence they 
are less likely to escape from the dol jal.
7 Taki jal
Taki jal is a seine net of around 20 yards by 10 yards used as a lift net, frequently found 
in Gopla Nodi. Four bamboo poles are planted in the water and the net's comers are slung 
from them. The two upstream comers are periodically dropped into the water and pegged 
back up. At 3", the taki jal's mesh size is comparatively large. This is to permit rapid 
lifting. Taki jal fishermen frequently have days when no fish enters the net that is large 
enough to be held by the wide mesh.
8 Push nets
When interviewed, fishermen and "non-fishermen" frequently omit to list their push net 
(felun jal, plen jal, mokha jal) as fishing equipment, perhaps because it is such a common 
household tool as to be beneath mention. The push net is suited to paddy, submerged
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pasture, ditches, and puddles and even filters mud. It sells for Tk 175, of which Tk 25 
covers the triangular bamboo frame, and lasts for around 6 months. The mesh size is 
usually in the range 7mm - 9mm.
The push net is either operated by one person, sometimes a child, without a boat or by 
two people, one poling a boat and the second holding the net in the bow. A third method 
is to use the push net with a thick rope. Two people agitate the water with the rope, 
driving fish into a push net held by a third. This combination is called "gusa jal".
9 Fish traps
The smallest, most common trap is the dori, a box made from slivers of split bamboo 
2mm apart, with a slit on two opposite vertical faces. The fish enter the slits by pushing 
through a V-shaped straw "valve" which closes again behind them. The fishermen remove 
the catch through a square hole in the top surface. Dori are sold and used by the dozen. 
Their price varies according to demand, from Tk 120/dozen during the monsoon to 
Tk200/dozen in November. They last for around 3 months.
The faron is a larger version of the dori with a 1cm mesh size. It costs Tk 40 per piece 
and lasts for around 6 months.
The boshni trap is a 90cm by 60cm envelope made from slivers of split bamboo 2mm 
apart. Each of its two faces contains six openings with an o-shaped straw "valve". It sells 
for Tk 200 per piece.
The lunga and koin traps are bell-shaped with an circular valve at one end. Of the two, 
the wider koin is more suited to catching larger fish. Both are comparatively rare and it 
was impossible to obtain a market price.
The traps are not baited. There are two systems of trap placement, in paddy field 
embankments or in mid-water barricades:
Paddy field embankments: Plots of paddy land are surrounded by 5cm-15cm mud 
embankments. When the flood falls below the level of the embankment, water and small 
fish are trapped inside the plot. Some fishermen and farmers then fit dori or bosni traps 
into breaches in the embankment. The fish are caught as the current drawns them out of 
the plot. This technique does not require a boat.
M id-water barricades: As fne flood recedes fishermen build barricades (bandh) of 
aquatic vegetation up to 1km long across the water. Each barricade location has its own 
name and is allocated by the lessee or sub-lessee to a specific group of fishermen. They 
make gaps in the barricade and set dori, bosni and faron traps into them. When fish
attempt to pass the barricade they are caught. Figure 5.2 below illustrates the placement 
o f large barricades m Number 1 Beel.
Figure 5.2. Barricade-trapping in No. 1 Beel
o Garaduba Bandh
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Fish traps are manufactured locally by Hindu fishing households. To produce a dori, a 
faron and a boshni takes around 8 hours, 14 hours and 30 hours respectively. Usually, 
however, the household adopts a "production-line" system, performing each stage of the 
manufacturing process for batches o f 1 -3 dozen traps at a time. A boat is necessary for 
barricade-trappi ng.
10 Dewatering by pump
It is sometimes possible to empty a depression (beel) by raising a mud embankment 
around it and removing the water by means of a diesel pump ("machine"). Carps and 
small fish are removed from the surface of the mud. Larger snakeheads (shol, gojar) and 
catfish are dug out. The resulting pit may be over two metres deep and creates a prime 
fish habitat for the following season.
11 Dewatering by hand
Groups o f 3-5 men with scoops remove the water from an embanked paddy field and 
collect fish from the mud Fanners use this technique to bring forward the date of 
planting. Labour (Tk2Q-40/'person/day) is the main cost.
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12 Fishing by means of macro vegetation
A manual fishing method known as "panga" is practised in shallow water. Groups of 4 or 
5 fishermen make a circular embankment of water weeds. It is initially around twenty 
metres in diameter. They then walk around the embankment many times, pushing the 
weeds towards the centre as they go. When the circle is three metres in diameter it is 
fished out with a push net (felun jal). Small fish such as boisa, chanda and shrimp are 
caught. A group is said to be able to build and fish one panga embankment per day. The 
felun jal is the only gear required.
13 Basket-fishing
A polo is a large, conical wicker basket with a 2” mesh size and a hole at the pointed end. 
It is dropped wide-end-down in shallow water. The fisherman inserts his arm through the 
hole and gropes for any large fish that have been trapped between the basket and the mud.
Gear selectivity
The composition of the catch by species varies by season and gear. Table 5.5 presents an 
account of gear selectivity in Hail Haor for November 1992-November 1993. It shows 
that small species dominate the catch of hooks, gill-nets, traps and tana jals, the gears 
most commonly used by fishermen. Only the relatively expensive brush-piles have a high 
proportion of carps, the stocked species, in their catch. After the brush-pile season has 
finished in March, carps almost completely disappear from Hail Haor's catch, suggesting 
that they have been fished out. Although cast nets appear to have caught large non-carp 
species between March and May, these observations relate to tepwal fishing and could 
therefore be included with the brush-pile catch.
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1 abie 5.5. (Jear selectivity bv category of species. Haii Haor. November 1992-November 
1993.
Large species * ** ***
Carps others small v.. small tiny total n
Jun—Auer
Bosni - - - - -
Cast - - - - -
Dol - - - - -
Dori 0 0 0 3 98 100 4
Dry - - - - -
£ aron - - - - -
Felun 0 29 3 3 65 100 14
Gill 13 3 56 7 21 100 17
Hook 0 9 80 9 1 100 23
BHook 0 99 1 0 0 100 7
Lift - - - - -rp _ ^ 1 7 o o Qi o 1UU O
Spear - - - - -
Taki - - — - —
—
Sep-Nov
Bosni - - - - -
Cast - - - - -
Dol - - - - -
Dori 0 0 1 0 100 100 4
Dry - - - - -
Faron - - - -
Felun 1 13 15 0 7 0 100 8
Gill 5 3 49 23 20 100 15
Hook 0 10 75 8 7 100 14
BHook 0 100 0 0 0 100 7
Lift 1 0 4 1 95 101 5
Tana 0 0 2 0 98 100 7
Spear - - - - -
Taki — ~ — —
-
Bosni _ _ _ _ .
Cast - - - - -
Dol 60 cD 0 2 33 100 X
Dori 0 o 1 2 96 100 12
Dry 1 24 45 6 24 100 13
Faron 17 2 48 8 24 100 8
Felun 0 5 30 5 60 100
Gill 17 7 44 6 26 100 22
Hoo k 0 7 93 AU 0 i no±U 13
BHook - - - - - -
Lift 0 0 19 6 75 100 3
Tana 37 17 9 2 35 100
Spear 32 42 25 0 0 100 5
Taki - - - - - -
Mar-May
Bosni 0 0 8 4 88 100 1
Cast 0 100 0 0 0 100 2
Dol - - - - - -
Dori 0 0 3 1 96 100 9
Dry - - - - - -
Faron 0 1 88 5 6 100 4
Felun 0 0 0 0 100 100 5
Gill 1 3 32 16 48 100 5
Hook 0 3 97 1 0 100 7
BHook - - - - - -
Lift - - - - - -
Tana - - - - - -
Spear 25 38 37 0 0 100 2
Taki 0 0 0 0 100 100 2
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Notes to Table 5.5:
-The data for dry fishing is provisional.
-All observations are weighted equally, irrespective of the weight of the catch.
-Species categories are as defined in Table 5.2.
Fisheries specialists in Bangladesh, however, frequently underestimate the importance of 
small species, dismissing them as "trash fish", "commercially less important" (Tsai 1991 
p.2) or "miscellaneous fish". Coulter and Disney (1987) state that most small fish in the 
catch are the juveniles of larger species, which is patently untrue. This bias exists for 
several reasons:
a) the DOF and projects often use catch data from the operators of deep beels 
(e.g. Aquatic Farms Ltd 1992) where larger fish congregate and are caught.
b) the senior civil servants and expatriates who design fisheries policy are less 
familiar with small fish species because they do not eat them.
c) fisheries policy-makers have often been trained in carp aquaculture.
d) there is little demand for small fish in the rich countries where fisheries 
science and management models have been developed.
e) most importantly, the poorer fishermen who depend upon small fish species 
cannot communicate their situation to policy-makers.
It is a major theme of this study that the underestimation of the economic importance of 
small species has a regressive distributional impact when it is translated into policy.
Seasonality in the Hail Haor fishery
By contrast with the temperate marine fisheries for which orthodox fisheries management 
economics was developed, the fishery ecology of Hail Haor is highly seasonal. Figure 5.3 
below shows how seasonal flooding and fish movements produce a seasonal pattern of 
gear use.
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Figure 5.3. The seasonal fishing ecology o f  Hail Haor
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
h y d r o l o g y
Rain <--- monsoon----- >
Water level <----- high----- ><-------- falling--- ><low>
No.1 Beel depth(m) 0.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
f i s h
life-cycle <spawning><— rapid growth— Xslower growth>
Large carps/Channa <— dispersed— > <— in depressions-^->
Small fish <----------------- dispersed--------------
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Fishing wages ----------- Tk40/day—
Credit <-- borrowing high---
Fish prices  high--------
Fishermen's income <------ low------ ><—
— x-Tk 50/dayXTk40/day—  
— ><— repayment high— >
— x ----- low----x — high-
— medium— x-high-xfalls>
Fishermen describe the beginning o f the monsoon as the most difficult part o f the year. At 
this time the Flaor is almost devoid of fish, the weather is unsuited to fishing and there is 
no demand from agriculture for hired labour. As the Haor's waters rise fish migrate 
upstream from the Kushiara and Manu Rivers and push nets, lift nets, traps and gill nets 
are brought into use. In November the demand for labour rises as the aman rice crop is 
harvested and brush-piles and grass barricades are constructed. The prevailing wage rate 
rises as a consequence. By December the water has receded to the point where the fish 
are concentrated in depressions such as No. 1 Beel and Gopla Nodi. Between December 
and April these depressions are fished out by means o f seine nets. Smaller beels may be 
encircled by wicker fences and pumped dry. The intensity o f activity peaks in January 
and gradually diminishes until the end o f April. The majority o f fishermen, however, state 
that they take no part in the fishing of depressions
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Conclusion
This chapter has described the ecology and fishing technologies of the Hail Haor fishery. 
A salient feature is the degree of heterogeneity; the fishery is effectively composed of a 
number of sub-fisheries, different combinations of season, gear, fish species and location, 
each with their own particular production function. In this, Hail Haor is distinctively 
different from temperate marine fisheries, wrhere fishing activity has approximately the 
same character irrespective of the season, location or target species.
A conspicuous feature of the Hail Haor system is therefore its asymmetry. There are large 
species with a high affinity for deep water and more dispersed small species. There is a 
flood season of dispersed fry and a dry season of concentrated adult fish. There are cheap 
gears producing small catches of small species on the floodplain and expensive gears 
catching spectacular quantities of larger species in depressions. The key to understanding 
the distributional impact of inland capture fisheries policy in Bangladesh is to know how 
these physical asymmetries inter-act with the no less pronounced socio-economic 
asymmetry of rural society.
94
Chapter 6
The Hail Haor fishery: the fishing population
Introduction
One purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the people who fish in Hail Haor. 
A knowledge of the social structures within which they operate wilt be essential for an 
understanding of the subsequent discussion of benefit allocation. This chapter will 
therefore describe fishing groups, fishing communities, fishing households and the 
fisherfolk's distinctive identity in rural Bangladeshi society.
The second purpose of this chapter is to discuss a sociological issue which bears directly 
upon the operation of fisheries management policy. Put bluntly, there is a popular 
generalisation, frequently found in the fisheries literature, that fisherfolk are an 
underclass, homogeneously poorer than the rest of rural society. The supporting theory is 
that assetless people can take up fishing as an occupation of last resort because fisheries 
are open-access. If it were so, then fisheries policy-makers could conceivably be 
exonerated from considering the distributional impaet of their policies; whatever was 
good for the fishery would be good for the poor because all fisherfolk would be poor 
people. I f  it is not so, on the other hand, then the distributional impact of fisheries policy 
is indeed crucial. This chapter will assess whether the concept of fisherfolk as an 
underclass is applicable to the Hail Haor fishery.
The communities around Hail Haor
The four Unions around Hail Haor, Kalapur, Srimangal (excluding Srimangal town), 
Bonabir and Mirzapur, have a combined population of 68,247 (BBS 1990) and a surface 
area of 178knr% giving a population density of 383 persons/km^. This is low compared 
with the national population density of 768 persons/km^ (BBS 1992), but largely because 
these four unions include Hail Haor itself and the relati vely lightly-populated tea gardens. 
In fact, the level of population congestion in the villages beside Hail Haor is as high as 
the national average. In the mid-1980s there were 4 people per acre of agricultural land 
(Jansen 1987) for Bangladesh as a whole. For our 6 sample villages around Hail Haor 
there were 5 people per acre of agricultural land in November 1992.
A satellite image of Hail Haor shows an almost unbroken band of human settlements on 
the eastern, southern and western sides of the haor, between the line of maximum flood 
and the foot of the surrounding hills. Most houses (ghor) are grouped into yards (bari)
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which are grouped into quarters (para). Because there are often no open spaces between 
quarters, the "village" has no objective physical boundaries. The government has defined 
revenue villages (mauza) and administrative villages (gram) but local people have their 
own conceptual village (gram) boundaries, which are often little more than footpaths 
running between two yards. The village names used in this study refer to the villagers' 
own village definitions.
Only 49.5% of the population of Srimangal Thana is recorded as Muslim, as opposed to 
85% (Jansen 1987) for Bangladesh as a whole, This exceptionally low figure can be 
attributed to 2 factors: the employment of Hindu labour in the tea-gardens and the in- 
migration of Hindus seeking refuge from Muslim "pogroms" elsewhere. Out-migration 
after Partition and Independence reduced Bangladesh's Hindu population from 33% of the 
total in 1901 to its current level of 12% (BBS 1992). This process was less marked in 
Greater Sylhet, where Hindus are now 18% of the population (BBS 1992). Some border 
areas within Bangladesh, like Srimangal, became "safe havens" for Hindu migrants and 
received net in-migration of Hindus. It is one of very few regions with a growing Hindu 
population (3% p.a. 1974-81, BBS 1992). The next chapter will explain how the Hindus' 
strong numerical presence is of great importance for fishery management as Hindu and 
Muslim factions compete for access to fishing rights.
Srimangal must be one of Bangladesh's most vibrant Thana towns. It has an unusually 
high number of retailers, warehouses, wholesalers and vehicle repairers. Migrant 
remittances are one source of the town's prosperity; 90% of Bangladeshis in Great Britain 
are from Greater Sylhet. Srimangal also serves as the railhead for all of Moulvi Bazar 
Zila and as a market for the tea-gardens of the Balisera and Satgaon valleys.
The haor is provided with comparatively good communications. The Dhaka-Sylhet trunk 
road serves the villages on its east and south banks. The west bank is linked to the main 
road by a smaller metalled road. Although the road is in poor condition, a regular bus 
runs as far as Mirzapur. Srimangal has a main-line station and the Gopla River carries 
freight, including fish, during the monsoon.
A note on ternsinology
The word "fisherman" must be used with caution, as its meaning varies according to the 
speaker's intentions. Caste fishermen use it to distinguish themselves from other 
fishermen when asserting the greater legitimacy of their fishing rights. Non-caste 
fishermen use it to distinguish caste fishermen from themselves to stress their own 
separate status. People who finance fishing or market fish define themselves as
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"fishermen" in order to benefit from fishery support projects. They are frequently 
supported in this assertion by government officials. The poverty-oriented NGO BRAC 
defines a fisherman as anybody who catches fish with his own hands. The Department of 
Fisheries' NFMP defines a "professional fisherman" as one who devotes 9 months of the 
year or receives 90% of his income from fishing, apparently ignoring the fact that many 
fisheries hold water for less than nine months in the year.
Similarly, the phrase "non-fisherman" has entered the Bengali language to denote 
somebody who does not catch fish, who is not a caste fisherman or to whom the speaker 
simply wishes to deny fishing rights. Bangladesh thus has hundreds of thousands of "non- 
fishermen" who catch and sell fish.
The phrase "subsistence fisherman" is equally ambiguous. People who catch fish for 
consumption only are called "subsistence fisherfolk" or "non-fishers". Moreover, the 
phrases "part-time fishermen" and "subsistence fishermen" are used interchangeably for 
those who do not qualify as "professional fishermen" but catch fish for sale.
This study uses "fisherman" to mean a person who catches fish, or himself goes onto the 
water to supervise the catching of fish, for sale at any time during the year. (The "-man" 
suffix is appropriate in this case because only males fish for sale in Hail Haor.) The word 
"fisherfolk" shall refer to all the members of fishermen's households. To avoid ambiguity, 
the word "subsistence" will be avoided and replaced by the ungainly phrase "people who 
catch fish for consumption only".
The number of fisherfolk
Even where fishermen camp on their boats or beside the haor, their villages are always 
within 2km of the Haor, the camps being to minimise travelling time and to guard nets 
and fishing grounds. Fishermen say that their number is growing, but only because of 
population growth in the fishing community. They say that there is no in-migration of 
fishermen to Hail Haor and no adoption of fishing by other households.
The fishermen live in recognised fishing communities. These are 17 in number. The 
Thana Fisheries Officer (TFO) provided estimates of the number of fishing households in 
each community (Table 6.1).
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Tablg_6. L Estimated distribution o f  fishing households around Hail Haor
Coiranuni ty No. of fishing households
Shulpur 1000 (2000) M
Pachaun 500 ( 300) M
Mi r zapur 500 - M
Bolashi 150 ( 40) H
Bonabir 100 ( 175) H
Vimshi/Goshnogor 50 - H
Rustumpur 200 ( 500) H
Uttosur 50 ( 200) H
Udnarpar 200 Not fishing
Bilashirpar 100 Not fishing
Amarnathpur 150 - •?
Srimangal Busti 1500 ( 650) M
Baraura 1000 ( 500) H/M
Monargaon 200 ( 200) H
Hazipur 1500 1 (8000) M
Buruna 2000 1 M
Shohostri (n/a) (500) M
Source: Srimangal Thana Fisheries Officer (TFO)
(The village's own estimate o f the number o f fishermen is in brackets.)
H = Hindus 
M = Muslims
Given the huge disparities between the estimates o f the TFO and the communities 
themselves, neither was accepted as reliable. Instead, fishing population estimates 
calculated from the Fishing Population Survey are presented below in Table 6.2.
Table.6.2. Estim ation o f  ho useholds fishing for sale in Hail. Haor.
Male Estim. % of Estim
Method Male Voters no. h-holds fishii
Village * voters /h-hold h-holds fishing h-hol<
Buruna 1 1137 1.75 678 73 492
Hazipur 1 654 2.08 314 69 218
Monargaon 1 197 2.22 89 70 62
S.Busti 3 494 1.95 253 65 165
Baraura 3 331 2.15 154 85 131
Uttosur 4 917 1.85 495 50 250
Rustumpur 3 310 1.80 172 55 95
Ali sherkul 2 N/A* * 1.50 N/A N /A 30
Bolashi 3 780 2.26 345 20 69
Bonabir 3 699 2.05 341 10 34
Vimshi 2 656 1.94 338 20 69
N. Pachaon 3 181 1.53 118 35 41
M v rr o m iJ.11 J- VJ- J_ 2 489 1.63 300 48 145
Shohostri 3 403 1.30 310 20 62
ShulDur 3 350 1.75 200 85 170
Total 2033
C j L i U i .  u  o a i u p i C  O  <j
Total/sample 33.9
(* See earlier section for definition o f methods.)
(** No voter-list was available for Alisherkul.)
It was thus estimated that just over 2000 households were fishing for sale in Hail Haor 
either as their primary occupation or as a subsidiary occupation. The Catch-effort and 
Cash-fiow sample contained 60 households. Assuming the sample to be typical, the 
sample results can be multiplied by 33.9 to represent the whole Hail Haor
fishery.
Household iabour
The concept o f a household (poribar), being a group of people who eat together food 
cooked on the same hearth, is recognised and used in village conversation. Most
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production and consumption are organised at household level. The oldest male of the 
household's oldest generation is recognised by his household and others as the household 
head. Unless he is incapacitated by age or sickness, he acts as the household's spokesman. 
In a fishing household, the household head is usually able to describe household 
members' catch, income and expenses even if he does not go onto the water himself.
Households were classified according to the relationships between their married male 
members. The breakdown of households by composition is given in Table 6.3. O f the 133 
household heads interviewed, 132 were male. Even though one would expect the sample 
to be biased towards larger households, given the sampling method, the overwhelming 
majority o f households are nuclear, in the sense that they contain a single married couple. 
This explains the need for fishing households to combine into fishing groups.
Table 6.3. Classification o f households by composition
Household type Frequency
Household head and no other married males 85
Household head and married brother(s) 18
Household head and married sons 26
Household head, married brothers and married sons 4
TOTAL 133
The Catch-effort and Cash-flow Survey reveals how work is distributed between 
household members. Males enter the workforce around age 9 or when they leave school 
and leave it when they are incapacitated by age or disease. When a household's males are 
split between different activities it is the younger men that tend to fish. For example, a 
household head in his 50s with adult sons may market their fish, do agricultural work or 
tend livestock. One household head in Mirzapur supervised the hired labourers fishing his 
'orush-pile - one of whom was his own son. When more than one male is fishing, any 
adolescents are more likely to collect frogs or worms for bait or to fish with low-value 
gears like hooks or push-nets. Fishermen of all ages frequently take rest-days because o f 
sickness or exhaustion, especially between March and June.
Although females do not catch fish, both married and unmarried women do contribute 
labour to the fishery by baiting hooks, making nets and, most importantly, making and 
repairing traps. Their rate o f participation is much higher among Hindus than among 
Muslims for several reasons:
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a) The Koranic prohibition against men and women working together
b) Only Hindus manufacture traps. Women skilled in trap-making double several 
households' incomes in Alisherkul.
c) Purdah confers high status and poorer, Hindu households are less able to afford 
it.
We noted that fishermen's wives sometimes knew more of fish sales and fishing costs 
than the household's male members. It is possible that women in fishing households have 
more knowledge of and discretion over the household budget than their agricultural 
counterparts. During the dry season, when male household members are absent for up to a 
week at a time, they are left to maintain the supply of food. Fishing households also tend 
to buy rice for cash rather than grow it or receive it in kind. If, as Jansen (1987) writes, 
the household's senior female is responsible for managing its stock of rice, fishermen's 
wives will be more involved in managing the household's cash balances.
Fishing groups
As the foregoing discussion of fishing techniques indicated, some gears, especially seine 
nets, traps and gill nets, are operated most effectively by more fishermen than most 
households can provide. It is common, therefore, for fishermen from different households 
to band together into groups of 2 to 12 members.
The group's catch is sold collectively and the proceeds are shared among the members, 
after deductions for indivisible team expenses such as kerosene or large boat hire. It is 
usual for groups to avoid disputes by insisting that all group members provide the same 
gear. In the few tana jal (small seine net) groups where an outside net is used, a share is 
allocated to the gear. Again to prevent disputes, all group-members must contribute the 
same amount of labour. If illness or the need to travel forces a member to withdraw 
temporarily, he supplies a relative or hired labourer to take his place.
The most important criterion for gear membership is a fisherman's ability to bring along 
his share of fishing gear. It is unheard of for a fisherman to be included through family or 
social ties alone. Fishermen tend to join groups with people from their own bari, para, 
religion and village but all of these preferences are subordinate to gear-ownership.
In some cases, fishermen make a deliberate effort to recruit group-members from 
different paras in order to benefit from a combination of each para's skills and political 
status. The Buruna Maimals say they recruited Nomosudras because only they can work 
with fish-traps; the Hindus say they work with Muslims because otherwise their fish-traps
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would be stolen. In the words of a Muslim fish-trader, "They need our security." In most 
mixed groups the Hindus and Muslims come from neighbouring villages, but some 
Hindus are recruited in from Nabiganj, 40 miles away. The Muslims generally retain 
control over a mixed group’s marketing and accounting.
Groups do not have leaders, but rely upon a strict sharing of labour, costs and revenues to 
maintain cohesion. Every opportunity is taken to shift responsibility from the group to the 
individual. For example, many trap-groups only own the barricade in common, owning 
the traps and lifting the catch individually. Tana jal groups rarely own their net in 
common. Each member usually brings his own section of net, to be sewn onto the others 
at the start of the season and unstitched at the end. Group membership is fluid. They form 
and dissolve seasonally as different gear types are used and set aside. When last year's 
group re-forms it will simply replace any old member who cannot contribute his share of 
the group's costs (poisha).
Fishing groups, in short, are nor social organisations but an opportunistic means of 
obtaining economies of scale from labour. Within the group, social relationships are 
subordinate to commercial relationships. So far as a household's life-chances are 
concerned, therefore, the primary determinant is not its relationships with its fellow- 
fishermen but its access to gear and then to water. This theme will be developed in the 
chapters upon unequal access and the position of poor fisherfolk.
Fishing society
Underlying fisheries policy, and justifying its interventions, there is a quasi-official 
version of the fisherfolk's place in Bangladeshi society. It can be condensed into two 
statements:
a) "Genuine fishermen", also known as "professional fishermen" or "full-time 
fishermen", are recognisably distinct from "non-fishermen."
b) "Genuine fishermen" constitute an underclass that is exploited by "non­
fishermen". In the words of a DOF socio-economist, "They live sub-human lives 
at the mercy of the arotdar (wholesaler) and lessee" (Chowdhury 1993).
These assertions follow a powerful body of literature that sees fishing as an activity of 
iast resort and a refuge for the marginalised. Pollnac, for example, starts a discussion of 
fishermen’s organisations with the statement, "Small scale fishermen, who are frequently 
among the poorest of the poor in developing countries..." (Pollnac 1988, p.l). Kurien 
(1980) similarly proposes that the nature of fishing causes fishermen, whatever their 
ethnic group, to be relatively poor. He argues that fishermen are inward-looking, bound to 
nature rather than to local society, and therefore particular vulnerable to the depredations
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of middlemen and local politicians. Rahman (1986) asserts that inland fishing in 
Bangladesh is associated with landlessness and powerlessness, low-caste Hindus and 
failed Muslim peasants.
The view that fishermen are a socially distinct and exploited underclass serves to justify 
current fisheries policy, giving the impression that any foreign aid to the fisheries sector 
will be to the benefit of the very' poor. If fisherfolk are an underclass, then the allocation 
of fishing rights through Fishermen’s Associations will be equitable, artificial stocking 
becomes an exercise in poverty-alleviation and the eventual biomass gains from effort 
controls will reach those who need them most.
This study will contest, however, that this simplistic class analysis of fisherfolk’s position 
is not appropriate because they do not constitute a homogeneous underclass. It will be 
argued that they are separate but not subordinate to the rest of rural society and that 
fishing communities exhibit socio-economic structures which are in many ways a mirror 
image of their agrarian neighbours'.
The fishing identity
Those who catch fish in Hail Haor for sale fall into five social groupings:
a) Some villages contain Muslim communities specifically associated with 
fishing. They call themselves, and are called by others, "Maimal" or "motshojibi" 
(fisherman).
b) Some Hindu villages contain communities of Nomosudras, a fishing caste.
c) Some Hindu villages contain members of the Sarker agricultural caste who fish 
for sale. In at least one case, that of Alisherkul village, the shift from agriculture 
into fishing took place in the last 30 years. Residents of this village had farmed 
land to the north of Moulvi Bazar and fled to Hail Haor to escape the Muslim 
pogroms. In the words of one m an,"Since we were next to water we studied 
fishing," The Sarker fishermen are recognised as "motshojibi" rather than "non­
fishermen" by the Maimals. They are frequently referred to as "Nomosudra", 
suggesting that the fishing caste identity has touched them.
d) Some Muslim villages contain households that have recently taken to fishing 
tor sale with gill-nets. The Maimals and Hindu fishermen call them, rather 
confusingly, "non-fishermen", implying that the gill-netters have neither a Maimal 
identity nor a place in the leasing system. Although "non-fishermen fishermen" 
are an important feature of other floodplains (e.g. Blanchet and Talukder 1992), 
and some, from villages on the northern edge of the haor, set gill-nets in the Gopla 
Nodi north of Pachaon and in adjoining Manik Haor, they do not operate in Hail
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Haor proper. This is because the northern jalmohols are operated by Buruna 
village which is strong both numerically, financially and politically. In the words 
of one Buruna fisherman, ’’They are frightened to come near us. They know that 
we can beat (marte) them."
e) Those who fish for consumption only are drawn from all the communities 
around Hail Haor.
The phenomenon of migratory fishermen, though widespread in Bangladesh, is not found 
in Hail Haor: all those who fish there live there.
It is common for uneducated villagers who have not taken in the official line on 
Bangladeshi nationalism to make a distinction between Maimals and Nomosudras on the 
one hand and "Bengalis" on the other. Although Maimals and "Bengali" Muslims may 
live in the same block of houses (bari), they will not inter-marry. The "Bengalis" claim to 
look down on the Maimals and vice-versa. It is said, however, that the poorest "Bengalis" 
and Maimals will inter-marry out of necessity. Educated Bangladeshis will not describe 
the Muslim Maimals as a caste (jati), although they will use this word for the very similar 
Hindu Nomosudra.
Ehsan (1993), writing of Muslim "Mondot" fishermen in Tangail, argues that Muslim 
fishermen have no real caste identity. In his analysis, marriage between cousins and 
between fishing households, both for economic reasons, combine to produce an 
endogamous group with "no distinct cultural identity." This thesis, however, is 
contradicted by evidence from Hail Haor and Ehsan’s study itself: Both Mondols and 
Maimals see themselves as distinct from "new" fishing households, even if that household 
has been fishing for three generations. Mondols themselves believe that they are the 
descendants of Hindu caste fishermen. A Hail Haor Maimal can give up fishing but he 
and his children will remain Maimals, seen by themselves and others as different from 
"Bengalis."
Reinforcing the separateness of the caste identity is the distinctive nature of the 
fishermen's work. Fishermen relate proudly the indubitable fact that their work is more 
difficult and dangerous than agriculture. Often immersed in the water for hours at a time, 
they are prone to skin diseases, leeches and fevers. Although Hail Haor looks to a 
westerner like a placid lake, the fishermen consider it to be a haunt of pirates and 
malicious ghosts. (One "ghost" tipped a Buruna fisherman out of his boat in October 
1992. The resulting brain damage was seen as possession by evil spirits. Fishermen were 
frightened of him from then on and felt obliged to support him when he became a 
beggar.) Unsurprisingly, the fishermen have acquired a reputation for courage and self- 
reliance. A Catholic Missionary in Srimangal recalls that the Pakistan Army did not dare 
enter the fishing villages around Hail Haor during the War of Independence.
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The five fisherfolk groupings described above are spatial as well as social. Where only 
some residents of a village are fishermen, they tend to live in a recognised quarter (para) 
of the village. This is usually the waterside (lama) quarter. Where a village contains both 
Hindus and Muslims, each again tends to occupy a distinct space in the village. Within 
any one village there is a strong correlation between occupation and religious affiliation. 
In Mirzapur, for example, a community of Hindu shopkeepers and traders lives alongside 
a larger Muslim community of Maimal fisherfolk. In Shulpur a small group of Hindu 
landless labourers lives alongside the Maimal fishermen. In Monargaon, on the other 
hand, a community of Muslim landowners, businessmen and local politicians lives 
alongside a much larger community of Hindu Nomosudra fisherfolk.
As Jansen (1987) has stressed, it is within the para, rather than the village, that people 
form their most intimate social and economic relationships. It is thus possible for a 
Vimshi fisherman to point across a rice field to a row of houses 50 metres away and say, 
"They are not the same people (eki lok) as us." As we will see later, this has important 
implications for fisheries management because the para becomes the social template 
through which fisheries rights are allocated.
Sub-dividing the fisherfolk.
The "grey" literature generated by fisheries projects, for example Wood (1990) and BCAS 
(1992), frequently distinguishes between full-time and part-time fisherfolk and between 
subsistence and commercial fisherfolk. The rhetoric of the Department of Fisheries and 
its projects stresses the aid-worthiness of the "professional" fisherman. It is worth 
investigating whether these classifications are of value as socio-economic indicators.
Although fishermen are drawn from castes traditionally associated with fishing, a 
household's degree of participation in fishing is determined by opportunism, not by its 
professional identity. Households are constantly comparing the income to be obtained 
from fishing with that from other sources. They thus switch in and out of fishing several 
times during the year according to the catchability of the fish, the restrictiveness of the 
leasing system and the demand for labour on dry land.
For example, an adult Hindu male without enough land for subsistence might fish the 
flood from June to October, harvest aman rice as a hired labourer in November, make 
fish-traps from December to February, fish with hooks in March and April and spend 
May at home. In this particular case the switches would be caused by the imposition of 
fishing controls and a rise in the demand for labour in November, a fall in the demand for
105
labour and a rise in the demand for fish-traps in December, a fall in the demand for fish- 
traps in February and a fall in catch-per-unit effort in May.
A high degree of participation in fishing could either denote the existence of assets and 
opportunities in fishing or the absence of assets and opportunities on dry land. The 
phrases "part-time fishing households" and "full-time fishing households" do not 
therefore identify any social grouping. As an illustrative analogy one could consider the 
value of classifying office-workers according the proportion of their time spent behind a 
desk.
For the same reason of opportunism, the households described as engaged in "subsistence 
fishing" are economically heterogeneous. Any person that fishes for sale, from the brush- 
pile entrepreneur to the boy of 11 with the push-net, may retain fish for home 
consumption. Retained fish typically constitute 15-20% of the value of the catch. If a 
fisherman does not retain fish, this does not reveal the economic or social position of his 
household; it indicates rather that he does not wish to confuse the accounts of his fishing 
group or that he does not trust the fish to remain fresh until cooking time. Many 
households fish for consumption only during the monsoon season when agriculture 
generates no demand for labour, but these include land-owning, landless, predominantly 
farming and predominantly fishing households. "Subsistence fisherfolk" are therefore in 
no sense a recognisable social or economic order.
Indications of economic differentiation among fishing households
Between 57 sample households who received a positive net income from fishing between 
December 1992 and November 1993 there was a significant variation in recorded 
income. As Table 6.4 indicates, this holds true for total income, net income from fishing 
and, taking account of variation in household size, the hourly returns to labour from 
fishing. The 25% of households who received more than Tk7.5/hour from their fishing 
labour were certainly not low-paid in Bangladeshi terms, with agricultural labourers in 
Greater Sylhet earning Tk33/day (BBS 1992). Another indicator of economic 
differentiation between fishing households is the difference in incomes between villages. 
ANOVA shows a fishing household's village of residence to be a significant determinant 
of net fishing income (99% level of confidence), total income (95% level of confidence) 
and returns to labour from fishing (95% level of confidence). The notion that fisherfolk 
constitute a homogeneous underclass does not stand the most rudimentary statistical 
analysis. The subsequent discussions of gear ownership and fishing right allocation will 
explore how the differences in fishing households' incomes arise and are maintained.
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Table 6.4. Income comparisons by quartile for 57 fishing households. December 1992 to
November 1993











Economic status of fishing households as compared with others
As well as fishing gear and boats, the Preliminary Survey asked villagers to report on 
ownership o f homestead land, homestead roof type, agricultural land, watches, cycles and 
radios. They were also asked which o f their children were attending school. These 
indicators were used to make a comparison between the economic status o f households 
that fished and households that did not fish. Ownership o f each of the three luxury goods, 
watch, cycle and radio gave the household one luxury good point. A household's school 
enrolment rate was defined as the number o f children between the ages o f six and fifteen 
inclusive in attending school as a percentage of the total number of children in that age 
group. All means are unweighted.
The results are presented in Table 6.5. It shows that there is no statistically significant 
difference in these basic indicators between the fishing and non-fishing populations. The 
only exception is in ownership o f agricultural land where non-fishermen, who are mostly 
farmers, have an unsurprising advantage. The hypothesis that fishing households are 
distinctly poor is not therefore sustained by this survey.
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Table 6.5. Indicators o f  econom ic status o f  fishing and non-fishing households.
Households Significance
Indicator Fishing Non-fishing of difference
Homestead land (% owning) 93 88
Agr. land (mean acres) 1.0 2.0
Tin roof (% owning) 34 58
Luxury good points (mean) .47 .30
School enrolment (mean %) 45 56
* : Hypothesis that population means are the same was rejected at a 95% level of 
confidence.
Heads o f fishing households were asked whether their fathers, grandfathers and great­
grandfathers had fished before them. Their responses are presented in Table 6.6. It 
indicates that the vast majority o f fishermen are not "economic refugees" from other 
occupations but have inherited the profession from their forefathers. The one exception is 
again Alisherkul. Many of this village's Hindu households were previously farmers in a 
non-fishing area to the north of Moulvi Bazar. They left this area because "they were 
tortured by the Muslims" and moved to Hail Haor where a strong Hindu presence 
guaranteed them relative security. Finding themselves beside a fishery, some 
experimented with fishing. For most fishing households on Hail Haor, fishing is not an 
occupation o f last resort.
Table 6.6. Length o f association with fishing.
(Fishing households)
No. of generations fishing
Village 1 2  3 over 3
Buruna 1 1 0 27
Hazipur 2 0 0 6
Monargaon 3 1 0 15
Alisherkul 3 2 1 3
Vimshi 1 3  0 10
Mirzapur 1 3  1 11
TOTAL 11 10 2 72
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There is no significant difference between the labour resources of fishing and non-fishing 
households. The mean number of persons performing non-domestic work in fishing and 
non-fishing households was 1.9 and 2.0 respectively. One cannot conclude therefore that 
fishing acts as an employer of last resort for the surplus labour of larger families.
Rahman (1986) wrote that many Muslim fishing households have come to fishing 
recently, whereas Hindu fishing households tend to be from low castes specifically 
associated with fishing. This distinction is not confirmed by the data for Hail Haor. Hindu 
and Muslim fishing households in the Preliminary Survey sample had been fishing on 
average for 4.1 and 4.4 generations respectively (Table 6.6). (For the purposes of data 
analysis, households associated with fishing for 4 generations and more than 4 
generations were classified together.)
If fisherfolk were a subordinate part of rural society, one would expect fishing households 
to invest in non-fishing assets tike land as their income rose. There would then be a 
negative correlation between total income and the share of income received from fishing. 
In fact, however, the opposite is the case. A regression of the percentage of income 
received from fishing (%F) upon total annual household income (TY) in Tk'000 for 57 
households who made a positive net income from fishing between December 1992 and 
November 1993 shows a significant positive correlation at a 95% level of confidence.
%F = 49 + (0.6 x TY)
In other words, every thousand taka added to income tends to increase the share of fishing 
in total income by 0.6 percentage points. This regression again refutes the hypothesis that 
fishing is an activity of last resort for marginalised people. It suggests that surplus assets 
are invested in fishing rather than non-fishing diversification and that the worst-off are 
not full-time fishermen but those too poor to invest in the fishery.
If all these statistics suggest that fisherfolk are not economically subordinate to their 
agrarian neighbours, the same sentiment is shared by the fisherfolk themselves. In the 
words of one Maimal, "We think we are better than them and they think they are better 
than us." Jensen (1987) drew the same conclusion from a study of fisherfolk in Noakhali. 
If fishing were low-status, one would expect to see rich fishing households marrying into 
peasant households. In fact, however, the opposite is the case. Maimals say that only poor 
Maimals will marry "Bengalis." If fishing were low-status, one would expect to see 
households shedding the fisherman label when they stopped fishing. In reality, rich 
members of fishing communities, like the owner of Buruna market, Udnarpar's 
wholesaler and Bilashirpar's late landlord, none of whom catch fish with their hands, 
continue to assert that they are fishermen. At least three local politicians, the Union
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Parishad members for Mirzapur, Pachaon and Shulpur, continue to live in their respective 
villages' Maimal paras and own brush-piles, living on the water when necessary. They are 
not ex-members of a subordinate society but senior members of a parallel society.
The allocation of labour to fishing
In the upwardly-biased Preliminary Survey sample, the mean number of people available 
for labour outside the household was around 2 in every village. (See Table 6.7.) 
Households were thus divided into those participating and not participating in fishing 
(Tables 6.8 and 6.9). Alisherkul emerged as a village with high involvement in 
agriculture and a low involvement in fishing, even though the team had based the sample 
on a list of fishing households. When a household denied fishing, they were asked several 
times whether they never fished for consumption, whether they owned no fishing gear 
and so on. As Table 6.9 indicates, however, the mean number of workers per household 
fishing as a subsidiary activity is rather low in villages with both higher and lower rates of 
fishing as a primary activity. In fishing households, moreover, only 19% of workers were 
reported to practice an activity other than fishing as their primary occupation. In other 
words, most fishermen are mostly fishermen.
Most fishing households depend upon fishing for most of their income. For 57 households 
who made a positive net income from fishing between December 1992 and November 
1993, 69.5% of total income was obtained from fishing (including the consumption of 
their own catch). 50% of households took more than 75% of their income from fishing 
and only 7% of households took less than 20% of their income from fishing.
These findings refuted the initial hypothesis that a large number of households would use 
part-time fishing as an insurance against the failure of other activities. It suggests another 
hypothesis, however: when fishermen invest cash and negotiation into obtaining fishing 
rights and gear, these are sunk costs; the cost of the rights and the gear is more or less the 
same whether the fishermen use them fully or not. Fishing is therefore economically more 
attractive as a full-time activity than as a part-time activity because part-timers would be 
amortising the same fishing costs with a lower fishing income. The sunk cost of fishing 
access is probably another reason why fishermen have retained their distinct, specialised 
status rather than blending into the agricultural and petty-trading sectors with the rest of 
rural society.
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Table 6.9. Labour allocation to fishing and fish-trading. 







Buruna 1.1 .1 .1 .1
Hazipur 1.3 0 .2 0
Monargaon 1.5 0 0 0
Alisherkul .7 0 .5 0
Vimshi .8 .1 .4 0
Mirzapur .9 .1 .1 0
I l l
Conclusions
There is a strong body of opinion that fishermen are a low-status underclass, marginalised 
and driven into fishing because they are too poor to participate in other activities. The 
evidence from Hail Haor suggests an alternative view of fisherfolk as a parallel, but not 
subordinate society:
a) Fisherfolk are not an underclass. They are not significantly poorer than their dry-land 
neighbours on average and there is a wide range of incomes amongst them.
b) Fishing on Hail Haor is not an occupation of last resort. The fishermen have a caste 
identity and have been fishing for many generations.
c) Fishing does not absorb the surplus labour of larger households.
d) Fisherfolk cultivate their fishing status rather than trying to shed it. It carries high 
status within fishing communities. If prosperous, fisherfolk invest in fishing.
e) Subsistence fishing is not exclusively for the poorest. It involves a wide range of 
economic classes.
The key factor is access. The statement that poverty drives people to fish assumes 
implicitly that access to the fishery is open compared with access to other income- 
generating activities. This theory may be applicable to temperate marine fisheries with 
open access. In Hail Haor, however, as the next chapter will explain, entry is restricted by 
gear requirements and the operation of the leasing system. The poorest people are not 
those who fish but those excluded from the fishery.
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Chapter 7
The Hail Haor fishery: economic and institutional transactions
The water-bodies, fishing gear and labour, Hail Haor fishery's three factors of production, 
have already been described. This chapter will now explain the transactions that bind 
them together and convert them into fishery incomes. Determining the level and 
distribution of value-added in the fishery, they are the matrix through which policy will 
affect the livelihoods of poorer people. The chapter will cover the behaviour both of 
markets and of institutions. Since many economic transactions involve an element of 
politics and many institutional actions involve an element of commerce, it would be 
misleading - and difficult - to distinguish between them.
Marketing
Coulter and Disney (1987) and personal observation report that there is a margin of 
around 40% between the price paid by the consumer and the price received by the 
fisherman. Economic theory tells us that a trading margin consists of three components: 
normal profits (compensation for risk taking), trading costs and super-normal profits 
(produced by restricted competition). From the point of view of the fisheries policy­
maker who wishes to increase the share of sales accruing to fisherfolk in general or 
poorer fisherfolk in particular, the research need is to identify the relative importance of 
these three components. Coulter and Disney (1987) and the World Bank (1991) have 
studied the marketing of freshwater fish in Bangladesh. Both identify a multi-level 
system, where small traders assemble fish for, and are financed by, larger merchants. 
Both concur that it is the high cost of marketing rather than monopsony that restricts 
fishermen's share of the retail value of the fish to around 60%. The World Bank argues 
that any monopsony is created by the smallness and isolation of that particular market. 
Both conclude by recommending infrastructural investment. However, it is popularly 
believed and part of official policy rhetoric that monopsonistic fish-markets exploit the 
fisherman by producing super-normal margins (e.g. Kurien 1980, Nuruzzaman 1993). If 
this is so, the policy prescription is for marketing reform rather than new infrastructure.
Before examining the marketing of Hail Haor's fish it is first necessary to understand a 
key feature of the pattern of demand: fish size and consumers' income are positively 
correlated. Small fish (chingree, puti, koia etc) serve as a daily accompaniment to rice in 
many households. Households with higher incomes, however, tend to favour larger fish, 
especially the major carps (rui, katla, mrigal), because they are firmer and less bony. 
These fish therefore command a higher price in urban areas, which leads to a situation
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where the length of the marketing chain tends to be a direct function of the size of the 
fish.
Direct sales
For the majority of fishermen, who catch around 2kg of mixed small fish per person per 
day, there are two marketing possibilities. Either they can sell their fish to a porter-trader 
(paiker) or they can retail it directly to the consumer in an evening market. The 
fisherman's choice between paiker and consumer depends largely upon his individual 
circumstances:
a) Night fishermen tend to sell to paikers because they land their catch in the 
morning when there is little consumer demand.
b) Group fishermen tend to sell to paikers because, by making the sale price a 
single, publicly-known figure, they minimise the risk of being cheated by the 
group-member on selling-duty.
c) Paikers are used when household labour is in demand, for example during the 
dry season when there is a high return to working on the water both day and night. 
Conversely, a household with a "spare" infirm or old adult male often sells its own 
fish.
The outcome is that paikers buy the majority of fish of the majority of fishermen.
Paikers buy fish from fishermen either in a fish-market (mas bazar) or on the water. The 
most important fish-markets for Hail Haor are at Srimangal, Hazipur and Buruna. There 
are two selling-sessions daily, one around 7.00 a.m. for the night catch and another, 
around 3.30 p.m., for the day catch. In line with the pattern of gear use, the morning and 
evening markets are dominant in the dry and monsoon seasons respectively.
Buruna's fish market provides a good illustration of how fishermen sell to paikers. The 
marketplace is owned by a nonogenarian Maimal. He attends every market, collects tolls 
in kind from each seller, offers judgements on disputes and organises contributions for 
improvements to the marketplace such as the installation of a water-pump. If small boys 
are selling fish he advises them what price to accept. His tolls are not onerous: 2kg fish 
on a turnover of 200-1,500kg per day. The market is competitive, with vigorous haggling. 
20-30 fishermen sell unsorted fish to 20-30 paikers and the bargaining sometimes 
resembles a set of simultaneous open-cry auctions. Paikers often wedge the offered 
money into the fishermen's clothing and fishermen ask for a higher price by pushing it 
back. The resulting shoving match is the continuation of haggling by other means. The 
eventual sale is direct; there is no wholesaler or commission agent.
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Arot
Brush-pile (dol kata) and pump groups produce fish, both large and small, in bulk. They 
sell their fish through an arot market. Hail Haor is served by arots at the Gopla River's 
inflow, Srimangal and Moulvi Bazar. Between them they contain 30-40 arotdars. The 
feature that distinguishes a fish arot from a fish market like Buruna's is the extra liquidity 
injected by the arotdars (arot-agents), who auction off the fish and finance fishermen and 
paikers in return for a percentage of the sale value. The advantage of an arot as a point of 
sale for brush-pile and pump groups is that it provides credit for their capital-intensive 
gears and a large number of liquid buyers for their bulk catch. Some fishermen using 
smaller gears also sell their catch in an arot because it is nearer or offers higher prices.
The arot where the Gopla River enters Hail Haor illustrates their general function. 
Fishermen bring baskets of sorted fish to one of the 3 arotdars. His assistant auctions 
them, basket by basket, to the 30-50 assembled paikers. The paiker pays the auctioneer. 
The auctioneer retains a percentage of the price and pays the rest to the fishermen. If the 
seller has borrowed from the arotdar the auction fee is 6% of the sale in cash plus about 
4% in kind. If the seller has not borrowed from the arotdar the auction fee is 4%.
Arotdars have two strategies for increasing their turnover. One is dalal, where the seller 
borrows money from the arotdar in return for a promise to use his auctioneer and pay the 
higher auction fee. There is competition between arotdars for dalal clients. Fishing 
entrepreneurs approach several arotdars before committing themselves. Arotdars try to 
poach other arotdars' sellers. They do this by offering larger loans, not by offering to 
reduce their percentage. It cannot be concluded, however, that the price of credit is fixed 
uncompetitively. If the arotdar offers to fund a larger portion of the same project in return 
for the same percentage of the same output, he is effectively offering an interest rate cut. 
The arotdars' second strategy for increasing their turnover is to offer buying paikers 24 
hours' free credit.
Secondary marketing
Most fish therefore pass into the ownership of a paiker, whether by direct sale or by arot. 
The paiker's income can be attributed to two functions:
a) He contributes physical labour, carrying two baskets of fish with a combined 
weight of 10-20kg over 3-15km per day.
b) As the fish's owner, he is taking the risk of speculating on its price. On any one 
day there is a 5-10% probability of making a loss.
Paikers receive on average a profit of Tk67/paiker household/day from fish-trading (49 
observations, s.d.= Tk46), which places them on a par with middle-income fishing
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households. Many fishermen slip in and out of fish-trading according to the two 
professions' relative profitability. Somdu Miya of Buruna, for example, gave up fish- 
trading for fishing and agriculture in November 1992 and then gave up fishing for fish- 
trading in May 1993. The Maimals of Bilashirpar and Udnarpar converted en masse into 
paikers after their exclusion from Hail Haor 20-25 years ago and now trade as far afield 
as Chadpur, Habiganj and Sylhet. Indeed, farming communities consider paikers to be a 
form of fisherman. In the words of one Bilashirpar resident, "They call us fishermen 
because we buy and sell fish."
Having obtained his fish, the paiker has one of two possible destinations, a retail market 
or a secondary arot.
Many villages have a retail markets (bazar) every evening. Some have a larger market 
(hat) once or twice weekly. Every bazar or hat has a fish section where at least 5 
fishermen or retailing paikers (nikari) sell their wares. Because of the high population 
density, retail markets are rarely further than 3km from each other. Fishermen and nikari 
often change their market to another in search of higher prices.
A secondary arot resembles a primary arot except that the sellers/dalal-clients are not 
fishermen but paikers. During the flood season, when the catch of large fish in the 
Meghna basin falls and the catch of ilish (Hilsa hilsa) downstream is high, the flow of 
fish is reversed. Srimangal and Moulvi Bazar's fish arots become secondary arots for the 
influx of ilish.
The fish-market at Sherpur is a good example of a secondary arot. Selling paikers bring 
fish from Azmiriganj district by launch or country boat. As soon as the fish arrives it is 
taken to one of 8 arotdars. The arotdar auctions it to one of around 50 buying paikers. The 
auctioneer takes a percentage of the sale for the auction, a further percentage for dalal if 
applicable, Tkl for the marketplace and Tkl for the mosque. He hands the remainder to 
the selling paiker along with a purchase note showing the sale price, deductions and net 
price. The buying paiker carries the fish to the Dhaka-Sylhet road for a bus to the next 
point of sale.
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Figure 7.1 summarises the channels through which Hail Haor's fish are marketed. 
Generally speaking, the larger the fish, the more distant the consumer and the greater the 
number of links in the marketing chain.
Fish prices
Hail Haor's fish are rarely priced by species and weight. (The pump-fishing catch o f 
smaller air-breathing species such as koi, magur, taki and shing is the only exception to 
this rule. To save time, they are occasionally sold by weight at the arot. ) The usual 
procedure is for a mixed basket to be sold on sight. Rather than calculating price per kg 
by species, therefore, it was more logical and easier to calculate the price that matters to 
the fisherman, which is price per kg by gear.
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Fish prices were estimated from the follow ing regression equation:
yit =  P l w i t + -  + Pnw i t + U it
where: y^  is the income in Tk from fishing o f household i on day t.
wnjt is the weight in kg o f fish caught from gear n by household i on day t. 
pn is the price o f fish caught by gear n in Tk/kg.
Ujt is a random term s.t. E(Ujt)=0, cov(Ujt,Wjt)=0 for all i,t.
The equation was estimated once for each 3-month season between December 1992 and 
November 1993. The results are shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1. Prices received by Hail Haor's fishermen 1992-3 
(Price estimate and standard error o f estimate in Tk/kg)
Period Dec:-Feb Mar-May Jun-Aug Sep-Nov
Gear Pn s. e . Pn s. e . Pn s. e . Pn s. e .
f ai 34 4.4 35 2.9 28 1.8 31 1. 6
felun 29 10.9 21 2.2 20 2.4 21 4.0
lift - - - - - - 44a -
tana 19 7.6 35 9.7 13 2.1 10 2.0
taki - - - - - - 28 14.0
hook 37 13.9 44 3.3 33 2.4 28 2.4
big hook 39 15.0 - - 40 4.7 34 2.7
spear - b - 61 16.0 - - - -
dori 27a - 26 2.2 9 2.6 23 2.4
faron 48 11.7 - - - b - 33 6.0
bosni - b 29.3 24 7.1 39 18.0 - b -
dol 44 3.3 83 9.1 - - - -
jhaki - b - 24 8.6 - b - - -
kanja 21 4.7 50 4.5 15 2.0 - b -
pump >59c - - - - - - -
Notes: a) High variance because o f multiple gear use. Estimate obtained from single-gear 
observations only.
b) S.e.>0.5(pn). Estimate too unreliable for presentation.
c) By direct interview.
- not available.
Table 7.1 shows that the price o f fish varies significantly according to the gear used. The 
highest price per kg is for the brush-piles that aggregate major carps during the dry 
season, for pump-fishing and for fish-spears, a relatively rare gear that can catch large 
carps and snakeheads. Middling prices are awarded to gill-nets, farons and hooks. The 
lowest prices go to the small fish gears, the dori and tana jal. The rise in the price o f large 
fish during the monsoon is well-known (Coulter and Disney 1987). Table 7.1 shows a 
corresponding collapse in the price o f small fish.
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Competitive or monopsonistic?
To return to the policy issue, how much of the fish-trading margin can be attributed to 
monopsonistic super-normal profits? For Hail Haor at least, the answer is, "Very little.” 
Whether at the mas bazar, the arot or the retail market, fishermen and paikers are selling 
into a competitive market with many buyers and many sellers.
One possible source of confusion about the level of competition in fish-marketing has 
been the institution of dalal. There is a common belief that the dalal borrower is obliged 
to sell fish to the lender. In fact this is not true; the borrower sells fish through the lender's 
auctioneer into an open, competitive auction. Even the lender's rate of return is negotiable 
and competitive, with the competition being expressed in terms of the principal amount 
rather than the interest rate.
Finance
Hail Haor's fishermen have four principal sources of credit:
a) Simple interest loans (shudhi)
b) Formal sector credit (loan)
c) Dalai
d) Mortgaged (bondo) land
Their demand for all types of credit follows a seasonal cycle. Drawdowns peak in 
September and October as they re-equip after the lean monsoon period. This is the time 
when they commission new boats or travel to Boirob to buy new nets. Repayments peak 
three months later, between December and February, when CPUE is at a maximum. The 
quantitative data (n=58) upon credit use by Hail Haor's fishermen refers to November 
1993, when amounts outstanding were near their annual peak.
83% of fishing households had some form of credit outstanding at this time. For those 
with debts, the median value of the principal amounts was Tk3,000 per household. 38% 
of borrowing households had loans with a combined principal of less than Tk2,000 per 
household.
Shudhi
78% of households, or as many as 94% of borrowing households, had shudhi outstanding. 
In 2/3 of cases, shudhi were taken from moneylenders (mohojon) or shopkeepers 
(dokandar) in the borrower's own village. They are also taken, however, from relatives, 
households in the same bari or more distant mohojons. Some Buruna fishermen obtain 
shudhi from Srimangal. Some Monargaon fishermen obtain them from Moulvi Bazar or
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their Hindu co-religionists in the tea-gardens. One fishing group, requiring a loan of 
Tk23,000 for a sub-lease, put it together with shudhi from half-a-dozen mohojons from 
different villages. 23 fishing households in Vimshi, most of whom genuinely worked on 
the water, had combined into a lending association (somity) with capital of around 
Tk30,000. They operated commercially, lending to non-members only at the going shudhi 
interest rate. They say, in so many words, that they associated to in order to benefit from 
economies of scale.
The cost of shudhi loans is expressed as Tk per Tkl,000 principal per month. Interest 
accruals depend upon the principal amount, not upon the balance outstanding. The mean 
interest rate was 12.2% per month, equivalent to 146% p.a.. Although this is much higher 
than the rate for formal sector credit, it is not far out of line with alternative speculative 
uses of capital. For example, the price of stocked potatoes in Srimangal rose by 13% p.m. 
between March and December 1993, while the price of stocked onions rose by 11% p.m. 
between September and December 1993. Borrowers in different villages faced 
significantly different interest rates: the average rate was 11% p.m. in Buruna and 
Hazipur and 18% in Mirzapur. Inter-village interest rate differences were different at a 
95% level of confidence (One-way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis).
Formal credit
20% of households had formal credit outstanding, with 75% of such loans coming from 
the NGO Caritas or the Grameen Bank and the remaining 25% from nationalised banks. 
The Caritas loans were given to women for poultry production. The Grameen bank loan 
was for house improvements. The nationalised bank loans, around Tk2,000 per 
household, were obtained through the agency of the Union Chairman. The interest rate of 
formal sector loans, at 1-1.5% p.m., is effectively insignificant.
Dalal
The institution of dalal has already been described. It is not easy to estimate the arotdar's 
rate of return upon dalal advances because both he and the borrower will tend to 
understate their turnover. Table 7.2, however, illustrates the dalal account of one 
particularly reliable dol-fishing respondent from Mirzapur. On the assumption that the 
arotdar's cut is 10% of the catch, 6% as cash and 4% in kind, it is estimated that the 
arotdar's rate of return was around 16% per month. Although this is similar to the shudhi 
rate, fishermen unanimously believe dalal to be a more favourable contract than shudhi 
because the lender bears some of the risk of failure. It is in the arotdar's interest, however, 
to restrict dalal to a few promising prospects, the brush-pile groups, pump-fishermen and 
sub-lessees. This is because he needs to be sure that the borrower is productive and can
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be observed by his network of informants. The fishermen's preference for dalal is in clear 
contrast to the opprobrium with which it is viewed by policy-makers.
Table 7.2. The dalal account of Joinal Abedin's brush-pile group. 1992-3.
Dalal Group Arotdar Arotdar
advance revenue revenue cashflow
October (15,000) (15,000
November 0 0 0 0
December 0 0 0 0
January 0 74,900 6, 809 6, 809
February 0 182,147 16,559 16,559
March 0 34,258 3, 114 3,114
IRR p.m. : 16.0%
M ortgaged land
Jensen (1987) has described land mortgages as the principal medium o f economic 
polarisation in rural Bangladesh. In his sample, around 30% of households owned land 
that was mortgaged (bondo) to another household. A key feature o f these contracts is that 
the mortgagee obtains full usufruct rights over the land until the principal amount has 
been repaid. The mortgagor is therefore generally less solvent after the mortgage than 
before and usually takes recourse to further mortgages and, eventually, to selling the land.
57% of Hail Haor's fishing households owned some agricultural land and 24%, or about 
half the landowning households, had mortgaged at least some of it. Overall, 12% o f the 
acreage of fishermen's land was mortgaged. The mortgagors mostly pledged land to other 
households in the same para, sometimes to their own brothers. The Nomosudra fishermen 
of Monargaon, however, had made almost all their pledges to the Chairman's bari in the 
neighbouring Muslim para. The mortgagors had received on average Tk 7,929/acre in 
credit for the usufruct o f their land but the mortgage prices were spread evenly between 
Tk3,000/acre and Tkl 3,000/acre. This spread probably reflected variation in the age of 
the debt and the social relations between borrower and lender.
Credit and patronage
Some writers (Jansen 1987, McGregor 1988, 1989a, 1992) have argued that credit in rural 
Bangladesh is not marketed to the end-user competitively because a client can only hope
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for resources, including loans, from his own political patron. If the same situation 
prevails in fishing communities as in the predominantly agricultural villages studied by 
previous authors then there are important implications for fishing rights reform. As a later 
chapter will demonstrate analytically, with fishermen dependent upon the same patron for 
water-rights and capital, a resource-access reform such as the NFMP will alter the 
economics of the fisherman-capitalist relationship without severing it and the reform will 
not produce the intended results.
There are some key differences between fishermen and peasants that make monopolistic 
credit relationships a priori less likely in fishing communities:
a) Fishermen are socially distinct from "Bengalis". When they go to the Bengali 
mohojon or dokandar for credit they are more likely than peasants to be moving 
outside their own network of political ties.
b) Although there are of course seasonal peaks and troughs, fishing can produce 
incomes all the year round. Ceteris paribus, fishermen’s demand for credit is 
likely to be lower than that of farmers or agricultural labourers, where income 
comes in brief spurts.
c) Because fishing skills are relatively scarcer than other labouring skills, an 
experienced fisherman without capital is in a less parlous position than a 
"Bengali" without capital and his demand for credit is therefore likely to be lower.
d) One inducement for mohojons to lend money to peasants is the hope of 
acquiring their land. Also, the land serves as security. Fishermen own less land 
than peasants and economic rents in fishing derive from their skills and access to 
water, neither of which can be pledged. Even fishing gear does not constitute a 
reliable pledge because it is somewhat perishable.
In the absence of firm knowledge of the relationships between lessees and moneylenders, 
it is unclear whether lessees supply credit to fishermen monopolistically or not. It would 
probably take a prolonged period of participatory observation to resolve the issue.
Access to gear




d) As hired labour
e) Borrowing
These types of access will be described in turn below.
122
User-ownership
User-ownership is by far the most common mode of access to gear. At any one time, 
more than 90% of fishermen are working with their own gear. Gill-nets, traps and hooks 
are almost invariably owned by their users. This contrasts strongly with the agricultural 
sector, where share-cropping, land-renting and hired labour predominate and ’’owner- 
occupied" plots are in a minority. There are several possible causes:
a) Hooks, gill-nets and traps are fragile. The hiring of fragile goods creates a 
problem of moral hazard.
b) The gear is perishable. With the exception of boats and seine nets, for which a 
market does exist, artisanal fishing gear usually rots away into uselessness within 
6 months. Fish hooks have to be replaced within two weeks. Perishable goods 
cannot be hired and returned after use.
c) Fishermen have access to simple interest loans.
The predominance of personal ownership contrasts with the view of some fishery policy­
makers, who assert in informal conversation that professional fishermen are exploited by 
gear-owners. It is possible that this view of the fishery, like many others, has arisen 
because policy-makers have concentrated their attention upon the capital-intensive, 
deeper-water, major carp fishery. Self-employment is indeed rarer there because the 
water-rights and gear are more expensive.
Gear shares
The fishermen in a group normally contribute equally to the gear stock and receive equal 
shares of the revenue. Sometimes, however, a group trades access to gear for a share of 
the catch, the "net's share" (jalir bag).
The net-share arrangement occurs most commonly between a group of 4-7 fishermen and 
a tana jal owner, who invariably does not work on the water himself. The net-owner 
receives the same share as one fisherman. Net-maintenance is the group’s responsibility 
but the owner sometimes pays for the pitch (rong, alcatra) which is used to preserve the 
fibres. With a 5-man tana jal costing around Tk20,000 and a labour share running at 
around Tk60/day, the owner would have a rate of return of around 9% for each month 
that the net was in use. This is in line with the cost of shudhi and other speculative uses of 
capital.
Lift-nets occasionally offer a net-share. We found one lift-net group of two fishermen, 
where the net-less fisherman had agreed to work longer hours than his net-owning partner 
in return for 50% of the catch.
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Another category of gear share contracts is as a means whereby brush-pile or pump- 
groups bring in labour to fish out their enclosures. When a seine net is used, the seine- 
netters receive as a group between 5% and 10% of the catch, which they must then divide 
between themselves and any net-owner. When a cast-net is used in brush-piles, the cast- 
netter gives all fish longer than around 2" to the brush-pile group and keeps the smaller 
fish himself. This practice is known as tepi or tepwal.
Gear shares are not used for fish-traps, hooks and gill-nets, the gears that most fishermen 
use most of the time. Even tana jals were labour-owned in 56% of cases (March-October 
1993, n=36).
Rental
The most commonly rented item is the fishing boat. The ordinary 4-yard boat rents for 
Tk300/month, giving the owner a rate of return of around 10% per month which is, once 
again, in line with the informal money-market rate. Fishing households do not obtain 
most of their boat-use from rental. On the actual day that they were fishing, 22% of 
households were using rented boats and 78% were using their own boat, a borrowed boat 
or no boat at all (January-February 1993, n=144).
Brush-pile and pump groups require larger boats between November and January for 
carrying bamboo, brushwood or mud or for shoving away surface vegetation. These are 
hired at Tk600 per month.
As hired labour
Sometimes when fishing labour is hired the hirer provides equipment to the labourer.
This is the normal arrangement for the construction of pump and brush-piles. It is rare for 
other gears, but we found one fish-trader in Buruna who hired two labourers, inserted 
them into trap-fishing groups, provided them with gear and took their share of the groups' 
net revenues.
Borrowing
One household sometimes borrows equipment free of charge from another household, 
often a brother or a member of the same ban. Equipment is usually only lent free of 
charge for a few days while the lender's household labour is otherwise occupied. Only the 
lowest-value gears such as felun jals and polos are lent and even these are more 
commonly rented for Tk5/day.
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Theft
The theft of gear from the water by other fishermen is a great worry to the fishermen of 
Hail Haor. Around 5% of households in the Catch-Effort sample had some or all of their 
gear stolen between December 1992 and November 1993, a mishap which could led to 
the abandonment of fishing for several weeks. Many fishermen have to remain on the 
water even when not catching fish, just to guard their gear. This is, of course, an 
economically unproductive use of labour.
There is a pattern to the theft. We never heard of any cases of fishermen stealing gear 
from their fellow-villagers. In most cases the victims were fishermen, usually Hindus, 
who were fishing outside their village's territory. The blame was invariably attached to 
the fishermen of Buruna. The fear of gear theft is therefore an important element in 
fishermen's choice of water-body. The more co-religionists or members of the same para 
are fishing there, the more secure they will feel their gear to be.
The pattern o f  fishing gear ownership
Table 7.3 shows the distribution of fishing gears among Preliminary Survey fishing 
households. It should be noted that this is a "snapshot" of gear ownership in November, 
and that households adjust their portfolio of gear across the year in line with changing 
access conditions and catchability co-efficients. In particular, many households purchased 
fish-traps in early December, after the census. Nonetheless, the distribution of gear 
ownership provides some valuable insights.
The sample only revealed seine net ownership in one village, Buruna, the wealthiest of 
the six. Even within that village, only 10% of households reported seine net ownership 
and part-ownership constituted the most common form of ownership. This indicates that 
the vast majority of fishermen do not own gear adapted to the fishing of deep water and 
brush-piles, where large fish tend to reside, which suggests that when the Government 
and its foreign donors attempt to promote the capture of large fish through a combination 
of re-stocking with major carps and effort controls, little benefit is likely to reach the 
majority of fishing households.
Gill nets, push nets and hooks constitute the most widely-dispersed fishing gears. The 
census interviews did not ask fishermen to describe the mesh size and construction of 
their gill nets because narrow mesh sizes and the monofilament current jal are illegal. 
They were instead observed directly from a boat; it was estimated that at least 90% of gill 
nets were of monofilament thread and at least 90% of gill nets had a mesh size of 1/2". It
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may be concluded that the majority of gill nets on Hail Haor are illegal and adapted to 
catching small fish. Push nets may also only catch small fish. The majority of fish caught 
by hooks, however, are snakeheads or small catfish (shol, shing, magur, taki, gojar, 
tengra) ranging from 3cm to 25cm.
Table 7.3 confirms that fish-trap ownership is concentrated among Hindu households. In 
fact, 26 out of 55 Hindu fishing households owned fish-traps as opposed to 1 out of 77 
Muslim households. Both Hindu and Muslim fishermen say this is because Hindus are 
more skilled in the production and use of fish-traps. It is not clear, however, why this 
should be so, since Maimals have also been fishing for many generations. The most 
widely-distributed trap was the dori, which can only catch small fish (<5cm) and shrimps. 
The lunga and koin, which are specifically adapted to catching large fish, were very rare.
At around 40% of all fishing households, a significant minority did not own a boat. There 
are four ways to overcome this lack. The most common is to hire a boat at a daily rate of 
TklO. Otherwise, they are restricted to fishing with a push net from the bank, working as 
hired labour or working as the less-welcome members of a fishing group. Similarly, 31% 
of fishing households owned no fishing gear except a push net - not even hooks.
In conclusion, therefore, an "ordinary” Haor fishing household is chasing small fish with 
low-cost gear adapted to shallow water. About a third of fishing households own only 
push nets or no gear at all. A very small minority exists with the means to catch large fish 
in deep water.
126
Table 7.3. Percentage of fishing households owning each type of fishing gear. November 
1992.
Percentage of households owning: 
__________ Nets__________
Village Seine Gill Push Lift Cast Hook Boat
Buruna 10 38 52 7 7 38 66
Hazipur 0 67 44 0 0 67 56
Monargaon 0 53 53 5 16 84 74
Alisherkul 0 11 44 0 0 22 44
Vimshi 0 33 33 0 0 67 60
Mirzapur 0 31 75 6 38 56 63
Traps
Dori Bosni Far on Lunga Koin
Buruna 3 0 3 0 0
Hazipur 0 0 11 0 0
Monargaon 89 47 74 16 26
Alisherkul 56 44 33 0 0
Vimshi 27 7 33 0 0
Mirzapur 0 0 0 0 0
Fishery management (access and effort control)
Official enforcement
Under normal circumstances, enforcement o f the Protection and Conservation o f  Fish 
Act (1950) in Hail Haor is best described as lax. Between November 1992 and August 
1993 there was no attempt to enforce the bans on monofilament nets, dewatering, mesh 
below 4.5 cm, the capture o f undersized carps and boal catfish or the capture of 
snakeheads between April and June. Srimangal's Thana Fisheries Officer knew that these 
illegal practices were going unchecked but claimed not to be able to control them without 
additional staff. Fishermen are well aware o f the restrictions on current jals and under­
sized carps but, for most o f the time, pay no attention to them.
However, the stocking of Hail Haor with carp fingerlings in the monsoons o f 1992 and 
1993 prompted sudden and occasionally violent enforcement campaigns in September 
and October o f both years. In November 1992, when this study was drawing its sample of 
fishing households, two fishermen reported that they had been beaten by the TFO's
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assistant for using monofilament gill-nets. One displayed the fresh scars on his back and 
both reported having to pay a TklOO bribe/fine to retain their nets. Hail Haor was stocked 
again in the three weeks to September 10th 1993. This time the accompanying 
enforcement campaign covered legal push nets and seine nets as well as monofilament 
gill-nets. The TNO reported that he had lodged 39 court cases and confiscated 130 gears, 
of which over 100 were monofilament gill-nets, by September 18th 1993. His 
enforcement patrols appeared to have concentrated upon the accessible southern part of 
Hail Haor and to have disproportionately affected the fishermen of Srimangal Busti and 
West Baraura.
The Department of Fishery's (DOF) 1993 enforcement campaign reduced the use of 
illegal monofilament gill-nets and legal tana jals by fishermen from the south and west of 
the Haor. As the study’s effort statistics will show, however, the fishermen of Buruna and 
Hazipur continued to use gill-nets with impunity. One may hypothesise that their lessees' 
strong influence at Thana level ensured their immunity.
The 1993 campaign quickly aroused opposition. In late August a day of protest was 
organised by the Chairmen of the 3 Unions around Hail Haor (Kalapur, Bonabir and 
Mirzapur). Fishermen were collected from their villages in buses and trucks and taken to 
the Thana offices in Srimangal. For Buruna the cost of vehicle hire was defrayed by tolls 
collected from fishermen. The Moulvi Bazar TFO estimated that 3,000 - 4,000 fishermen 
attended the protest meeting. This figure seems improbably high but confirms that 
fishermen did arrive in impressive numbers. Although interviews with fishermen in 
September 1993 revealed great hostility to gear controls, not all those who attended the 
meeting knew why they were there. It was thus possible for at least one government 
official to dismiss the protest as "Awami League (opposition party) activism".
The TFOs were motivated to enforce gear restrictions in 1993 by two sets of incentives, 
official and unofficial. Officially, their normally dormant responsibilities as DOF 
employees were awakened by the demands of the Second Aquaculture Development 
Project (ADPII); the project had paid field allowances and led to the designation of 
Srimangal's TFO as "Fisheries Officer of the Year." Unofficially, to quote Moulvi Bazar's 
TFO, "The elites are learning that banning current jal is in their interests." In other words, 
the lessees and arotdars upon whom the TFO depends for his unofficial income supported 
gear control because it raised the profitability of leases, pump-fishing and brush-piles. 
Leterme and Chisholm (1993) noted that the stocking of floodplains in west Bangladesh 
was accompanied by similar gear control campaigns, even though gear controls were not 
requested by the stocking project (Keith Fisher,pers. comm.).
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Another possible cause of the TFO's zeal in confiscating gear was the profit to be made 
from re-selling it. Srimangal's Executive Officer (TNO) lodged a case against the TFO 
after the 1993 control campaign on the grounds that the TFO was not legally entitled to 
confiscate and retain gear. The TNO had the Zila authorities order the TFO to hand in the 
confiscated gill-nets and now accuses the TFO of altering official documents in order to 
retain some of them.
One is left with the strong, but not altogether surprising, impression, that the pattern of 
effort control is determined, not by the wording of the Protection and Conservation o f  
Fish Act, but by the balance of political pressures acting upon the TFO. The majority of 
fishermen are opposed to gear controls and thus the Act is ignored for most of the time. 
Artificial stocking, however, stimulates in lessees and arotdars a greater interest in stock 
protection. A gear-control campaign ensues, causing resentment among most fishermen 
but ultimately raising the profitability of the capital-intensive carp fishery. Why, after all, 
is the legal tana jal confiscated and illegal de-watering tolerated? It is because the tana jal 
is labour-intensive and unprofitable whilst de-watering, to quote again the TFO, "Is 
supported by the Land Ministry and influential persons."
Types of tenure
Hail Haor's area is governed by 3 forms of legal tenure. The dry-season fishing grounds 
are government property. The outlying floodplain is privately-owned. There is also a 
small amount of government-owned (khas) agricultural land which is leased out to 
private farmers. Khas land is not important in Hail Haor and will not be not discussed 
further.
Fishing over agricultural land
During the high-water season from June to September fishermen avoid the deep water 
and work the flooded land close to their villages, where low-cost gears are most effective 
and the danger from storms is smallest. Flooded, privately-owned agricultural land in Hail 
Haor is in principle an open-access fishery. Landowners only rarely try to restrict access 
to the water over their land. Several reasons are given for this: the land-holdings are 
fragmented, fishing is not profitable enough to give tolls, the fishermen are the farmers' 
friends and relatives and the law prescribes open access over flooded private land.
It is clear, however, that local patrons will create and enforce private property rights over 
flooded agricultural land if the rents available justify the transactions costs of enforcing 
control. One example of this is Mahania Beel, a shallow depression of around 2 ha 
between Buruna and Monargaon villages. Receiving the fish run-off from the surrounding
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rice fields, Mahania Beel supports gill nets, traps and a small brush-pile in November and 
December. It provides employment for around 10 fishermen during these two months. 
Until 20 years ago, Mahania Beefs ’’owner" (malik) lived in Buruna. It is not clear 
whether he charged fishing tolls. Around the time of Bangladesh’s independence, 
however, the Union Chairman, a resident of Monargaon's Muslim para, took over the 
beel, securing his title with a certain amount of physical violence. He now rents the beel 
back to fishermen from Buruna. The letter of the law, which prescribes free fishing 
access to flooded paddy land, would not support the Chairman’s control over Mahania 
Beel. Neither does he own much of the paddy-land beneath it. He has simply used force 
and political influence to create a title1.
A second example is Garulia Beel, another water-filled paddy land depression. In this 
case the land consists of many plots that are owned by one landlord. Fishermen explain 
that he is the beefs "malik" because he owns the land beneath it. The gradual 
concentration of land holdings is increasingly likely to enable landlords to take control 
over beels in this way.
Fishermen report that more and more floodlands are being privatised with the passage of 
time. The fishermen of Rustumpur have an explanation: an increase in the fishing 
population has increased the amount of competition for fishing spots. The increase in 
competition has reduced the income that fishermen are prepared to receive and the fall in 
their income has increased the profitability of privatisation.
Bromley (1989) hypothesised that the degree of private ownership over land is 
determined by its use. He argues that a community will privatise the most profitable land 
in order to realise its potential for intensive cultivation. His optimistic theory implies that 
communities move towards the most efficient land tenure system. The process of fishery 
privatisation in Hail Haor, however, is rather different from that proposed by Bromley. 
The tenure system is not designed in the interests of a "community"; there is just one set 
of people imposing its will upon another. Neither is there any efficiency motive; the 
floodplain is no more productive than it would be under open access.
Fishermen of one village attempt to prevent other fishermen from fishing over certain 
areas of flooded agricultural land (Figure 7.2).
Example 1: The Muslim Maimal fishermen of Buruna and Hazipur use the 
threat of force to prevent the Hindu fishermen of Monargaon from fishing 
close to the three villages. This territorial pattern was identified by direct
1 Many economic resources in Bangladesh have been unilaterally privatised. Dhaka, for example, has 
hundreds of unofficial taxi-ranks where rickshaws and baby-taxis pay tolls for using the public pavement.
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observation and confirmed by conversation with two Buruna fishermen in 
September 1993.
Example 2: During the "open-access" season, fishermen from the villages on 
the haor's southern shore are afraid to fish north of the embankment. As one 
Baraura fisherman explained, "The Buruna people would send us back."
This is one instance of the economic importance of belonging to a "strong" fishing 
community.
In brief, it is time to rethink the popular, romantic view that the floodplain is one of the 
few resources open to the poorest of the poor. The most productive parts of the floodplain 
are gradually being privatised and professional fishing communities have established 
territorial rights over the floodplain’s toll-free remainder.
One normally thinks of tenure as an exogenous variable, determined by law before people 
start making economic decisions. In the case of the Bangladesh floodplain, however, the 
degree of private ownership is dependent upon the economics of the fishery; profitability 
brings about privatisation. The notion of endogenous privatisation has important 
implications for fisheries management. A strategy of fishery intensification, as followed 
by the stock-enhancement programmes of the TFP and the ADPII, is likely to increase the 
degree of private ownership when it raises the profitability of the fishery. This in turn 
may negate the strategy's benefits to fishing labour. The process of endogenous 
privatisation will be modelled analytically in a subsequent chapter.
Secondly, the territoriality that fishermen exercise over the floodplain has important 
policy implications. The popular view that the floodplain is "open to anyone with a net" 
(Majumder and Durante 1993, p.2) and that fishermen "are the most deprived and poorest 
class" (Chowdhury 1993, p.8) has long coloured people's thinking about fisherfolk and 
has provided ammunition against the Flood Action Plan. This way of thinking has been 
reinforced by the fact that most fisheries research in the west has been upon marine 
fisheries where access is comparatively open. The unromantic truth is, however, that 
fishermen, like everybody else in this crowded country, wish to protect their livelihood 
from others. As the joke says, "Soon the air will have a lessee."
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Figure 1.2. A sketch map of the division of "open-access" fishing above paddy land 















Ja lm o h o ls
The dry-season (October to May) fishing grounds, however, are vastly more important in 
terms o f the yields and employment that they provide. They are divided into more than 60 
water-estates (jalmohols) which are leased out, usually for a period o f 3 years. Those over 
20 acres are leased by the district (Zila), those under 20 acres by the sub-district (Thana). 
Jalmohol leases are allocated in May and the government requires payment from the 
lessee by August. They constitute an important source o f local government income. To 
cite one example, jalmohols under 20 acres provide Tk650,000 p.a. (US$16,250) to 
nearby Nabiganj Thana, around 50% o f locally-collected revenue.
Under British rule and until 1962 control over fishing waters, either through ownership or 
leaseholding, was largely exercised by Hindus. Nomosudra fishermen remember this as a 
time when they could fish in the deepest, most productive parts o f Hail Haor and the 
Muslim Maimals were restricted to catching small fish in the shallows. Since the 1962 
Land Reform, however, this position has been reversed. Hindus and Muslims alike 
recognise that a minority o f fishermen from the Maimal villages o f Buruna, Hazipur and, 
to a lesser extent, Mirzapur and Shulpur, have best access to the high-yield fishing zones, 
where they use expensive seine nets (ber jal, thana jal, taki jal, mokha jal, boro jal, urun 
jal). The others now describe themselves as fishing for small fish in shallow water.
132
Older fishermen say that the leasing system served them better 20 to 25 years ago. They 
say that civil servants were less corrupt, that leaseholders employed fewer water-bailiffs 
and that they permitted fishing for sale with push nets and gill nets without demanding 
tolls. Fishermen attribute the tighter enforcement of fishing controls to population growth 
and increased competition for leases.
Lease allocation
Hail Haor's leases were supposed to be allocated until 1991 through an open auction. The 
auction for each jalmohol would be initially restricted to Fishermen's Associations; if they 
failed to offer the reserve price the auction would be opened to individuals, so long as 
they were from the same Thana. In 1991, however, a new system was introduced on the 
grounds that open auctions created public disorder. Associations and individuals from any 
Thana now submit closed bids to the government and the government announces a 
winner. The secrecy increases the scope for bribery and allows government officers to 
award the lease to the strongest bribe, irrespective of whether the applicant is an 
individual or a Fishermen's Association, local or outsider and whether the bid is highest. 
The leaders of Fishermen's Associations complain that lease prices have risen and their 
access to fishing grounds has been reduced.
A new system of payment was introduced along with closed bids in 1991. The lessee had 
previously been required to pay 50% of the lease value immediately after the auction in 
May, followed by 50% a week later. Under the new system, tenders must be accompanied 
by a bank draft worth 25% of the value of the bid. The bidder must therefore incur the 
transactions costs of arranging a source of finance and negotiating the banking system 
before acquiring the lease. This has two effects: it favours literate middlemen over 
fishermen and, more importantly, creates an additional incentive for the lease to be 
awarded by a private deal between a bidder and officials.
In practice, however, leases are not awarded to the highest open or closed bids but for 
bribes. It is normal for lessees to make side-payments to government officials before the 
lease is allocated. It is also common for side-payments to be made afterwards, to initiate 
or prevent their re-allocation. Some illustrative examples follow:
» The Rustumpur Fishermen's Association obtained three leases in 1992 at an 
official price of Tk23,000 per year for three years. However, they also paid a bribe of Tk 
375 to the Co-operatives Department for a certificate of audit, a bribe of Tk300 to obtain 
three tender forms, a bribe of Tk 14,000 to the Thana leasing committee and a bribe of 
Tkl 5,000 to the Zila leasing committee.
» One Alisherkul Fishermen's Association obtained a lease over Lotwa Kancata 
for Tk21,000, of which Tkl 8,000 was in side-payments, mostly to have an appeal against
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the allocation quashed. They lost the appeal and Lotwa Kancata was allocated to another 
association from the same village. This second association had paid an official lease price 
of Tk4,795 per year, a Tk5,000 bribe to the tender committee, a Tkl,500 bribe to a 
fisheries officer, a Tkl,000 bribe to a co-operatives officer, a Tk500 bribe for a 
favourable audit and a Tk7,000 to the Zila office. The Thana Fisheries Officer boasted to 
the research team that he (illegally) kept the seals of the Co-operatives Department and 
had used them to support the successful association's case.
» In the late 1980s an association from Pachaon village paid Tk90,000 for a 
jalmohol, of which Tk30,000 was the official value. The Zila office retained the money, 
but awarded the lease to another bidder.
» In May 1993 the lessee of Hail Haor's most important jalmohol, No. 1 Beel, had 
his lease term extended from 3 to 8 years, in line with the new regulations, by persuading 
local officials to classify his jalmohol as a fisheries development project. He boasted that 
he would not implement the "development plan" that he had submitted. The Thana 
Fisheries Officer for Moulvi Bazar described such development plans as, "Good on paper 
but impossible to enforce."
The definition of jalmohols has caused disagreement between the Thana Revenue Office 
and the Fisheries Officer. The Fisheries Officer argues that corrupt officials in the 
Revenue Office are defining fishing grounds as pasture land in order to circumvent the 
requirement that Fishermen's Associations should have priority in the allocation of fishery 
leases. The revenue per hectare demanded by central government for pasture and arable 
land is moreover much lower than that required for fisheries, thus increasing the resource 
rents to be retained at Thana and Zila level as profits for the lessee and bribes for the 
revenue officials.
It is clear that collusion between officials and bidders is a constraint upon jalmohol 
revenue. The Land Ministry had issued a guideline that lease prices should rise by 25% 
per year but it is not always observed. Indeed, is hard to see how lease revenues could rise 
exponentially indefinitely. Thana officials do not feel that they are under pressure from 
the Zila to increase jalmohol revenues. They attribute this to the fact that Zila officials are 
also accepting low tenders when leasing out jalmohols of over 20 acres.
Notwithstanding the level of corruption, for those jalmohols over 20 acres that came up 
for auction in 1992 the official lease value has increased substantially (Table 7.4). This is 
attributed to a combination of inflation (the lease prices are reset every three years), 
restocking, increased demands from central government and the increased acceptability 
of bids from individuals and outsiders. Jalmohols under 20 acres appear simply to have 
been revalued by 25%.
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Table 7.4. Leases granted for 1992-4 (Tk/vear)
Name Previous lease Current lease
over 20 acres
62 Beel 65,000 135,000
Gopla Nodi 3 52,000 96,000
Jirwar Doba 19,000 57,000
Balia Beel 5,200 16,500
42 Dolnetch 49,000 65,000
Dumar Beel 3, 500 7, 800
Beel Doba 55,000 74,700
Mobarjonoika Poishakali 6, 500 15,000
under 20 acres
Bokbokia 5,100 6, 375
Charudoba 1, 800 2, 350
Patrodobar 375 469
Kunj aberi 675 844
Gurudara 1, 725 2,156
Lotwakankata 6, 900 8, 625
Dolidoba 1, 500 1, 875
The fishing rights market after lease allocation
The lessee usually parcels out his jalmohol into smaller areas, which are rented on a 
yearly basis by sub-lessees. This practice is illegal. The lessee and sub-lessee may be an 
individual, a group (sorik) o f fishermen or a Fishermen's Association (Motshojibi 
Somobaya Somity). The sub-lessee then charges a fee to fishermen for access to water 
although he may tacitly tolerate the push nets o f those fishing for home consumption. 





























It is normal for lessees and sub-lessees to sell fishing rights to people in their own 
communities. This is for several reasons:
a) It reduces the transactions costs o f the sale and the collection o f tolls.
b) The fishermen will have to band together against poaching and the theft of
gear.
c) From the lessee's point o f view, the political support o f his fellow-villagers is 
more useful than that o f outsiders.
Fishermen can thus say that Number 1 Beel is Buruna's territory, 62 Beel belongs to 
Srimangal Busti and Baraura, the north of the Gopla River is "the Muslims'" and so on.
If the lessee needs to market fishing rights outside his own fishing community, he may 
employ an agent to recruit fishermen from his v illage. The Secretary o f the Baraura MSS 
acts as both agent and front-man for the true lessee in Srimangal. The Buruna lessee of 
No. 1 Beel has a full-time agent living on the water to recruit fishermen from other 
villages, collect tolls and exclude unauthorised fishermen. The fishermen are often 
scarcely aware o f the real lessee and will consider the agent to be the jalmohol's "malik".
The time-distribution o f payments is a key feature o f the sub-leasing market. The lessee 
incurs the first costs, paying bribes and the lease price during the low-season between 
May and August. The fisherman, however, pays tolls to the lessee or sub-lessee during the 
high season, between October and the following March. As one fisherman explained,
"The lessee's year begins in May but ours begins in October." The sub-leasing system is 
therefore effectively a form of seasonal credit delivery provided by the lessee and sub­
lessee to the fisherman.
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Challenges to lease allocation
Even when a lease or sub-lease has already been allocated, the fishermen's access is not 
secure unless it is backed by political and/or physical power. The challenge to fishing 
rights allocation can appear as an open faction fight or as surreptitious poaching. In either 
case, a fishing right has to be backed by might.
Sometimes a group of fishermen openly challenge the existing allocation of a lease or 
sub-lease. This will be illustrated by two examples, those of the Baraura Motshojibi 
Somobaya Somity (Fishermen's Association) and a No. 1 Beel sub-lease.
The Baraura Somity obtained the lease to 62 Beel in 1992. An influential Hindu from the 
village of Bonabir then challenged Baraura Somity's title to the lease on the grounds that 
he had held it for the previous three years and had not made a profit. The case was 
referred by the Assistant Deputy Commissioner to the High Court in Dhaka and is still 
pending at the time of writing. It is realistic to expect the lease to end before the lawsuit. 
Legally speaking, fishing is banned in 62 Beel until the case is resolved. In December 
1992, however, 62 Beel was still being sub-let by the man from Bonabir and his sub­
lessees were building brush-piles. Then, in February 1993, after a certain amount of 
physical violence, 62 Beel was being fished solely by fishermen from Baraura and 
Srimangal Busti, all paying subscriptions to the Baraura Somity.
At the end of the 1993 monsoon, a group of 10 fishermen obtained a sub-lease for part of 
No. 1 Beel. 5 of the group members were from Buruna, the lessee's home village, but 5 
were from Mirzapur. In November 1993 some other Buruna fishermen started fishing 
inside the sub-lease area. The sub-lessees came in a group to Buruna's fish-market and 
complained that their sub-lease had been violated. A heated argument followed. Many 
Buruna fishermen took the side of the poachers, arguing that the Mirzapur fishermen had 
no right to exclude Buruna residents because No. 1 Beel was "Buruna's lease". The 
Mirzapur fishermen were pushed physically to the edge of the market.
By contrast with other water-bodies such as Shanir Haor (Blanchet and Talukder 1992), 
the problem of surreptitious poaching by non-toll-payers is relatively infrequent. The 
Maimals of Shulpur complained in November 1992 that "non-fishermen" from the 
villages around Manik Haor were setting gill-nets in a Shulpur jalmohol north of Hail 
Haor. The Buruna fishermen complained in November 1993 that Shulpur fishermen "had 
paid the fisheries officer to use fine-meshed monofilament nets in No. 1. Beel". Apart 
from this, however, we found no instances of surreptitious poaching.
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The reason for the near-absence of poaching is that the toll-paying fishermen themselves 
act as the lessees' water-bailiffs. As one Buruna fishermen remarked, "The 'non- 
fishermen' wouldn't come here. They know how strong we are." In other words, the 
Buruna fishermen can organise themselves to defend their territory from poachers 
because they are united in their allegiance to a common lessee. This has very important 
implications. First, it implies that the toll-paying fishermen's immediate concern is the 
maintenance, not the weakening, of the leasing system. Secondly, it gives the fisherman 
another reason to affiliate himself with a strong lessee; the stronger the lessee, the more 
numerous the fisherman-bailiffs and the lower the risk of poaching.
All these examples show how it is possible to defend or re-allocate fishing rights after 
lease allocation, by deploying local influence, government officials and physical force. 
This has important policy implications. Official fisheries policy, from the World Bank 
(1991) downwards, recommends the re-allocation of fishing rights from lessees to 
fishermen as a means of producing a more equitable distribution of fishing rents. The 
problem is that a paper lease has to be backed by local influence to be effective. At the 
moment, of course, the corrupt nature of the leasing system ensures a high degree of 
congruence between lease allocation and local influence; those who have the power to 
obtain a lease will also have the power to defend it. The rhetoric of official policy, 
however, envisages the allocation of leases to relatively powerless people. Without 
external support they are unlikely to have the power to defend them.
Gear-specific fishing rights
Within each lease- or sub-lease-area separate contractual arrangements usually exist for 
each fishing technology. The deepest water is often allocated exclusively to a group of 
fishermen for the construction of brush-piles (dol, dol kata), artificial fish habitats, or for 
de-watering by diesel pump. The lessee or sub-lessee will authorise the owners of such 
rights to prevent all other fishing in the deep water until their own operation has finished. 
All the clients of the same lessee are expected to defend each others’ patches, by force if 
necessary. Lessees and sub-lessees also specify the permitted gear when selling the right 
to fish the remainder of the tract of water. Where a tract of water can support fish- 
trapping with barricades (bandh), the placement lines are known by name and allocated 
by the lessee or sub-lessee specifically to a group of fishermen. It is customary for 
fishermen catching small fish for home consumption, usually by push-net, to work free of 
charge.
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There is therefore a hierarchy of fishing rights, as follows, defined in terms of the cost of 
access:
dol fishing/dewatering 
deep water fishing for sale 
shallow water fishing for sale 
push-net fishing for consumption or total exclusion
The activities at the top of the hierarchy are capital- intensive, inasmuch as the expense 
of deep-water rights, seine nets and dol-construction must be incurred before a short 
period of work produces a substantial catch of large fish. The activities at the bottom of 
the hierarchy are capital-saving but offer a low return per unit of labour.
Effort control by leaseholders
The manner in which fishing rights are marketed to the fishermen is of economic 
significance; it is clear that owners of fishing rights restrict the level of effort applied to 
the water in order to maintain rents.
The lessees approach or are approached by interested fishermen, sometimes through the 
lessees' agents. The price of access and the timing of the payments are determined by 
negotiation. It happens that two groups using the same gear in the same area at the same 
time are paying different tariffs.
The means by which effort is controlled depends upon the technique being used. A 
distinction may be made between two types of fishing technique: territorial techniques 
and mobile techniques. The former include dols (brush-piles), traps and dry-fishing. The 
latter include seine nets, gill-nets and push-nets.
For the territorial techniques, the right to fish is sold by area. The fishermen are allowed 
to use as much labour or gear as they wish, so long as they restrict their activities to the 
specified site. (It will be remembered that trap-lines are individually named.) Effort is 
obviously restricted by the fact that sites cannot be "double-booked." This is another point 
of divergence between Hail Haor and orthodox fishery economics. Existing bio-economic 
models warn that rents will be dissipated under open access because they will always 
attract higher levels of effort. Hail Haor's combination of cheap labour and fertile water, 
however, might make it possible for the locational constraint to put a limit on effort 
increases before rents are dissipated.
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For the mobile techniques, fishing rights are sold by "man and a boat" units. The price 
per unit varies according to the gear used. If a group wishes to take on an extra member 
during the season, it must pay an additional fee pro rata. Fishermen report that the seller 
may refuse to sell additional access lest his area become less profitable. In this way the 
margin between total cost and the value of the catch is maintained.
However, the owners of fishing rights make no apparent attempt to maintain the growth 
and reproduction of the fish stock. Leaseholders and sub-leaseholders are not known to 
ban monofilament or narrow-mesh gill nets during the flood season, to establish reserves 
or to maintain a breeding stock for the following season. Because the areas of the 
jalmohols and sub-leases are small and the fish are mobile between them, especially 
during the flood-season, the benefits of stock maintenance would be largely externalised.
Fishermen's Associations and lease allocation
The official rationale for the government's awarding preferential auction rights to 
Fishermen's Associations, and indeed for the New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP), 
was that Fishermen's Associations (Motshojibi Somity) would allocate fishing rights 
equitably among the households of a fishing community. In reality, however, it is difficult 
to distinguish between Hail Haor's Fishermen's Associations and the cartels of influential 
individuals that they were intended to replace. In villages where a Fishermen's 
Association controls a jalmohol, non-members usually outnumber members by about ten 
to one and within the membership actual control over its finances is exercised by an 
individual or a small syndicate.
The true nature of Hail Haor's Fishermen's Associations is illustrated by four examples, 
the Baraura Motshojibi Somobaya Somity, the Jonokolan Motshojibi Somobaya Somity, 
the Bonabir Motshojibi Somobaya Somity Ltd and the Rustumpur Motshojibi Somobaya 
Somity.
The Baraura Motshojibi Somobaya Somity has a Chairman, a Secretary, 4 Directors and 
89 ordinary members out of an estimated 1,000 fishermen. Its finances are raised by a 
monthly subscription of Tkl 0 on all members and a loan of Tk30,000 from a Srimangal 
moneylender upon which interest accrues at a rate of Tk3,000 per month. In return for 
their membership fee Somity members receive access to the shallow part of all jalmohols 
leased by the society. The deep waters are sub-leased. The Baraura Somity is operating 
the final year of a Tkl 0,000 p.a. three-year lease over Lota Gang, a two-mile river fishery 
principally supporting bel jals (pivot lift nets). In April 1992 it paid Moulvi Bazar Zila 
(district) Tk86,000, being a 50% instalment on the annual lease value of 62 Beel, which
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adjoins Baraura village. The Somity intended to repay its Tk30,000 loan by sub-letting 
part of 62 Beel and charging entry fees to non-members, who constitute most of Baraura's 
fishermen. In the event, a man from Bonobir village claimed 62 Beel for his Fishermen’s 
Association on the grounds that they had owned the lease previously and had not made 
enough profit at that time.
Jonokalan Motshojibi Somobaya Somity has a Secretary and 210 members out of an 
estimated fishing population of 1,500 in Buruna, its home village. Ordinary members buy 
an initial permanent share for Tk25 and pay a membership fee of Tk2/month thereafter. If 
collected in full, membership fees would provide an income of Tk5,040/year. However, 
the annual official lease payments for the Somity's three jalmohols, Juduria (120 acres), 
Chapra Maguria (21 acres) and Morajonka Boishakali (71 acres) amount to Tk20,350. In 
reality, as the Secretary freely admits, he himself pays the government the lease money 
and sub-lets the jalmohols to syndicates of 5 to 15 Somity members. It should be noted 
that fishermen wishing to operate in No.l Beel, Hail Haor's prime jalmohol, pay fees to 
the Secretary of Jonokalan Motshojibi Somobaya Somity, even though the lease is held in 
another name.
The man from Bonabir who temporarily seized control of 62 Beel is called the Secretary 
of the Bonabir Motshojibi Somobaya Somity Ltd. This Somity had 108 members in 1992, 
up from 65 members the previous year. Each paid TklO/month as a membership 
subscription, but the Secretary is unable to explain what they receive in return, since the 
Bonabir MSS Ltd had in theory no jalmohol leases that year. In fact, however, the 
Secretary had obtained de facto control of 62 Beel pending the High Court ruling and was 
charging entry fees to his "members". Although the Bonobir MSS Ltd's "members" are 
Hindus from the Haor’s western shore, it is backed by a Muslim "non-fisherman" 
mohojon from Srimangal. The mohojon purchased the previous lease and finances the 
current lawsuit. The man from Bonobir recruits fishermen for him and satisfies the 
government's requirement that Fishermen's Associations should contain "bona fide 
fishermen." He is a front.
Some fishermen from Rustumpur village are paying the man from Bonabir for the right to 
fish in 62 Beel. Because of this, the man from Bonabir is sometimes described by men 
from other villages as "the Secretary of Rustumpur Motshojibi Somobaya Somity". It is 
interesting to note how the terminology of community development has been used to 
describe the sub-leasing relationship.
The Rustumpur Motshojibi Somobaya Somity has 56 members out of an estimated 500 
fishermen in Rustumpur. In 1992 they controlled leases for 6 jalmohols totalling over 150 
acres. For these they paid bribes totalling Tk45,000 followed by official lease payments
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of Tkl 5,000 per year. The Somity attempted to raise this capital through membership 
subscriptions but failed and resorted to a loan from a fish wholesaler (arotdar). The 
Somity members must in return sell their entire catch through him, and he receives a 6% 
commission upon the purchase price, the practice known as dalal. Not all fishing in the 
Somity's jalmohols is subject to dalal. Fishing between the monsoon and the beginning of 
December and fishing by Somity non-members are exempt. The Somity's beels contain a 
number of potential brush-pile sites. These are allocated to groups of 5-6 Somity 
members, which make a sub-leasing payment to the Somity after the brush-pile catch.
As these examples show, the absence or presence of a Fishermen's Association is not an 
indicator of the concentration or diffusion of access rights. Management by Fishermen’s 
Association should certainly not be interpreted as "community management" or "common 
property" and may be more realistically described as sub-leasing by another name. The 
lessee or his agent is called a "President" and the tolls are called "membership fees" but 
the flows of cash are the same. The advantage for government is that it can negotiate fees 
for accepting and registering these palpably fake associations.
Fishing factions
In contrast to the Department of Fisheries' official policy pronouncements, which are 
uniformly hostile to the leasing system, fishermen's own attitudes are more subtle. The 
relationship between lessee and fisherman appears to create a patronage system, as 
typified by Scott (1975): the fisherman, as client, cedes a part of his value-added to the 
lessee, as patron and the lessee in return assures him a fishing livelihood.
We saw earlier how the lessee usually sells fishing rights to members of his own 
community or, if he does not, the lessee's agent sells them to members of his own 
community. This has important implications; fishermen see their access to water as 
deriving from, as well as hindered by, the wealth and influence of leaseholders. Fishing 
communities without wealthy leaders cannot obtain direct access to the best fishing sites. 
Thus the Hindu fishermen argue that they have been excluded from prime spots since the 
1962 Land Reform undermined the economic status of the Hindu elite. Thus the Hindus 
of Bonobir and Rustumpur tried to gain access to 62 Beel by allying themselves with a 
Srimangal mohojon but were eventually excluded when their patron was out-manoeuvred 
by the patron of Baraura. Thus the Nomosudras of Monargaon obtain limited access to 
No. 1 Beel through the sub-lease taken in Buruna by their priest/doctor.
Even after the leases have been allocated, fishermen need a strong patron to make their 
title effective. Neither leases nor sub-leases are secure from rival factions and poachers
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unless they can be maintained by physical and political power. Fishing gear will be stolen 
unless the owner has colleagues on the water who are prepared to protect it. Although 
access to the floodplain is open in theory, groups of fishermen exercise territorial control 
over it in proportion to their strength.
In brief, a fisherman's chances on the water depend upon membership of a band of 
fishermen united by their common allegiance to a lessee, sub-lessee or agent - in other 
words, a fishing faction. To take the example of Buruna's Maimals, they receive many 
benefits from the influential lessee in their midst: they obtain access to Hail Haor's best 
jalmohol, they are better-placed on the floodplain during the "open-access" season, their 
gear is not stolen and they are relatively immune from gear restrictions. Unsurprisingly, 
they are comparatively rich, well-dressed, healthy and smug. Compare them with the 
Nomosudra fishermen of Monargaon who are visibly poorer, worse-clothed and worse- 
fed. There is no difference in their technological opportunities. Their villages are adjacent 
and the Monargaon fishermen are, if anything, more experienced and skilled. The 
difference is that the Maimals have a strong patron and the Nomosudras do not. From the 
fishermen's point of view, the imminent need is not to avoid "exploitation" - it is to have a 
strong "exploiter".
Certain fishermen complain bitterly about lessees and the corruption of government 
officials. It is significant, however, that their complaints are not against the leasing 
system per se but that its operation has deprived them of access to a good jalmohol. 
Indeed, some fishermen speak with some satisfaction of their position within the leasing 
system. So, whilst fishermen cede a portion of their incomes to the leasing system in 
general, they perceive their own lessee as protecting their fishing incomes.
Conclusions
This chapter has examined in some detail the social, economic and institutional 
transactions that combine labour, fishing gear and the water-bodies in the Hail Haor 
fishery. It has covered the markets for fish, credit, fishing gear and water-rights, which 
are of interest because they are what will transmit the effect of fisheries policy onto the 
fisherfolk. The markets for fish, credit and gear were found to be more or less 
competitive, as orthodox models of fisheries management assume them to be. The 
allocation of fishing rights, on the other hand, is dominated by patron-client relationships 
in which non-economic factors such as coercion, violence, theft and bribery also play a 
part. The remainder of the thesis will examine the outcomes of these transactions: the 
value of output, the distribution of value between participants in the fishery and the 
impact of policy interventions upon them both.
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Chapter 8
Benefits and factor shares
Introduction
The Ricardian model of agricultural production describes how value is created 
and then allocated between labour and landowners. It may be summarised as 
follows: as more labour is applied, its incremental productivity decreases. 
Landowners hire it in until its incremental productivity is the same as the pre­
determined wage rate. Total production is the sum o f all the labourers' 
incremental productivities up to that point, all o f  which are higher than the wage 
rate. Labourers receive the wage and landowners take the rest in land rent. 
Gordon (1954) applied Ricardo's model to the fishery and Schaefer's (1957) classic 
formulation refined it by including the possible of biological over-fishing with a negative 
incremental productivity of labour.
This section uses data collected in 1992-3 to locate the Hail Haor fishery within the 
framework of a Ricardo-Gordon-Schaefer model. It discusses the fishery's productivity, 
how rents are generated and the allocation of benefits. All the quantitative results are, of 
course, only "best estimates", but it is hoped that their orders of magnitude, both absolute 
and relative to each other, will produce some useful insights into fisheries policy.
Benefits
One reason for studying the total benefit flow from the fishery is as part of an assessment 
of effort controls. The case for these restrictions rests partly upon the belief that there is a 
negative relationship between effort and the fish catch. To test this hypothesis, a 
comparison of the productivity of Hail Haor with that of other tropical floodplain 
fisheries would permit one to judge the extent to which Bangladesh's higher 
concentration of fishing effort has led to a reduced catch.
A second reason for studying the haor's productivity is to inform land-use planning. In the 
land-scarce economy of a country with a population density of 741/km^, floodplain 
fisheries like Hail Haor appear to be taking up valuable space. One case for the 
construction of flood-control embankments, and a case that has come to the fore with the 
recent down-playing of flooding's destructive effects, is that an increase in the area of 
agricultural land accompanying a reduction in the area of the floodplain could produce a 
net increase in output and employment per hectare. For flood control, as for many
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environmental interventions, a body of opinion warns of the effect upon the poor. 
Majumder and Durante (1993), for example, argue that the floodplain is an open-access 
resource, "open to anyone with a net" (p.2), so those without private resources will bear a 
disproportionate part of the cost. Their case is far from proven, however. The recent 
flooding of Beel Dakatia, and the impoverishment of local villages as they converted 
from agriculture to fishing (BCAS 1993, Rahman 1994), suggests that, hectare for 
hectare, paddy land can support more livelihoods than standing water.
This section will describe the biological and economic productivity of the Hail Haor 
fishery1. It should be emphasised that it refers only to one particular aquatic system, one, 
moreover, which is hydrologically atypical of Bangladesh's inland fisheries. A 
particularly important weakness of the estimates presented below is that they only 
measure locally-caught fish. They do not capture the biomass, derived employment and 
value of fish that grow in Hail Haor during the flood season, swim north into the Gopla 
River and are caught elsewhere. The reader is referred to the Flood Action Plan 17 (FAP) 
project, which is currently preparing estimates of the fisheries' biological and economic 
productivity nation-wide.
Starting with the catch of households who fish for consumption only, the proportion of 
riparian households falling into this category was as low as 10% (n=160), with 95% 
confidence that the population frequency lies between 5.4% and 14.6%. One would 
expect this figure, however, to be slightly lower for Hail Haor than for many other 
floodplains, because Hail Haor's relatively steep banks, with gradients as high as 1:350 on 
the western side, reduce the possibility of fishing in trapped depressions. For these 
households, the mean catch was 30.8 kg of fish per household per year. With a total 
riparian population of 3777 households (Appendix 4.1), this suggests as a best estimate 
that 11.6 tonnes of fish are caught by households who fish for consumption alone.
As for the catch of households fishing for sale, there are an estimated 1,363 such 
households operating in Hail Haor north of 2402FN. It is estimated that they caught a 
total of 0.80 tonnes of fish and shrimp per household (Appendix 4.2) (or 1090 tonnes in 
total) between December 1992 and November 1993 by all gears except brush-piles2. 
Treating the 50 sample households fishing north of 24°21'N as a single population, the 
90% confidence interval for mean catch (excepting brush-piles) is 678 kg to 922 kg per 
fishing household per year (mean=800kg, n=50, s.e.=516, t{.90,49}=1.68). The area in
1 All estimates in this section exclude that part of Hail Haor to the south of the main embankment at 
24°21rN. This area, which holds 0% and 15% of Hail Haor's area during the dry season and monsoon 
respectively, was excluded for lack of data upon the local fishing population and the predominant fishing 
technique, dewatering by pump.
2 Dry fishing by villages north of the main embankment was excluded because it mostly took place south of 
the main embankment .
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question contained 139ha of brush-piles, producing, at an estimated 600kg/ha (see 
Appendix 4.9), 83 tonnes of brush-pile fish.
Table 8 .1. Total catch from Hail Haor north o f 24°21rN. December 1992 to November 
1993 (tonnes).
Households fishing for consumption only 11.6











The total catch o f all households fishing either for sale or for consumption only totals 
1,184 tonnes per year (Table 8 .1). Using dry-season acreage and maximum flood as the 
denominator, this works out as 658 kg/ha/year and 111 kg/ha/year respectively.
Estimating that this portion o f Hail Haor supports 77,708 hectare-months of flooding 
(Appendix 4.6), each flooded hectare produced 15kg o f locally-caught edible biomass per 
month.
It is estimated (see Appendix 4.5) that fishing households spent 3,592 work- 
hours/household/year, or 4 9 million work-hours in total, in self-employed fishing (Table 
8.2). To this must be added activities in support o f self-employed fishing, such as fish- 
selling, trap-building and repairing, net-making and so on. Such work adds a further 380 
hours per household per year. Fishing households hired out 115 hours per household per 
year o f labour for fishing or trap-making. Certain items o f fishing gear, namely flsh- 
baskets, creels and, most importantly, fish-traps, are produced for sale almost entirely by 
local fishing households. Fishing households spent an average o f T kl, 101/household/year 
on the purchase o f these items. Observing that the implicit wage, gross o f production 
costs, o f trap- and basket-makers is around Tk4/hour, this works out as a derived demand 
for labour o f about 275 hours/household/year. This figure is not far off the 320
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hours/household/year devoted to trap- and basket-making by the study's respondents. 
These four uses o f labour, accounting for the labour demand generated by the fishery 
until the catch passes out o f the fishermen's hands, sum to 5.9 million vvork-hours per 
year, which is equivalent to 3,303 work-hours per dry-season hectare, 561 work-hours per 
hectare at maximum flood or 77 work-hours per hectare-month o f Hooding.
No information is available for the labour required by subsequent marketing. It is likely, 
however, to add around a further 10% to the demand for labour generated by the fishery. 
Observing that one paiker handles around 20kg of fish in a 10-hour day, and allowing for 
the fact that fishermen who fish for sale eat about a sixth o f the catch themselves, it is 
possible to estimate that the fishery requires around 0.5 million hours of paiker labour per 
year.
Table 8.2. Local employment generated bv the Hail Haor fishery from gear-production to 
the first sale, north o f 24°2TN only ('000 work-hours per vearf
Activity /fishing household Total
Self-employed fishing 3.6 4,895.9
Supporting work 0.4 535.2
Hired fishing labour 0.1 156.5
From local gear purchases 0.3 375.2
Total 4.4 5,945.4
(Figures may not sum exactly owing to rounding.)
Considering next the value o f the fish catch (Appendix 4.4, Table 8.3), households who 
fish for consumption only report that their catch consists almost entirely o f small fish and 
shrimp, which are observed to have a value of around Tk20/kg. This suggests that the 
value o f their annual catch is Tk0.2 million for the area in question. To put it in 
perspective, it is about US$1.54 per riparian household or the equivalent o f around one 
and a halfdays' wages per riparian household per year.
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Table 8.3. The value of the Hail Haor fishery north of 24°21fN (Tk million/year).
Gross sales
H o u s e h o l d s  t h a t :
fish for consumption only 0.2
fish for sale 35.1
Total 35.3
The gross value of the catch o f households fishing for sale was Tk25,747/household/year 
or Tk35.1 million/year for the area in question. The total annual value o f the catch 
therefore works out at T k l9,625 per dry-season hectare, Tk3,332 per hectare at maximum 
flood or Tk454 per hectare-month of flooding.
The Marine Resources Assessment Group (MRAG 1993) has contrasted the productivity 
estimates above with those o f the project's other study sites in Thailand and South 
Sumatra. The comparison revealed that the fish yields reported above, measured as kg per 
hectare at maximum Hood, were up to three times higher than those o f the other two sites 
and the published yields o f over 30 other tropical inland fisheries, despite Hail Haor's 
density o f fishermen being up to ten times higher It has also compared the composition 
(Appendix 4.3) and length frequency o f Hail Haor's catch with those o f the other two 
sites and concluded that Hail Haor produces higher physical yields, not by exploiting the 
same large species to a higher degree, but by targeting smaller, fecund, "r-selected" 
species as well as larger species. MRAG's analysis has three important implications for 
the relationship between effort and catch:
a) If Hail Haor's yields have been reduced through over-fishing, the reduction is 
not abrupt enough to be demonstrable by comparison with fisheries in other 
countries.
b) Because the level o f exploitation of any one species is apparently no higher 
than elsewhere, the higher concentration o f fishing effort in Hail Haor is unlikely 
to bring about a higher risk o f recruitment failure and stock collapse, as reported 
from some marine fisheries.
c) Effort controls aimed at restricting the catch o f juveniles will indeed increase 
the yield-per-recruit of larger species but at the cost o f a reduced catch o f "r- 
selected" species.
In brief, the response o f total catch to effort is likely to be minimal around current levels 
o f effort (MRAG 1994, p.94).
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Factor shares in the fishery
The distribution of revenues by factor share provides a useful indicator in the assessment 
of management options. Existing normative economic theories of the management of 
natural resources focus upon the value of resource rents (revenues minus costs). The main 
theme of this literature is the development of algorithms whereby the manager can adjust 
the pattern of effort so as to maximise rents. This study, however, is more concerned with 
another factor share, the benefits accruing to fishermen. Bangladesh's New Fisheries 
Management Policy aims, ostensibly at least, at re-allocating resource rents away from 
lessees towards fishing labour. All these approaches are primarily concerned with factor 
shares.
Fishing revenues since Gordon (1954) have traditionally been divided into three factor 
shares. Material costs are a loss to the economy. The prevailing wage, which is 
determined in a clearing labour market as the opportunity cost of labour, is multiplied by 
the amount of labour applied to produce an implicit wage bill. Since the wage rate 
represents labour's opportunity cost it is also a loss to the economy; increases in fishing 
employment do not per se generate any increase in economic welfare. The residual, 
revenues less material costs and labour costs, constitutes fishery rents.
This simple three-way model, however, fails to capture the economic processes that 
divide the catch in a floodplain fishery in Bangladesh. It must be refined.
A marginal divergence between the wage and the social opportunity cost of labour
Orthodox fisheries management theories specify economic rents as the target variable to 
be maximised. Since one is concerned in this case with poverty-alleviation in a labour- 
surplus economy, however, it is appropriate to treat the social opportunity cost of labour 
as negligible and thus to include the flow of revenues to labour as part of net benefits 
rather than an economic cost.
Gordon (1954) defined the optimum management stance as one where a small change in 
the level of fishing effort would not affect fishing rents. Considering the opportunity cost 
of labour as negligible, however, one should attempt to seek the point where any marginal 
increase in rents due to a change in the pattern of effort would be cancelled out by a 
marginal decrease in the value of labour's remuneration.
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A marginal divergence between the wage and the private opportunity cost of labour.
Moreover, the labour market does not clear. For most o f the year there is an excess supply 
of fishing labour at the prevailing wage, or implicit wage, allowed to labour. In the 
foregoing discussion of the allocation of fishing rights it was observed that there is 
vigorous competition between fishermen o f different communities for fishing rights at the 
prevailing level o f tolls. Communities clearly feel that they have lost out if  deprived of 
the right to fish; in other words, they believe that the private return to fishing is 
significantly higher than the next best use o f labour. There is a clear parallel here with 
Jansen's (1987) description o f an agrarian community, where there was fierce competition 
for sharecropping contracts at the prevailing labour share.
Copes (1972) has suggested that fishermen's remuneration could be higher than the 
private opportunity cost o f labour because fishing skills are in scarce supply. In his 
analysis, factor rents are created not only by the scarcity o f fish but by the scarcity of 
people to catch them. There are several pieces o f evidence, however, that suggest that 
Copes' hypothesis does not apply to Hail Haor.
a) If fishermen were in short supply, they would not have to compete with 
violence and bribes for the right to fish.
b) If fishermen were in short supply, the wage rate for hired fishing labour would 
be higher than that for hired agricultural labour. As Table 8.4 indicates, however, 
there is no significant difference between the two rates.
c) Hindu fishermen in general and some Maimal Muslim fishing communities 
such as Bilashirpar, have been displaced from the fishery by richer and better- 
connected villages such as Buruna, Hazipur and Srimangal Busti. The resulting 
presence o f non-fishing fishermen strongly suggests that fishing skills are not 
scarce.




Mean wage (Tk/day) 39.8 38.1
Median wage (Tk/day) 40.0 32.5
s.d. of wage (Tk/day) 13.6 12.8
(s.e. o f difference between means=3.69, t=0.48)
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Another possible source of the divergence between the prevailing rate of remuneration to 
labour and the private opportunity cost of labour lies in the restriction of effort. If effort is 
restricted to below its open-access, rent dissipating level by regulation, community 
management or private ownership, then some of the resulting resource rents could accrue 
to fishermen. There is one apparent problem with this hypothesis, however: with a large 
number of fishermen competing for the fishing spaces allocated by a small number, an 
oligopsonistic number even, of lessees, one would expect all the resource rents to accrue 
to the lessee rather than to labour. The evidence from Hail Haor suggests that some 
resource rents are indeed diverted to labour and that the source of this divergence lies, not 
in the operation of a classical competitive labour market, but in the nature of the 
patronage relationship between the lessee or sub-lessee on the one hand and his 
fishermen on the other.
Orthodox economic theory assumes that property rights are sacrosanct, being preserved 
by the state, and goes on to predict the actions if rational agents under this restriction. In 
Bangladesh's floodplain fisheries, however, property rights can be captured and lost, not 
only through purchase and sale in the economic market, but also through physical force 
and political manoeuvring. The foregoing section upon access management noted how 
bribery, coercion and local influence had more importance in determining de facto  
jalmohol allocation than the official bid. It also demonstrated how jurisdiction over other 
parts of the floodplain is established through physical coercion. A large body of writers 
upon rural Bangladesh (e.g. Hartmann and Boyce 1983, Jansen 1987, McGregor 1989b) 
show how physical security, land and external aid are allocated through force and 
political influence. Part of Kramsyo and Wood's (1992) case for NGO interventions is 
that they create a countervailing power by putting physical force and political influence 
under the control of the rural poor.
If the mobilisation of physical force and political support is a key concern of the rural 
capitalist, it follows that he wishes to secure the physical and political support of a 
number of followers. This "loyalty" is obtained by allowing his clients, whether 
sharecropping tenants, regular labourers, plaintiffs or, in this case, fishermen, somewhat 
more than the market-clearing private opportunity cost of their labour. This "loyalty" 
premium is akin to the economist's "efficiency wage", where the employer raises the 
remuneration of his workers in order to improve their performance. In the floodplain 
fishery, the "loyalty premium" provides a potent explanation of the non-price rationing of 
employment through vertical faction alignments in a non-clearing labour market.
The existence of a "loyalty premium" has important implications for a factor-share 
analysis of the floodplain fishery. It suggests that a portion of the fishery's resource rents
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will flow to fishermen, even if their skills are not in short supply. If this is so, and there is 
an accompanying marginal divergence between the fishermen's implicit wage on the one 
hand and the private opportunity cost of labour on the other, then it is no longer possible, 
with Gordon, to identify fishermen's remuneration as a cost to the economy. This 
provides a further argument for treating employment in the fishery as a target variable 
rather than a cost.
Tolls
The tolls that are paid by fishermen can be conceptually apportioned into five factor 
shares, between:
a) venal civil servants
b) lessees' and sub-lessees' opportunity cost of capital
c) lessees' and sub-lessees' rewards for risk-taking
d) lessees' and sub-lessees' super-normal profits
and e) government revenues
The official Department of Fisheries view is that toll payments are largely channelled 
towards (d), lessees' super-normal profits and (e), government revenues, thus creating 
plenty of scope for a progressive redistribution of rents through the New Fisheries 
Management Policy. The evidence from Hail Haor, however, suggests that payments to 
venal civil servants and the lessees' opportunity cost of capital account for a large share of 
toll payments.
Regarding civil servants' incomes from lease allocation, the evidence presented in the 
preceding chapter suggests that bribes, or informal fees if one prefers, represent around 
40% to 60% of a lessee's official and unofficial outlay upon lease acquisition. This figure 
rises sharply if a law-suit arises. The importance of bribery is revealed in the huge 
variability in the per acre value of leases. The 1992 lessee of Gopla River 3's 58 acres, for 
example, paid Tk96,000 per year while his neighbour in Gopla River 4's 52 acres paid 
Tk8,300. The 16 large, central and therefore, one would expect, relatively productive 
jalmohols leased out by Zila officials went for an official price of Tk413/acre (n=T6, 
unweighted average), while those rented out by Thana officials went for Tk 1,215/acre 
(n=T3, unweighted average). One possible explanation is that the relative seniority of Zila 
officials permits more scope for private arrangements.
The importance of bribes should lead one to reconsider the rates of profit made by 
leaseholders. Many writers (e.g. Blanchet and Talukder 1992) show them making rapid 
profits by reselling or sub-leasing their jalmohols. Since these calculations invariably use 
the official lease price as the denominator they are almost certain to underestimate the 
lessee's outlay and thus overestimate his super-normal profits.
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One way of obtaining a rough impression of the leasing system's opportunity cost o f 
capital is to examine the time distribution o f lease acquisition payments and toll 
collection. Table 8.5 presents an estimated account of the flow of lease prices, bribes and 
tolls for Hail Haor in 1992-3. It shows how the lessees' initial investment in May earns a 
delayed pay-off, much of which is collected in two bursts, one in October, when lessees 
impose control, and one in April, at the end of the brush-pile and pump season. 
Considering this cashflow as a single investment, the internal rate o f return would be 
1 0 .0 % per month, which is more or less the going rate for loan finance in the informal 
sector. If one ignores away the cost to the leasing system o f bribes, the IRR rises to 16.7% 
per month.




May -614.1 -307.1 6.8
June 0 0 0
July 0 0 0
August 0 0 37.3
September 0 0 33.9
October 0 0 283.9
November 0 0 415.2
December 0 0 132.8
January 0 0 161.8
February 0 0 487.2
March 0 0 17 6.5
April 0 0 99.9
(a) Source. Thana Fisheries Office, Srimangal
(b) Low estimate: 50% of official price
(c) Mean tolls per household paid by 60 fishing households, scaled up to the 2,033 
households estimated to fish on Hail Haor, May 1993 to November 1993, December 1992 
to April 1993.
O f course, this calculation is prone to a number o f possible inaccuracies: the allowance 
for bribery is at best a rough guess and toll payments and the total fishing population are 
statistical estimates. The point remains, however, that the leasing system's IRR is o f the
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same order o f magnitude as the informal sector rate o f return upon financial capital. It 
follows from this that a large portion of the profits accruing to the lessee and sub-lessee 
are not super-normal profits but the market's standard return for capital investment. This 
in turn suggests that the NFMP's official aim, which is to shift super-normal profits from 
lessees and sub-lessees to fishermen, will be of limited effectiveness without a change in 
the cost o f capital and/or a postponement o f lease allocation payments.
Distribution of fishery revenues by factor share
Table 8 .6  shows the breakdown of Hail Haor's fishing revenues by factor shares from 
December 1992 to November 1993 (see Appendix 4.8 for data). The share of fishery 
revenues absorbed by the leasing system, at 3.6%, is strikingly low. If one allows that the 
labour component of trap and basket sales is around 50%, the share o f fishery revenues 
accruing to fishing labour, either through self-employed fishing, fishing labour hire or 
trap and basket production, is around 78%. In other words, the leasing system's gross 
earnings are only around l/25th of the net earnings o f fishing labour. If one subtracts the 
government's share, Tk614,000 per year, from the leasing system's turnover and allows 
that another Tk600,000 or so is pocketed by government officials, one estimates that the 
lessees' and sub-lessees' surplus is only some 1.3% of fishing households' net incomes 
from fishing and gear-production. Any allowance for the lessees' opportunity cost o f 
capital would have to come out o f this 1.3%.
Table 8 .6 . Breakdown of fish sales: 60 sample households. December 1992 to November 
1993.
(per cent o f fish sales)
Leasing system:
Official lease price 1%
Lessees, sub-lessees, bribes 2%
Fishing costs: 
Labour hire 2 %
Traps and baskets 
Other fishing costs 18%
4%
Fishermen's net incomes 72%
Total: Fishing sales 1 0 0%
(Percentages may not sum to 100 because o f rounding.) 
(Source: Appendix 4.8)
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If these figures are accurate, or a least of the right order of magnitude, then they have 
very significant policy implications. The potential rise in fisherfolk's net incomes from an 
NFMP-type redistribution of lessees’ profits is around 1.3%. Given the administrative 
costs of a change in procedures, the provision of credit to license-buyers and breaking the 
venal link between lessees and government officials, one should question whether 
policies such as the NFMP could produce noticeable or cost-effective benefits to fishing 
labour.
It remains to be explained, however, how the view has arisen that the leasing system 
absorbs a high fraction of fishing revenues. Dey (1986), for example, has studied the 
cash-flow of the haor fishermen of a Nomosudra village in neighbouring Habiganj Zila 
and estimated that leasing costs were equivalent to 25-30% of fishing groups' total costs. 
The answer to this problem of perception lies in the asymmetrical nature of the fishery. 
Around 93% of the catch by weight (see Table 8.1) is produced by low-cost, relatively 
unproductive gears such as gill-nets, push-nets, tana nets hooks and traps. Since they 
produce a small surplus over labour's requirements the lessee cannot levy tolls from them 
at a high rate. The remaining 7% of the catch, however, is obtained from relatively 
productive brush-piles.
Table 8.7 breaks down revenues from brush-pile fish sales by destination. It shows how 
their high profitability allows lessees to obtain an important share (34%) of sales. 
Supposing that one did redistribute jalmohol costs back to the brush-pile owners, they 
would see a 140% increase in their net incomes, which is very high by comparison with 
the 4% increase on offer in the fishery as a whole. If, as the NFMP proposed, low-cost 
credit replaced "exploitative dalal", the brush-pile owners' net incomes would stand to 
rise by 170%.
It is very probable that it is the highly-visible, capital-intensive and politically well- 
connected brush-pile and pump fishery that has given the impression that lessees' tolls 
consume a high proportion of fish sales. Dey's (1986) list of gears, for example, does not 
mention the existence of gill-nets, traps, hooks and push-nets. It has already been pointed 
out that policy-makers have drawn their perceptions of the catch composition (dominated 
by major carps) and fish marketing (exploited by dalal) from this small but powerful sub­
sector. It would hardly be surprising if the same were true for tolls.
The observation that tolls cost brush-pile groups proportionally much more dearly than 
ordinary fisherfolk ought to cast the political economy of the NFMP in a new light. Those 
who would benefit most are not the marginalised fishing underclass of popular myth but
capitalised fishing entrepreneurs. These are, in the case o f Hail Haor at least, "genuine 
fishermen", being members of Maimal or Nomosudra social groupings who live and sleep 
on the water during the brush-pile season. If implemented in Hail Haor, the NFMP could 
certainly meet its official goal o f helping "genuine fishermen", but the principal 
beneficiaries would be the richest members of fishing society. One returns to a point 
made earlier, that an understanding o f fisheries policy should start with a conception of 
fisherfolk as a parallel hierarchy rather than as a homogeneous underclass.
('000 Tk/ha of brush-pile)
Share Mean % of sales
Jalmohol costs 11.7 34
Building costs 5.6 16
Fishing costs 6.1 18
Arotdar's dalal 2.8 8
Net revenue 8.3 24
Total sales 34.5 100
Source: Appendix 4.9
Factor shares and effort controls
It is possible to use this data upon the distribution o f sales by factor shares to analyse the 
possible redistributive effects of a reduction in fishing effort. Figure 8 .1 illustrates a 
Schaeferian model of the Hail Haor fishery. Non-labour costs are shown as a constant 
multiple o f the amount o f labour applied to the fishery. The yield curve is represented as 
a horizontal line, the form suggested by MRAG's (1994) observations upon the probable 
relationship o f catch to effort. Labour's remuneration is a constant multiple o f the amount 
of labour applied. There is no positive relationship between labour use and the implicit 
wage, in line with the earlier observation that there is an excess supply o f labour with 
fishing skills. The margin between the value of sales on the one hand (Tk35.3 million) 
and labour remuneration plus non-labour costs on the other (Tk34.0 million) provides 
tolls, the leasing system's turnover (Tk 1.3 million).
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Figure 8J.. Schaefenan model o f  factor-share detem in a tio n  in.Hail Haor,
35.3
34.0
T k m illio n
7.06





The response o f labour's remuneration to a change in the amount of labour applied can be 
calculated as:
34.000.000 - 7-060-000 = Tk 4.5 per work-hour 
5,945,000
The response o f tolls to a change in the amount o f labour applied can be calculated as:
-34.000.000 = Tk -5.7 per work hour 
5,945,000
This small illustration brings out an important feature o f the political economy o f effort 
management, that it is nearly a zero-sum game. For every Tk 1.00 lost to labour because 
of the reduction o f effort only Tkl .27 is taken by the leasing system. To put it another 
way, one needs to remove Tk3.75 from fishing labour in order to gain Tkl.O for the 
economy as a whole. It is therefore likely that a large part o f the pressure for gear controls 
will derive from concern for the leasing system rather than concern for economic 
efficiency. For policy-makers, the question is whether their social welfare function 
accords leasing system turnover, o f which around two-thirds accrues to lessees and venal 
government officials, at least 79% of the weight that it accords fishing labour's income. If 
it does not, there is a case against effort controls.
The question then arises o f why lessees and sub-lessees do not reduce the amount o f 
labour applied to the haor and then raise the total value o f tolls. The answer probably lies
157
in the fragmented nature of property rights. Once Hail Haor has been divided into 
jalmohols and those jalmohols have been divided into sub-lease units, the mobility of fish 
means that the stock-depletion costs of effort are largely externalised. This fits with the 
observation that independent fishermen are more or less excluded from enclosable units 
such as the 62 Beels' pump areas and Beri Beel near Sherpur, which are fished almost 
entirely by sub-lessees' pumps and brush-piles.
Conclusion
This section has presented estimates of the flow and distribution of benefits from the Hail 
Haor fishery. The analysis attempted to locate Hail Haor within a Ricardo-Gordon- 
Schaefer model of the creation and allocation of benefits. Having done so, it was possible 
to make a number of tentative conclusions about the operation of fisheries policy:
a) The fishery generates 15kg of fish, 7 work-hours and Tk454 (US$11.35) of fish 
sales per hectare-month of flooding. These are the benefits that might be lost to a 
programme of flood control.
b) The fishery is highly productive by international standards, suggesting that the 
high density of fishing effort is not significantly depressing yields (MRAG 1994).
c) Because tolls are a relatively small share of sales and government officials and 
capital costs consume part of the leasing system's turnover, the potential benefits 
to the average fishing household from a reform of the leasing system may be 
smaller than previously imagined.
d) The potential benefits to the relatively rich owners of capital-intensive gears 
such as brush-piles, however, are very high indeed.
e) Effort controls are quite close to being a zero-sum policy. For every TklOO 
gained by the leasing system, Tk79 is lost by fishing households.
This kind of fishery assessment, analysis in terms of the value and factor-distribution of 
benefits at one point in time, provides a complement to more conventional biological 
assessment methods. In particular, a discussion of the allocation of benefits between 




Unequal access to the fishery
Introduction
Hail Haor's lessees and sub-lessees break the haor up into thousands of different fishing 
spots, differentiated from each other by location, season and gear-type. The fisherfolk 
themselves are also differentiated, by socio-economic status, place of residence and 
religion. The purpose of this section is to examine how the latter maps onto the former, 
how a household's physical activities on the floodplain are determined by its place in 
fishing society. Just as biologists speak of a species' ecological niche within the 
ecosystem, it will be possible to identify how different groups of fishermen occupy socio- 
ecological niches on the floodplain.
The leasing system
The leasing system allocates access to Hail Haor's fish stocks to some whilst denying it to 
others. It is possible to study the 1992-3 pattern of allocation and denial and observe what 
factors determine a fisherman's chances of making a living from fishing on any one 
particular day. A key issue is whether the main determinant of access is economic, the 
fisherman's ability to pay the toll, or social, the fisherman's membership of a well-placed 
fishing community or faction. The distinction is of significance for fisheries policy, as it 
bears upon the political economy of a shift from leasing to licensing. If the allocation of 
rights is principally economic, with price competition for fishing space, then one might 
expect fishermen actively to support a policy that removed the middleman. If, one the 
other hand, access is restricted to members of a particular fishing faction, the fishermen 
who currently enjoy access rights would stand to lose from any policy that threatened the 
privileged position of their lessee patron, which is the professed intent of the NFMP and 
NGOs.
Figure 9.1 illustrates this theoretical approach. Charts (a), (b) and (c) represent 
respectively the fishermen of well-connected faction A, excluded faction B and both 
factions together. The "MAPT" lines represent fishermen's Marginal Ability to Pay Tolls 
in each chart. They are downward-sloping because the fishermen within each faction 
have differing abilities to pay tolls, according to their liquidity, fishing skills, access to 
credit, gear-ownership and so on. Suppose that the lessee has enough fishing spaces for L 
fishermen. If his goal were to maximise immediate monetary profit irrespective of his 
need to secure political support within a particular faction i.e. chart (c), he could charge a
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toll o f T j and earn revenues of T j L. If, on the other hand, he behaves as a patron o f 
faction A, he will only charge a toll o f T2  or, making a toll concession in return for 
political support, T3 . Now, suppose the NFMP or NGO offers the low toll T4  to all 
comers. If the lessee had been maximising tolls before the change, subleasing the 
jalmohol to both factions, the net gain for fishermen o f faction A will be their share, say a 
half, o f the gains from the toll reduction, or l/4L(Tj-T^). If, on the other hand, the lessee 
had previously been acting as a patron, the net loss in surplus for faction A's fishermen 
will be shaded area x (representing the gain from lower tolls) minus shaded area y 
(representing the loss from sharing access with faction B). The smaller the fall in tolls, 
the more likely it is that a net loss will result, with the exclusion of some effort (area x) 
outweighing the gains to the remainder (area y) from the lower tolls. Fishermen on the 
whole, o f course, will be net gainers, but this consideration will not weaken faction A's 
support for its patron's subversion o f the NFMP or NGO's policy.
Figure 9.1. Toll reductions with and without patronage factions.






labour applied to the fishery
One way of analysing this question quantitatively is to examine seasonal patterns in 
fishing participation. As Table 9.1 indicates, fishermen work on toll-free flooded rice 
land during the June-September monsoon season and in the jalmohols during the 
November-May dry season. The period of most intense control by lessees and sub-lessees 
is the brush-pile and pump fishing season of January to March. Fishing participation picks 
up in April and May as this exclusion is relaxed, even though the new season's fish stocks 
will only start to appear in the catch in early June. One can therefore identify the
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fishermen who are excluded by the leasing system as those who fish during the monsoon 
flood and drop out between January and March.
Table 9.1. Fishing participation by month and season. December 1992 to November
1993.
(% o f households fishing on any one day.)
Month jalmohol floodplain tot<
M June 7 60 67
M July 27 55 82
M August 25 58 83
M September 27 47 73
M October 19 59 78
November 35 25 60
December 47 3 49
January 58 1 59
February 57 3 60
March 64 2 66
April 62 1 63
May 70 4 74
M: monsoon month
Table 9.2 compares the seasonality o f fishing participation for rich and poor households. 
If a household's financial ability to pay tolls were an important determinant o f its 
participating in dry-season fishing, one would expect to see a greater falling-off for poor 
households than rich households during the dry season. The figures show that a poor 
household was 35% more likely than another household to be fishing on any one day 
during the flood between July and October. Conversely, a non-poor household was 26% 
more likely to be fishing on any one day during the dry season between November and 
April than a poor household.
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Table 9.2. Fishing participation for rich and poortai households. December 1992 to 
November 1993.
(% o f households fishing on any one day.)
Month Poor - Other = Difference
M June 52 55 - 3
M July 83 54 29
M August 70 53 17
M September 83 66 17
M October 74 57 17
November 65 69 - 4
December 57 76 -19
January 63 76 -13
February 54 92 -38
March 61 65 - 4
April 63 81 -18
May 80 55 25
M: monsoon month
(a) Ranked in the poorest 40% on the study sample list by their fellow-vi I lagers.
As the preceding discussion o f the leasing system explained, many of the wealthy Hindus 
who used to obtain jalmohols on behalf of their Nomosudra co-religionists fled 
Bangladesh after Partition, the 1962 Land Reform and Independence. If the patronage 
hypothesis is correct, one would now expect to see Muslim Maimal lessees and sub­
lessees selling scarce dry-season fishing spaces to Muslim fishermen. Hindu fishermen, 
on the other hand, would have to withdraw from the fishery at this time. Table 9.3 
compares the seasonality o f fishing participation for Hindu and Muslim households. It 
shows that Hindu fishermen are slightly more likely than Muslim fishermen to fish during 
the flood months o f July to November. During the January to May dry season, however, a 
Muslim household is 30% more likely to be fishing than a Hindu household. The 
relationship between fishing access and community membership is vividly illustrated by 
the locational distribution of eastern shore fishermen in early November 1993, just as 
they were moving back off the floodplain into the jalmohols. O f 12 Buruna Maimal 
households fishing on one particular day, 9 were already fishing in the jalmohols. O f
162
these, 6  were in No. 1 Beel, Hail Haor's central basin. O f 8  Nomosudra households from 
neighbouring Monargaon, however, 7 were still fishing over paddy land.
Table 9.3. Fishing participation for Hindu and Muslim households. December 1992 to 
November 1993.
(% o f households fishing on any one day, 3-month moving average.)
Month Muslim- Hindu = Difference
M June 73 72 1
M July 74 78 - 4
M August 72 83 - 9
M September 73 83 -10
M October 67 73 - 6
November 67 62 - 5
December 64 52 8
January 64 47 17
February 69 48 21
March 69 49 20
April 73 58 15
May 70 63 13
Although the number of participating fishermen falls during the dry season, the total 
effort and catch applied to the fishery does not show a matching decline. The proportion 
of households that fish on any one day is 41% higher in July-September than in 
December-February (Table 9.1). The total value o f sales, however, is 8 % higher in 
Decernber-February than in July-September (Appendix 4.4). This clearly represents a 
high premium for dry-season access.
It is also possible to examine how important access is for fishing households by 
comparing the returns to labour from fishing with those from a fall-back activity. For 
many Hindu households, who are rather more likely than Maimals to be excluded, an 
important fall-back activity is trap- or basket-making. The median net income from trap- 
making per standard nine hour day is Tk30/day. This result is the same whether one uses 
household income per year (n=17) or household income per month (n=81) as the unit of 
observation. The modal range is Tk20-29/day. Even though the distribution is positively 
skewed (mean=Tk34/day), the mean net daily income from trap- or basket-making is
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significantly different from Tk40/day, the mean net income from hired fishing labour or 
self-employed fishing.
A third indicator of the importance of dry-season access to the fishery is provided by the 
relationship between the labour that a household devotes to fishing between December 
and May and its total income during the same period. If it were possible for households to 
substitute out of fishing into another equally remunerative activity, one would observe no 
relationship, or even a negative relationship, between fishing labour use and total income. 
If, one the other hand, there are no equally remunerative substitutes for dry-season 
fishing, one would observe a positive relationship between fishing labour use and total 
income. The following regression equation was estimated in order to choose between 
these alternative hypotheses:
Yi = a + (Bx Hj) + Uj
where:
Y- is household i's total income (Tk) from all sources less tolls and fishing costs between 
December 1992 and May 1993.
B is the propensity of dry-season fishing to increase total household income.
Hj is household i's allocation of labour to self-employed fishing or related support 
activities between December and May (work-hours).
The regression, which was significant at a 99.9 level of confidence (n=60, regression sum 
of squares^ 1.4x10^, residual sum of squares=3.9xl0^) showed that every hour of labour 
used in fishing alone led to an extra Tk2.6 for total household income. The regression 
explained 26% of the variance in total household income. This result is particularly 
telling in view of the fact that December to May is considered a "fat season" for the 
agricultural sector, with the aman harvest in December and boro preparation in January. 
One would therefore expect alternative employment to be relatively abundant at this time.
To sum up, there is a contraction in the number of fishermen participating in fishing at 
the start of the dry season. For those who can retain access there will be a significant 
income premium over and above what they could obtain from non-fishing activities. 
Because there will therefore be more claimants than dry-season fishing places, this 
premium has to be rationed. The first determinant of premium allocation is the 
community to which the fisherman belongs. The second determinant is his economic 
status within that community. The lessee will, of course, only contract with those who 
can afford his tolls; however, the existence of a sizeable fishing premium after the 
payment of tolls suggests that social status within the village and ability to mobilise gear 
are of more concern to the lessee in his choice of client than maximising toll revenue.
164
The importance of gear purchase as a determinant o f fishing incomes will be discussed 
below.
Gear ownership
Fishermen often describe each others' status in terms of the gears that they operate. With 
access to the jalmohols, gear-ownership is the second determinant o f a household's 
income from fishing. Gear ownership is itself determined by the fishing household's 
economic status.
Gear as a determinant of fishing incomes
In order to estimate the importance o f gear costs, fishing income was modelled as a 
Cobb-Douglas function of non-toll costs (mostly gear), toll costs and fishing labour:
Yj = A . GjB > . Tj82 . Lj8 ’ . Uj
where:
Y: is the gross fishing income of household i (Tk)
Gj is the non-toll fishing costs incurred by household i (Tk).
Tj is the value of tolls paid by household 1 (Tk). Zero values were set to Tkl.
Lj is the fishing labour applied by household i (work-hours)
This model was estimated by OLS regression from the total income, costs and labour use 
between December 1992 and November 1993 of 57 sample households, in the form:
InY j = a + Bjln(Gj) + B2ln(Tj) + B3ln(Lj)
The results are presented in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4. Determinants o f fishing income
estimate s.e. t significance
Intercept 3.91 .506 7.73 * *
.35 .067 5.20 * *
b2 .02 .022 1.02
B3 .38 .081 4.71 * *
** significant at a 99% level of certainty
(Regression sum of squares 29.8, residual sum of squares 6.7, r-squared .82, n=57.)
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The co-efficient upon toll expenses (B2) was not significantly different from zero. This 
evidence supported the earlier hypothesis that it is not the cost of the toll that inhibits 
access but non-price rationing, the lessee's choice of client. It is consistent with the 
existence of a fishing premium. Once again, one is led to question the assertion that 
fishermen are kept off the water by the exorbitant levies of lessees. With tolls amounting 
to only 12% of total fishing costs, it would be surprising if they were an important 
determinant of access.
The co-efficients upon non-toll expenses (B j) and fishing labour (B3) are both 
significantly greater than zero and smaller than unity at 99% levels of confidence. This 
implies, unsurprisingly, that both are important determinants of fishing income and that if 
one factor of production were fixed the other would exhibit diminishing marginal returns. 
The sum of the co-efficients is .729, distributed with a standard error o f . 148 and a 90% 
confidence interval of .48 to .98, indicating slightly diminishing returns to scale.
Bearing in mind that there is an excess supply of fishing labour, it is not surprising that 
the principal effect of investment in gear for most fishermen is to bring their labour into 
the fishery rather than to increase labour productivity on the water. There is a high degree 
of correlation between non-toll expenses and labour use; simple OLS regression of 
fishing labour upon non-toll expenses produces an r-squared of .47 (n=57). Indeed, non­
toll expenses alone explain 74% of the variance of fishing income. Simple regression of 
labour productivity (Tk/work-hour) upon non-toll expenditure, on the other hand, only 
produces an r-squared of .08. Once again, one returns to the idea that there is a premium 
just for access to the water and fishermen's economic and social strategy is to obtain and 
exploit it.
Economic status and gear choice
The neo-classical theory of the firm predicts that producers will choose the unique 
technique of production that maximises profits subject to the market prices of labour and 
capital. For Hail Haor's fishermen, however, the opportunity costs of labour and capital 
vary according to the household's economic status. This means that there will not be a 
unique best technique but a best technique for each household.
The opportunity cost of capital is likely to be higher for poorer fishing households. They 
have a higher subjective rate of time-preference because a higher proportion of their 
income is spent on necessities. They are less likely to hold cash balances or liquid 
physical assets. The study of the credit market showed that they are less likely to receive
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credit on dalal or mortgage terms. If McGregor's (1989) analysis of rural power systems 
applies to fishing communities, poorer households are less likely to receive credit on 
favourable terms through village patronage networks. Conversely, poorer households are 
likely to have a lower opportunity cost of labour. Owning less land and having less access 
to fishing rights, they have fewer alternative opportunities for employment. They are also 
least able to afford the moral authority that Bengali society confers upon those who 
abstain from manual labour. One would therefore expect poorer fishing households to opt 
for capital-saving, labour-intensive techniques of production.
Self-employed fishermen's gross incomes by gear were estimated from two regression 
equations. The first estimated income as a function of gear use, or value per unit effort
(VPUE):
Y(t = B jE j + B2E2 + ... + BnEn + Uit 
Where:
is the gross income from fishing of household i on day t.
En is the use of gear n applied by household i on day t.
Bn is the VPUE co-efficient for gear n.
A second regression equation estimated labour use as a function of gear use:
=  ^ 1 ^ 1  +  ^2 ^ 2  + ••• +  L nE n +  ^ i t  
Where:
Hjt is the fishing work-hours of household i on day t, including support activities. 
En is the use of gear n applied by household i on day t.
Ln is the labour-for-unit-effort co-efficient for gear n.
The results of these regressions are presented in Table 9.5.
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T able.9.5. Value per uniLeffort and_laboyr_pcf unit effort by gear, Hail Haor 1992-3
VPUE(Tk/unit) Labour(hrs/unit)
Gear Effort unit mean s . e . mean s . e .
Intercept -no intercept-
Gill net '000 yard hours 5.4 .28 .8 .04
Felun jal net hours 11.6 1.4 1.9 .18
Tana jal net hours 36.2 5.4 5.8 .71
Hook '000 hook hours 6.9 .7 1.1 .09
Big Hook '000 hook hours 12.2 1.6 2.0 .20
Dori trap hours .06 .01 .010 .001
Faron trap hours .04 .01 .005 .001
Bosni trap hours .18 .01 .010 .010
Regression details:
VPUE: r-squared=.73, n=479
Labour requirement: r-squared=.79, n=473
Table 9.6. Implicit wage by gear. Hail Haor 1992-3
Gear Tk/9 hours
Gill net 60.8







The implicit wage for a 9-hour working day for each gear can be calculated as 9 times the 
value per unit effort divided by the labour requirement (in hours) per unit effort. The 
results o f this calculation are presented in Table 9.6. Apart from the bosni trap estimate, 
for which the standard error is very high, all these low-cost gears appear to provide a 
gross income of around Tk55 per 9 hour day.
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Table 9.7. The cost o f  equipping one fisherman with different gears
Gear Unit Units Outlay/ Outlay 6 month
needed unit(Tk) (Tk) income(Tk)
Gill net '000 yards 1.25 3333 4166 10944
Tana jal net 1/7'th 15000 2142 10116
Hook '000 hooks .88 140 123 8092
Dori '00 traps 100 12.5 1250 9720
Faron '00 traps 200 40 8000 12960
Dol hectares .63 11700 7371 21735
The cost o f equipping a single fisherman is presented in Table 9.7. The figures for gill- 
nets, hooks and traps were the ratios of gear-hours to work-hours derived from Table 9.5 
above. It was assumed that one tana net equips 7 fishermen and that one push-net equips 
one fisherman. The figure for brush-piles is the mean number o f brush-pile hectares per 
group-member. No cost information was collected for big hooks. Bosni traps were 
removed from the analysis because o f the high standard errors in Table 9.5. Felun jals 
were removed from the analysis because o f their use in tepwal fishing within brush-piles. 
Even after these exclusions, the remaining gears account for 83% o f Hail Haor's marketed 
catch by weight. The 6 -month incomes were calculated by multiplying the daily gross 
income estimates in Table 9.6 by 180 days. TklO/day is deducted from hook income for 
hook replacement.
These calculations are summarised in Figure 9.2, which illustrates the different 
combinations of labour and capital that fishermen can use to catch Tk 1,000 o f fish. One 
would expect poorer fishermen to tend towards the labour-intensive techniques to the 
south-east and richer fishermen to tend towards the capital intensive techniques to the 
north-west. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the contribution of each gear to the 
catch o f richer and poorer households in Vimshi and Mirzapur (n=20). These two villages 
were selected because they are the only villages in the sample that practised brush-pile 
fishing. The six gears in the analysis account for 82% and 84% of the catch o f richer and 
poorer households respectively. The poorest 30% of households (ranking 1 to 3), as 
identified by their fellow-villagers, caught 74% of their fish by weight from the three 
most labour intensive gears, hooks, dori traps and tana jals. This compares with a 
contribution o f 45% from these gears towards the catch o f the richest 30% of households 
(ranking 8 to 10). The richer households caught 39% o f their catch from the three most 
capital intensive gears, gill-nets, brush-piles and faron traps. This compares with a figure 
o f 8 % for the poorer households. These results demonstrate that a gear's capital-intensity 
is one determinant of a household's choice o f technique.
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Figure 9.2. Capital outlay and labour composition o f different gears 
Capital outlay(Tk)/Tkl000/6 months
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O f course, gear cost is not the only determinant o f gear choice. The preceding description 
o f fishing rights allocation explained that there is a spatial constraint upon gear use. The 
sub-lessee allocates spots to brush-piles, gill-nets or trap-embankments according to the 
season and their hydrology and topography. With lessees and sub-lessees externalising the 
cost o f stock-depletion in open jalmohols it is usually availability o f fishing space rather 
than fear o f stock-dissipation that constrains the amount and composition o f effort 
applied to a jalmohol. Fishermen can only choose a gear for which a suitable spot is 
available at that time.
A third determinant of choice o f technique is the difference between the tolls charged for 
different gears. The gears that generate a higher surplus, brush-piles and pump- 
embankments, produce much higher tolls. The tolls paid for leasing year 1992-3 by 
households who only used gill-nets, push nets, tana nets, hooks and traps only amounted 
to 3 .5% of net income between December 1992 and November 1993, defined as gross 
income less gear costs. The tolls paid by brush-pile groups in 1993-4, on the other hand, 
were equivalent to 51% of net income, defined as gross income less the cost o f building 
and fishing the brush-piles. In other words, tolls effectively double the capital 






labour-intensive gears. This further directs poorer fishing households away from the 
brush-pile fishery.
Conclusion
This section has examined how households’ access to the fishery is related to their 
economic and social position. Just as the community to which a household belongs 
determines its place on the "open-access" floodplain, it also determines a household's 
probability of being admitted to the relatively open-access dry-season fishery. Dry-season 
access is also positively related to a household's economic status within the community. 
This does not appear to be because lessees and sub-lessees are maximising rents and is 
probably related to their desire for the social support of their wealthier fellow-villagers. 
Fishermen’s choice of fishing technique is again related to their economic status, with 
poorer fisherfolk relatively dependent upon capital-saving, labour-intensive gears.
Unlike the homogeneous marine fisheries of orthodox fisheries economics, Hail Haor's 
floodplain fishery exhibits heterogeneity - by season, location and gear type. The social 
heterogeneity of riparian villages keys into the ecological heterogeneity of the floodplain 
and admits different social groups to different ecological niches. The next stage in the 
analysis is to identify the socio-ecological niche occupied by poorer households and to 
assess how they perceive fisheries policy to be acting upon it.
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Chapter 10
The position of poorer fishing households.
Introduction
It is a well-worn theme of development agricultural economics that the effect of 
government policy upon resource-poor farmers is often qualitatively different from its 
effect upon the agricultural sector in the aggregate. Two early steps in analyses of the 
relationship between policy and poor farmers are therefore to classify the poor and to 
locate their specific position within the sector as a whole. This section will classify and 
describe the poorer fisherfolk of Hail Haor and show that they occupy a distinct niche 
within the fishery. It will argue that they therefore experience fisheries policy differently 
from their richer neighbours and that they perceive the difference to be to their 
disadvantage.
The identification of poorer fisherfolk
The study identified poorer fisherfolk by means of one subjective criterion, wealth 
rankings given by their fellow-villagers, and one objective criterion, the household's 
estimated annual income. Before using these indicators to classify the fisherfolk it was 
necessary to test their significance. This was done by correlating households' subjective 
ratings with their annual estimated incomes.
The following regression equation was estimated for 60 sample households:
Wj = a + b1ell + ... + b5e5l + b6lj +
Where: W* is household i's subjective wealth ranking, ranging from 10 (richest in that 
village's sample) to 1 (poorest in that village's sample)
eH to e5i are household i's estimated annual gross incomes from fishing, agriculture, 
fish-trading, hired labour and craftwork (Tk).
lj is the area of land owned by household i (acres).
The results of the regression are presented in Table 10.1. Estimated annual incomes and 
land-ownership explained 55% of the variation in subjective wealth rankings and the 
regression was significant at a 99.9% level of confidence. The r^ value is particularly 
reassuring as the subjective wealth rankings could capture within-village but not 
between-village wealth differences. Predictably, there was a high correlation between the
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co-efficient upon income from agriculture and the co-efficient upon land-ownership. 
Removal o f land-ownership from the regression only reduced the r2  value by three 
percentage points to 0.52, showing high correlation between land and annual income.
Table 10.1..1The determinants o f subjective wealth rankings
Intercept Estimate t-value significance
Income: 3.03 4.27 * *
from fishing (Tk) .00004 2.13 ■Jc
from agriculture(Tk) .00025 4.88 •Jc
from fish-trading(Tk) -.00005 -.56
from labour(Tk) .00006 .64
from craftwork(Tk) .00005 .51
Land--ownership (acres) .263 1.96 *
** difference from zero is statistically significant at a 99% level o f confidence.
* difference from zero is statistically significant at a 95% level o f confidence.
r2  = .55, n=60.
If  wealth rankings are regressed upon total income alone, however, the correlation is 
much less pronounced, with r2 falling by 40 percentage points to 0.12. This suggests that 
the source o f income, as well as its value, determines the subjective impression o f 
economic well-being. A simple regression o f subjective wealth rankings upon income 
from agriculture gives an r2 o f 0.44. A simple regression o f subjective wealth rankings 
upon income from fishing, on the other hand, gives an r2 of only 0.03, with a t-value 
upon the estimator o f a statistically-insignificant 1.40. Whilst subjective wealth rankings 
are certainly correlated with a household's financial income, therefore, they take more 
account o f agricultural income than of income from other sources. It remains useful, 
therefore, to use total estimated income as an indicator o f material poverty.
Poorer households' niche within the fishery.
The ecology of the Hail Haor fishery displays at least four types o f asymmetry. There are 
distinctions between small fish and large fish species, between capital- and labour- 
intensive gears, between the floodplain and the depressions and between the monsoon- 
and dry-seasons. One path towards an assessment o f poorer fisherfolk's experience of
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fisheries policy is to locate them within these four dimensions and to explore how policy 
affects, not the fishery as a whole, but the specific niche or locus that they occupy.
Table 10.2. Labour use o f poorest and richest quartiles*









* by annual estimated income
Poorer fishing households have a distinctive pattern o f labour use. Table 10.2 compares 
the labour allocation o f the poorest quartile of fishing households with that of the richest 
quartile. The total labour use o f poorer households is just under half that o f richer 
households. The result is the same if households are classified by subjective wealth 
rankings rather than estimated annual income. Households ranked in the poorest 30% 
worked an average o f 5,188 hours per year while households ranked in the richest 30% 
worked an average o f 7,428 hours per year. The median values for each group were 5,085 
hours/household/year and 8,227 hours/household/year respectively. The difference 
between the means is statistically significant at a 95% level o f confidence and the 
Kruskal-Wallis test shows the difference between the medians to be statistically different 
at a 95% level o f confidence. The result is similar, but o f course less pronounced, when 
allowance is made for the number o f workers per household. The poorest quartile of 
households in terms of total annual income contributed 2682 hours/worker/year, 
compared with 3862 hours/worker/year for the richest quartile o f households. These 
results suggest that a household's inability to put its labour to work is a major feature of 
poverty. They confirm the hypothesis that there is an "employment premium", that the 
market for labour does not clear and that there is non-price rationing o f jobs by employers 
towards more advantaged households. This corroborates the socio-anthropological 
literature's observations that competition for employment opportunities creates vertical 
patronage alignments.
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Poorer fishing households spend much less time fishing than richer households. The same 
result is obtained when households are classified by subjective wealth ranking. The 
households ranked in the poorest 30% fished on average 3,493 hours per year while the 
households ranked in the richest 30% fished on average 4,382 hours/household/year. The 
median values were 2,370 hours/household/year and 4,493 hours/household/year for the 
two groups respectively. These differences are not statistically significant, however, 
probably because of the importance of between-village variation as a determinant of 
fishing participation. Once again, this result remains true, but is less pronounced, when 
the number of household workers is taken into account. The poorest quartile of 
households spent on average only 55% as much time per worker fishing as the richest 
quartile (1591 hours/worker/year as against 2879 hours/worker/year). This confirms the 
hypothesis that the poorest households are not those of "full-time fishermen" but those 
that are excluded from the fishery.
Owning less land, 0.9 acres/household as compared with 2.7 acres/household, the poorest 
quartile of households only spent 27% as much time farming as the richest quartile of 
households. Craftwork, almost entirely the production of fish-traps and baskets, was an 
important fall-back activity for poorer households. They spent 22 times as long on this as 
the richer households, amounting to around a sixth of their annual labour use or over a 
quarter of the labour use of the poorest 50% of Hindu households. There are several 
reasons why poorer households are associated with trap- and basket-making:
a) Only Hindu fishermen, who are more likely than their Muslim counterparts to 
be excluded from the fishery, know how to make traps.
b) Trap-making households sell their output weekly, and can therefore operate on 
one week's working capital, only Tk200-300.
c) Trap-making requires no tolls and no fixed capital except a knife.
d) Hindu females make traps and poorer households are less able to afford the 
social status afforded by restricting women to domestic work.
e) The return to labour from trap-making is lower than that to fishing.
Poorer fishing households' pattern of earnings follow their pattern of labour use (Table 
10.3). They are comparatively less dependent upon fishing for their livelihoods, with 55% 
of their incomes deriving from fishing as opposed to 78% for the richest quartile. This 
difference is taken up by poorer households' dependence upon craftwork for 18% of their 
incomes. Rich and poor households receive the same percentage of their income from 
agriculture but the absolute value is of course larger for richer households.
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Table 10.3. Incomes of richer and poorer quartiles o f households* by source 







Total ('000 Tk/household/year) 12.2 46
* by estimated annual income per household 
Percentages may not sum to 100 because o f rounding.
Because poorer households are more likely to be excluded from the fishery during the dry 
season they have a slightly different seasonal distribution o f fishing labour. Households 
earning less than Tk20,000/year (n=22) worked 47% of their fishing hours and caught 
54% o f their fish by weight during the flood season between July and November as 
compared with 34% and 36% for those earning more than Tk40,000/year (n=10). There is 
a corresponding increase in the demand for poorer households' hired labour in agriculture 
and the brush-pile fishery during the dry season, with 82% o f hired labour hours sold out 
in the five months between November and March.
As the previous section explained, poorer fishing households are led by the different 
capital requirements and toll requirements o f different gears to adopt a distinctive pattern 
of gear use. Table 10.4 illustrates this point. They only catch 1% o f their fish by weight in 
brush-piles, as compared with 8 % for the richest households. They are significantly less 
dependent upon gi 11-nets and more dependent upon tana nets and push-nets. The poorer 
households' pattern o f gear use is reflected in the composition of their catch by species.
Extrapolating from the weight o f the catch o f per household o f the poorest households by 
gear and the composition of the catch observed at fish landing sites, it was possible to 
make an approximate estimate o f the distribution o f stocked species between different 
classes o f fisherfolk. This was that fishing households earning less than Tk20,000 per 
annum caught 28kg of stocked species per household per year, of which less than 2 kg per 
household per year came from the brush-pile fishery. Households earning over Tk40,000 
per annum, on the other hand, took 125kg o f stocked species per household per year of 
which 75kg came from brush-piles. This quantitative comparison is very approximate
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because the catch composition matrix (Appendix 4.3) was based upon a small number o f 
observations and almost all were taken from a single market. The trend, however, is 
incontestable.
With 75% o f the brush-pile catch by weight coming from stocked species the benefit o f 
stocking to brush-pile owners would be substantial. For poorer households, o f course, the 
effect is less spectacular. Assuming that artificial stocking doubled the catch o f stocked 
species for all fishermen and that all fish were sold at the fully-grown price o f Tk40/kg, 
poorer households could have gained a maximum of Tk560/household/year, an increase 
o f 4.6% over their existing fishing incomes. If fish-growth or mortality were density- 
dependent or lessees and sub-lessees reduced the demand for self-employed fishing effort 
in order to conserve brush-pile stocks, this increase could easily be cancelled out.
Table 10.4. Catch composition by gear for poorer* and richer* households.
(% o f catch by weight)
Gear Poorer households Richer households
Gill net 12 30
Push-net 20 6
Tana jal 23 1
Hook 17 11





Totals do not sum to 100 because of rounding.
* estimated income <Tk20,000 p.a..
** estimated income >Tk40,000 p.a..
Poorer households pay less tolls because their fishing is less profitable. The poorest 30% 
o f households by subjective wealth ranking paid Tk3 87/household/year in tolls compared 
with Tk 1430/household/year for the richest 30%. If the absolute importance o f tolls was 
lower for poorer fishing households, so was their relative importance. The poorer 
households paid only 2 . 1% of their lower net fishing incomes in tolls whereas the richer
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households paid 5.8% of their higher net fishing incomes. This confirms that the policy 
goal of releasing fishermen from the "burden" of tolls would have very little effect upon 
poorer fisherfolk beyond perhaps reducing their security of tenure. If any sub-group 
stands to gain from such a policy it is the brush-pile- and pump-embankment-owning 
fishermen.
The foregoing discussion of the leasing system showed how lessees tended to allocate 
fishing opportunities within their own village so that a household's chances in the fishery 
depended partly upon its village of residence. Hail Haor's principal lessee resides in the 
twin villages of Buruna-Hazipur and the mean annual income of fishing households in 
these villages was Tk30,431, 20% higher than the mean household income of other 
villages. Muslim incomes are higher (1-tailed test) than Hindu incomes at a 90% level of 
confidence. Hail Haor's Hindu fishing households had less access to means of production 
than their Muslim counterparts. With 1.0 acres on average per household, they owned 
38% less land than the Muslims but this difference is only statistically significant at a 
70% level of confidence. At 1,577 hours per worker per year, Hindu fishermen spent only 
68% as long fishing on average as their Muslim counterparts. This difference is 
statistically significant at a 95% level of confidence. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, 
that reported Muslim incomes are only 15% higher on average than reported Hindu 
incomes. This may be due to survey bias, with the explanation lying in the observed 
difference between the attitudes of Muslim and Hindu respondents to our interviews.
Poorer fisherfolk’s views of fisheries policy
Fisherfolk's subjective perceptions of the operation of fisheries policy are of interest to 
policy-makers for three reasons. Firstly, they determine how much co-operation fisherfolk 
will offer the state in policy implementation. Second, being experts in local ecological 
and social systems, fisherfolk may be able to give a more technically accurate assessment 
of the operation of policy than outsiders. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, if 
fisheries policy has not left the target group with an increased feeling of well-being, it 
cannot be said to have succeeded.
Hail Haor's fishermen's perceptions of the operation of fisheries policy are grounded 
within their view of the role of the state in the fishery. Orthodox models of fisheries 
policy (e.g. Gulland 1983) describe the state as an enlightened manager, using its expert 
biological knowledge to maximise fisheries benefits. Hail Haor's fishermen, however, 
understand the state's role rather differently. They perceive the state's goal as being to 
increase its legal and illicit revenues from the fishery rather than to improve social 
welfare; in their view, the state tries to achieve this goal by allocating fisheries benefits 
(jalmohols, enforcement services and fish fry) to individuals in return for money and
178
political support. Fishermen's understanding of their own personal relationship with the 
state varies according to their economic status but always remains within this view of the 
state as a venal patron. The very wealthiest in Hail Haor's fishing society, probably less 
than 10 in number, compete amongst themselves for fishery benefits, principally 
jalmohols, from the state. Those fishermen wealthy enough to invest in brush-piles or 
pump-embankments attempt to place themselves as clients of wealthy leaseholders. 
Lastly, for the vast majority of Hail Haor's fishermen who wish to obtain a toll-paying 
relationship with a sub-lessee, the state has a negative role. While their sub-lessee 
allocates fishing livelihoods to them, the state is capable of acting against ordinary 
fishermen in order to improve the fishery's productivity.
Lessees and brush-pile owners give qualified support to Hail Haor's artificial stocking 
programme. They say that they can recognise the stocked fish by their smaller size but 
that most of the brush-pile catch consists of naturally-recruited carps. This belief is 
supported by the almost-total absence of catla, mrigal or common carp, all of which were 
stocked in 1993, from the 1993-4 brush-pile catch. Most fishermen, on the other hand, 
argue that artificial stock-enhancement brings them no benefits. They say that they do not 
own the big (brush-pile) nets which would enable them to catch the stocked species and 
that they cannot make the poisha (contribution) necessary to obtain a suitable fishing 
spot. When asked their opinion of the stocking programme, fishermen of Buruna and 
Hazipur often told how a fisheries officer had leased the nursery pond from which the 
fish were to be released into Hail Haor to a private individual. In brief, they say that the 
benefits from stocking are restricted to those who can afford to invest in gear and access. 
This observation appears also to hold true for most of the water-bodies stocked by the 3rd 
Fisheries Project in W. Bangladesh (Leterme and Chisholm 1993).
Some fishermen, moreover, argue that they would be better-off without artificial stock 
enhancement. They explain that stocking induces lessees and sub-lessees to give more 
space over to brush-piles and pump-embankments which in turn restricts the effort of 
self-employed fishermen in the dry season. This opinion has not been confirmed or 
refuted by direct observation. Ordinary fishermen also argue that stocking makes lessees 
and sub-lessees put more pressure on the government to enhance the value of the brush- 
pile and pump catch with effort controls. This is certainly true; Hail Haor's fisheries 
officer himself said that "restocking has taught local influential people the importance of 
the Fisheries Act."
These effort controls are unevenly applied. They target labour-intensive gears, such as 
tana nets, gill-nets and push-nets but they ignore pump-fishing, which is illegal and, 
according to MRAG's (1994) analysis, harmful to total yields. Fishermen from the main 
lessee's village were relatively unaffected. Between July and September 1993, when the
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government was confiscating monofilament gill-nets, Buruna and Hazipur fishermen 
applied an average of 140,000 gill-net yard-hours per household per month, as compared 
to 5,000 yard-hours per household in other villages. 35% of households in Buruna and 
Hazipur used gill-nets during this period compared with 6% in other villages. Both 
differences are significantly different from zero at a 99% level of confidence. At the same 
time, however, Buruna and Hazipur fishermen were complaining that fishing groups from 
Shulpur had paid bribes to the fisheries officer in order to fish unobstructed with 
mosquito nets in No. 1 Beel. It is probable that most fishermen view immunity from effort 
controls, like leases, as something to be purchased from government.
Most fishermen deeply resent effort controls, arguing that they should be allowed to fish 
because they are fishermen. One fisherman from Vimshi complained, "If the government 
people are going to take nets when they give fry, it is better without fry." They do not 
agree that effort controls produce long-term benefits by allowing fish to grow. Firstly, 
they are not convinced that the government is actually interested in stock protection 
because the fisheries officer sometimes allows fishermen to keep or buy back the gears in 
return for bribes, because of incidents like the Hazipur nursery pond and because 
enforcement is seen to be selective. Secondly, they say that they will not participate in the 
big-carp fishery that effort controls are supposed to enhance.
Most fishermen are completely unaware of the Government’s reformulation of the leasing 
system through Fishermen's Associations, closed tenders and "fisheries development 
plans". Lessees and sub-lessees usually describe their operations as Fishermen's 
Associations and refer to themselves as "Chairmen". The fishermen, however, continue to 
speak of ijaradars (lessees) and zuma taka (tolls). They have no knowledge of recent 
changes to the tendering system. Even Hail Haor's principal lessee boasted that he would 
not have to implement his "Fisheries Development Plan" in return for his ten-year lease.
For the majority of Hail Haor's fishermen, earning Tk50-60 gross per 9-hour day with a 
capital of less than Tk5,000, the state's interventions in the fisheries sector are therefore 
at best negligible and at worst a cause if economic hardship during the monsoon season. 
For them, the operation of fisheries policy is not an accident. It is grounded in the venal 
relationship between government officers and influential members of local society.
Conclusions
Orthodox models of fisheries policy have traditionally aimed at maximising total fishery 
rents; heterogeneity within the fishery is not an issue because the sum of benefits, rather 
than their distribution, is the goal. However, if one is concerned with using fisheries 
policy to generate livelihoods for one sub-group of participants, in this case poorer
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people, it is important to understand how that sub-group obtains, or is excluded from, 
fishery benefits. It is necessary to explore the dimensions of heterogeneity within the 
fishery, to locate the poor people's position in each dimension and to analyse how 
fisheries policy affects their special niche.
This paper has identified one particular locus in the fishery with poor fisherfolk. They use 
labour-intensive gears, tend to operate in shallow water and during the monsoon season, 
generate few fisheries rents, pay few tolls and, perhaps most importantly, are the first to 
be excluded from the fishery altogether. Fisheries policy, which aims at promoting rents 
rather than promoting employment, tends not to benefit poor fisherfolk and can act 
against them by reducing the demand for their labour.
This kind of analytical framework has long been applied to questions of agricultural 
policy such as the identification of new technologies suitable for resource-poor farmers. 
Disaggregation is even more important in the case of Hail Haor because of the extra issue 
of subtractability; an increase in the take of one economic class can reduce the fish stocks 
or space available for others. It would therefore be particularly wrong in the case of a 
crowded, open-water fishery to identify the welfare of poor people with the productivity 
of the fishery as a whole.
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Chapter 11
Bio-economic models of the distributional effects of fisheries policy in Hail 
Haor.
Introduction: the purpose of the models
The preceding chapters have described how poorer fisherfolk participate in the fishery on 
different terms from their richer neighbours. It was argued that they tend to use cheaper 
gears, to fish in shallower water and to concentrate their effort in the monsoon season.
The jalmohol system and their confinement to less productive fishing techniques mean 
that most of their income is accounted for by the opportunity cost of their labour. Richer 
fisherfolk, on the other hand, participate in fisheries rents, which are largely generated by 
the more productive fishing techniques, such as brush-piles and de-watering by means of 
pumps.
The question then arises of how fisheries policy impacts upon poorer fisherfolk. It is not 
enough to argue, with the government, that all fisherfolk are poor and that what is good 
for physical productivity as a whole will also therefore be good for the poor. There is a 
wide amount of economic variation within the fishing community and fisherfolk of 
differing classes fish in different places, ways and times. Any policy-induced changes to 
the physical or economic environment will affect different social groups in different 
ways. There is therefore no a priori reason why the poor should benefit from fisheries 
policy and, given the nature of the policy-formation process in Bangladesh, it is probable 
that policies were not designed with their interests in mind.
Indeed, as the previous section upon the perceived effects of fisheries policy showed, 
poorer fisherfolk do not believe fisheries policy to be acting in their interests. They do not 
appreciate the yield benefits of artificial stocking, they resent effort controls, they think of 
Fishermen's Associations as fronts for the leasing system and, where the New Fisheries 
Management Policy has been enforced, they see no difference from what came before. In 
an ideal world, such perceptions of the effects of fisheries policy would be canvassed by 
the government and its donors as part of the policy and project cycles.
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate analytically why poorer fishermen do not 
believe policy to be working in their interests. It draws upon two custom-built bio- 
economic simulation models. The first simulation shows how different fisheries policies 
would affect the incomes of the 60 households who gave data for the study's year-round 
Catch, Effort, Income and Cost survey. It asks the question, "Given the current
182
relationship between a household's economic status and its pattern of fishing effort, how 
would fisheries policy affect different classes' incomes from this existing pattern of 
effort?" In other words, it looks at changes in value-per-unit-effort for the existing pattern 
of effort. The second simulation goes further, and looks at how the pattern of effort 
would be changed by fisheries policy. It asks the question, "Given that lessees and sub­
lessees manage the pattern of fishing effort in order to produce high incomes for 
themselves, how would they alter it in response to fisheries policy and what would this 
mean for the incomes of fishing labour?" The two models are therefore complementary. 
The first looks at income changes within the framework of the existing pattern of effort 
and the second looks at the wider issue of the market for effort as a whole.
Fisheries economists sometimes use bio-economic simulations as management tools to 
test the effects of different interventions before their implementation. It should be 
emphasised that neither of the two models below should be used as a management tool 
because they are based upon a limited data set and an incomplete understanding of fish 
ecology. Their purpose is rather to re-confirm analytically the bio-economic processes 
that the fisherfolk themselves described verbally to the author.
Model 1: fisheries policy and differential changes in value-per-unit effort 
Method
Fish prices by gear were estimated from data from the Catch, Effort, Income and Cost 
panel survey by regressing catch by gear, household and month upon gross fishing income 
by household and month. Catch/income observations that included a catch from brush- 
pile, lift net, taki jal, dry fishing, spear and cast net were eliminated from the regression 
because of the low number of observations for these gears. 247 observations were 
removed leaving 473 observations in the regression. The simulation used rounded 
versions of the regression estimates (Table 11.1). Price estimates were used for lift nets, 
taki jals, spears, cast nets, dry fishing and brush-piles, with the estimate for brush-piles 
coming from direct interviews.
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Table 11.1. Prices used to simulate the differential effects o f fisheries policy upon value 
per unit effort.
Estimated price(Tk/kg) s.e. of estimate rounded price
Gill net 33.3 1.2 35
Push net 22.0 1.7 20
Tana net 13.2 1.8 13
Hook 35.1 1.7 35
Big hook 35.9 3.0 35
Dori 20.0 1.6 20
Faron 16.8 2.3 20







The estimated prices were multiplied by catch by household, quarter and gear to obtain 
simulated fishing income by household, quarter and gear. Simulated fishing income by 
household quarter and gear was divided by total fishing income by household to obtain 
the share o f each household's annual fishing income deriving from the use o f each gear in 
each quarter.
The Marine Resource Assessment Group (MRAG 1994) estimated the proportional 
changes in the physical yield of each gear, by guild and quarter, that would result from 
various changes to the pattern of effort, such as closed seasons, effort quotas and gear 
bans The Catch, Effort, Income and Cost panel survey data provided estimates o f the 
share o f each household's annual fishing income deriving from each gear and each 
quarter
For the first simulation the policy-induced yield changes by gear and quarter were 
multiplied by the share of households' annual fishing income by gear and quarter to 
obtain policy-induced fishing income changes by household, gear and quarter. In other 
words, this simulation looked at how policy changes households' fishing incomes by 
changing their catch per unit effort.
As well as this yield effect, however, another important effect of fisheries policy is its 
effect upon the unit value of the catch by changing its species composition. A shift from
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small fish to carps, for example, could raise fishing incomes without any change in the 
volume of the catch. The composition of the catch under different policies, by gear and 
quarter, was therefore estimated from MRAG's (1994) biological simulations. Using 
estimated fish prices by guild (Table 11.2), fish prices by gear and quarter for each policy 
simulation were expressed as percentages o f fish prices by gear and quarter under the 
baseline simulation. The results were used as estimates o f policy-induced price changes 
by gear and quarter. The policy-induced yield changes by gear and quarter were 
multiplied by the policy-induced price changes by gear and quarter and households' 
estimated share o f fishing income by gear and quarter. The results gave the combined 
yield and price effect o f fisheries policy upon fishing households' incomes.
Table 11.2. Estimated fish prices by guild used to calculate catch-composition effects of 







The estimated effects of the policies upon fishing households' fishing incomes were 
averaged by social group. The averages were unweighted in order that they should not be 
dominated by households with high catches. 14 households who received less than 35% 
o f their annual income from fishing were eliminated because they were adding a lot of 
"white noise" to the results. The remaining 46 households were divided into terciles 
according to the wealth ranking given them by their fellow-villagers. Households that 
received all their fishing income from brush-piles in the third quarter represent an 
important social group. Because o f their low numbers they did not appear in the study's 
random sample. They were therefore defined as a hypothetical social group for the 
purposes o f this simulation.
Results
The results o f this model should be read in the context o f MRAG's (1994 p.94) multi­
species, multi-gear yield-per-recruit simulations o f the biological productivity o f the Hail 
Haor fishery as a whole under the different management scenarios. These predict that no 
gear bans, closed seasons or effort reductions would increase the fishery's productivity. 
The only management scenario that raises the haor's physical productivity is actually an 
increase in fishing effort o f 25% or 50%. The task o f the economic model is therefore to
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show how different management interventions would redistribute a more or less fixed 
yield between different social classes.
Tables 11.3 and 11.4 show the proportional change in the gross fishing incomes of 
different classes of fisherfolk that would be produced by the effects of fisheries policy if 
they continued with the existing pattern of effort. The difference between the two tables 
of results is that Table 11.3 only represents the yield effect of policy whereas Table 11.4 
also takes account of the price (catch composition) effect.
The first finding of the models is that gear bans have an unequal effect. Bans upon gill 
nets and seine nets, which are the gears confiscated by Hail Haor’s fishery officer, 
produce high increases in the incomes of brush-pile owners at the expense of small falls 
in income for poorer fisherfolk. The model is capturing the fact that bans on cheap gears, 
which are used mostly by poorer fisherfolk, save more fish, mostly major carps, for 
brush-piles, which are owned by richer people. Bans on brush-piles, on the other hand, 
raise the incomes of poorer fisherfolk at the expense of brush-pile owners. The major 
carps and snakeheads that escape the brush-piles will be caught later, probably the 
following season, by cheaper gears. Although the aggregate percentage changes in the 
incomes of poorer fisherfolk are not high in either direction, these average figures 
conceal a lot of variation within each quarter and social group; it is certain that Hail 
Haor's gear bans can significantly disrupt the cashflow of poorer households.
The model clearly shows the regressive effect of closed seasons, as imposed by the Third 
Fisheries Project in western Bangladesh and attempted by Hail Haor's fisheries officer. 
Both simulations show closed seasons to redistribute income away from self-employed 
fisherfolk towards brush-pile owners. A 7-month closure during the growing season (June 
to December) increases brush-pile owners' fishing incomes by 141% at the expense of 
income reductions of between 14% and 39% for self-employed fishers, with the poorest 
losing most. The regressivity of closures is even more pronounced if the time-distribution 
of income is taken into account. Closures postpone the incomes of self-employed fishers, 
reducing their discounted present value, but the increased incomes of brush-pile owners 
still come in the third quarter, the brush-pile season. What these simulations demonstrate 
is that closures allow more fish to be saved from self-employed fishermen to be caught by 
brush-pile owners. Once again, therefore, rich villagers have an incentive to press for 
controls that harm poorer fisherfolk.
Finally, the model also simulates the effects of a 50% rise and a 50% fall in effort. 
Although these runs do not refer to any specific policies being implemented in 
Bangladesh, they do say something about the general thrust of these policies. In brief, 
effort reductions have a significant regressive distributional effect, because they save
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more fish for the end-of-season capital-intensive gears, and effort increases have a 
progressive distributional effect because they allow a greater share o f the catch to be 
taken by self-employed fishers before the capital-intensive gears move in. Thus, although 
effort limitation, which is a central motif o f Bangladesh's fisheries policy, is promoted in 
the name of productivity, its principal effect is distributional and regressive.
Table 11.3. Results o f simulation o f the distributional effects o f fisheries policy in Hail 
Haor. taking account o f yield effects only.
Baseline simulation Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 23 25 28 24 100
Middle tercile 30 24 23 23 100
Low tercile 32 26 18 24 100
Brush-pile owner 0 0 100 0 100
Gill net ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 23 20 38 21 101
Middle tercile 32 23 29 24 107
Low tercile 28 22 18 23 92
Brush-pile owner 0 0 184 0 184
Brush-pile ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 24 26 19 26 94
Middle tercile 31 24 19 25 99
Low tercile 32 25 17 24 97
Brush-pile owner 0 0 0 0 0
Seine net ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 23 26 32 25 107
Middle tercile 29 23 24 23 99
Low tercile 29 25 16 22 92
Brush-pile owner 0 0 128 0 128
50% fall in effort Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 20 19 29 22 89
Middle tercile 26 19 22 20 87
Low tercile 25 20 14 19 79
Brush-pile owner 0 0 150 0 150
50% rise in effort Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 24 28 27 22 102
Middle tercile 33 26 23 22 103
Low tercile 33 27 17 21 98
Brush-pile owner 0 0 78 0 78
June-Dee. closed season Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 0 0 58 28 86
Middle tercile 0 0 47 27 74
Low tercile 0 0 29 26 55
Brush-pile owner 0 0 239 0 239
June-Sep. closed season Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 0 38 40 20 98
Middle tercile 0 37 35 20 92
Low tercile 0 39 33 19 91
BrUsh-pile owner 0 0 145 0 145
(Fishing income by social group as % of baseline simulation.)
Note. Q1 is July to September, Q2 is October to December, Q3 is January to March and 
Q4 is April to June.
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Table 11.4. Results o f simulation o f the distributional effects o f fisheries policy in Hail 
Haor, taking account o f Yield eff ects and price effects due to changes in catch 
composition.
Gill ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 23 20 39 21 103
Middle tercile 33 23 29 24 109
Low tercile 30 24 19 24 97
Brush-pile owners 0 0 194 0 194
Brush-pile ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 24 26 19 27 97
Middle tercile 32 25 19 26 102
Low tercile 34 27 19 27 107
Brush-pile owners 0 0 0 0 0
Seine ban Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 23 26 32 25 107
Middle tercile 29 23 24 23 99
Low tercile 31 27 18 24 99
Brush-pile owners 0 0 130 0 130
50% fall Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 20 19 30 22 91
Middle tercile 26 19 23 21 89
Low tercile 28 23 15 21 87
Brush-pile owners 0 0 159 0 159
50% rise Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 24 28 27 22 101
Middle tercile 32 26 23 21 102
Low tercile 33 28 19 22 103
Brush-pile owners 0 0 75 0 75
Closed season June to December Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 0 0 58 28 86
Middle tercile 0 0 47 27 74
Low tercile 0 0 33 28 61
Brush-pile owners 0 0 241 0 241
Closed season June to September Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
High tercile 0 38 40 21 99
Middle tercile 0 37 36 20 93
Low tercile 0 43 36 21 100
Brush-pile owners 0 0 146 0 146
Note: Q1 is July to September, Q2 is October to December, Q3 is January to March and 
Q4 is April to June.
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Discussion
Taken in tandem with MRAG's biological simulations, the results of this model strongly 
suggest that the effort management policies of the Bangladesh government and its donors 
are primarily redistributional and regressive rather than productivity-enhancing. Effort 
limitation, which is a central theme of Bangladesh's fisheries management policy, tends 
to save fish from the poor for the rich. Gear bans and closed seasons, which are variations 
upon this theme, are therefore regressively redistributional to a greater or lesser degree.
However, there are two caveats. Firstly, it is based upon a yield-per-recruit biological 
simulation which does not take into account the possibility of recruitment failure. It may 
therefore underestimate the productivity benefits to be obtained from effort-limitation. 
Recruitment failure is not thought to be a problem for the smaller species generally 
caught by smaller gears but it is considered likely that stocks of major carps are being 
limited by a lack of breeding adults. If this were so, the policy prescription would be to 
limit the gears that catch adult major carps, namely the brush-piles. It is obvious why this 
option has not been considered.
The second caveat concerns the structure of the model itself. It assumes a fixed pattern of 
effort, allowing neither lessees nor fishermen to respond to changes in value-per-unit- 
effort by changing overall levels of effort or by re-allocating it between gears and 
seasons. Neither does it take account of the fact that any change in the profitability of a 
gear could be cancelled out by a change in the value of the relevant toll. These are the 
economic processes that the next model will address.
Model 2: A bio-economic simulation of effort management in a leasehold fishery. 
Method
The object of this model is to predict how fisheries management policy will affect poorer 
fisherfolk by changing the level of employment in the fishery. It simulates the decision­
making of a lessee or sub-lessee who is maximising his own profits, subject to external 
biological and economic constraints, by adjusting the level of effort applied to his 
jalmohol. Fisheries management policy affects fisherfolk’s welfare indirectly; it changes 
the profit-maximising pattern of effort by establishing a new package of biological and 
economic constraints upon the lessee.
The pattern of effort that maximises the lessee's profits is identified by means of a grid- 
searching GW-BASIC programme (see Appendix 5.1 for listing). It uses a yield-per- 
recruit model with fish migration to predict the value of fish sales under different levels
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of employment. A Ricardian model of factor-share determination divides sales for each 
level of employment between wages, non-labour costs and rents. The rent-maximising 
level of employment is selected as the predicted outcome.
This model has two distinctive features. Firstly, many economic models of fisheries 
management assume that the technocratic manager has full control over the application of 
effort. Their task is therefore simply to identify the pattern of effort that maximises the 
target variable. This model, however, is a more realistic portrayal of policy 
implementation in Bangladesh, in that it only allows policy-makers to control effort 
indirectly, by changing the structure of incentives acting upon the lessee. Secondly, 
existing bio-economic models describe the application of effort under open access. This 
is probably the first bio-economic simulation of a leasehold fishery.
The fishery represented by the model
Numbers in brackets refer to lines in the GW-BASIC listing (Appendix 5.1).
The biological year starts in September with an exogenously determined influx (260) of 
fish of both large and small species from spawning and from river systems. The fish grow 
each month. Growth rates are as fast for larger species as for smaller but faster during the 
flood than in the dry season. Net biomass growth is fish growth minus natural mortality 
and is given for each month for both large and small species (190-200). Between one 
month and the next fish stocks are increased by net biomass growth and in-migration and 
decreased by fishing mortality and out-migration (2060-2070, 3050-3060, 4060-4070).
The leasing unit in question is one of a large number of similar, contiguous leasing units. 
Fish can move between leasing units and out-migration is a pre-determined fraction (250) 
of the month's fish stock. The lessee cannot affect in-migration by his own actions but the 
sum of all lessees' actions, by affecting fish stocks, does affect in-migration. A feasible 
outcome is identified when exogenous in-migration is the same as endogenous out­
migration, indicating that all the lessees' decisions are consistent.
Two types of gear exist, "thinning gear" and "clearing gear". Thinning gear, which 
includes traps, hooks and gill-nets, can be used in varying quantities in every month 
except February. The catchability co-efficient of thinning gear is pre-stated for every 
month (210-220). It becomes more effective as the floods recede. Clearing gear, which 
represents dewatering and brush-pile fishing, is used in a fixed quantity in February only. 
Its catchability co-efficient is pre-stated (260). It is very effective at catching large 
species. For both types of gear the catch of a type of fish is the product of number of units
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of gear, the catchability co-efficient and the fish stock (2020-2030, 3010-3020,4020- 
4030).
Two types of management regime operate around the year. The lessee hires fishermen to 
operate the clearing gear in February and manages fishing with thinning gear for the rest 
of the season. The flood returns at the end of April and with it open access and a new 
stock of fish. This is the end of the lessee's planning period.
Fish prices are higher for big species than for small species (230-240). Gear costs are 
constant (260). There is a constant wage (260).
In February, the lessee's income is the value of the catch less gear and wage costs (3040). 
Fishermen’s incomes are the same as the lessee's wage costs (3030). In other months the 
lessee chooses the level of employment that gives him the highest total discounted 
income for the year (5000-5060). Fishermen's income is assumed to be the market wage 
(2040, 3030,4040). The lessee takes the catch's value, less fishermen's income and gear 
costs (2050, 3040, 4050). In other words, this is a Ricardian model where the resource- 
owner takes in rents or tolls the difference between sales on the one hand and the going 
wage plus costs on the other.
The model calculates the lessee's total annual discounted income for all employment 
combinations for one pattern of in-migration (5000-5060). It notes the level of out­
migration each month in this run (5060, 7010). It then calculates the lessee's total annual 
discounted income for all employment combinations for another pattern of in-migration, 
the pattern of in-migration this time being the same as the pattern of out-migration in the 
previous run. It repeats this process until two consecutive runs give the same result (7040- 
7050). This indicates a solution where out-migration, the product of our simulated 
lessee's decisions, is consistent with in-migration, the product of many other lessees 
acting in the same way. This outcome is analogous to that of perfect competition, where 
one producer is a price-taker but the price is formed by many producers acting in the 
same way. The programme converges upon a solution after only 5 to 10 iterations.
The pattern of employment that maximises the lessee's total annual discounted income 
for the final, consistent pattern of migration is the model's solution (8000-8030). It is 
identified to the nearest half-fisherman. It is the only outcome where the lessee cannot 
improve his income through individual action and the pattern of migration out of his lease 
unit is the same as the pattern of migration into it.
The model produced a baseline simulation. (Baseline exogenous variables are in 
Appendix 5.2). The effects of fisheries management policy were then simulated by
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altering various exogenous variables and observing how the outcome differed from the 
baseline solution.
The simulation shows that the level o f employment is significantly determined by the 
strength o f the incentive upon the lessee to conserve fish stocks; the higher the profits 
from conservation, the lower the level of employment. Table 11.5 shows levels o f 
employment for different discount rates. Higher discount rates lead to higher levels of 
employment because they make the lessee want to take profits sooner rather than waiting 
for fish stocks to grow. The model is thus picking up the arbitrage relationship described 
by Clark and Munro (1975) and Clark (1976), that profit-maximising fisheries managers 
will exploit the fishery up to the point where the rate o f return upon conservation is equal 
to the opportunity cost o f capital. Table 11.6 shows how the openness o f the water-body, 
the ease with which fish move in and out o f the jalmohol management unit, affects the 
level o f employment. As the percentage o f fish that escapes from the jalmohol per month 
varies from 0 , a perfectly closed jalmohol, to 1 0 0 , a perfectly open jalmohol, the lessee's 
selected level o f employment rises from 8 to 22. With no escapement the lessee 
internalises the benefits from stock-conservation and reduces the use of "thinning gears" 
in order to improve the low-water catch. With complete escapement, however, the 
benefits from stock-conservation are completely externalised. Any fish that the model's 
lessee preserves will swim out to be caught by another lessee. He therefore increases the 
use o f thinning gears in order to catch them as soon as possible.
Table 11.5. The relationship between the discount rate and employment




10 1 0 . 0
15 10.5
20 1 1 . 0
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Table 11.6. The relationship between the jalmohol's openness and em ployment












Artificial stocking with major carps was simulated by increasing the initial (early 
September) level o f stocks o f large species. As Table 11.7 indicates, stocking with large 
species has very little positive effect upon the earnings o f self-employed fishermen, even 
with very high levels of stocking. Although lifting the initial stock of large species from 
Okg to 1800kg would raise the net present value o f the lessee's income by 226%, it would 
only raise labour income's net present value by 4.5%. One prediction of this model is 
therefore that stocking tends to enhance resource rents much more than labour income.
Table 11.7. The effect o f artificial stocking with large species upon employment









Artificial stock enhancement can moreover decrease labour incomes by strengthening the 
lessee's incentive to conserve stocks. This, o f course, is most likely to happen when the 
lessee is most able to internalise the benefits of stock conservation because the discount 
rate is low or the jalmohol is closed to fish migration. Tables 11.8 and 11.9 show the 
effects o f artificial stocking upon employment in each o f these two situations. Stocking
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depresses employment, and therefore labour incomes, in both cases. The negative effect 
upon employment is strongest when both conditions apply simultaneously (Table 11.10).
Table 11.8. The effect o f artificial stocking with large species upon employment with a 
zero discount rate.









Table 11.9. The effect o f artificial stocking with large species upon employment with a 
zero escapement rate (closed jalmohol).










Table 11.10. The effect of artificial stocking with large species upon employment with a 
zero discount rate and a zero escapement rate (closed jalm oholf









Fishing bans during the growing season also have an uneven effect. Table 11.11 shows 
how a delay in the start of the fishing season from September to December will affect the 
selected level o f employment and the net present values of the incomes of fishing labour 
and the lessee. It predicts that a closed season would induce the lessee to engage more 
fishermen but, of course, for a shorter time. The net effect is a slender increase in labour's 
discounted incomes and a spectacular windfall for the lessee.


























However, a strong point that emerged from chapter 7 upon the management o f effort was 
that there is a binding locational constraint upon fishing effort and employment; Hail 
Haor is chock-a-block with fishermen so the amount o f gear and the number o f fishermen 
working there are limited by the physical space available. In effect, this is an extreme 
case o f the existence o f crowding externalities as described in Chapter 3. Beyond a 
certain level of effort the marginal cost of effort for the jalmohol becomes infinite and it 
is physically impossible for effort to increase further . This binding locational constraint, 
the sudden appearance o f prohibitive crowding externalities beyond a certain level of 
effort, prevents the class o f lessees from applying as much effort as they would otherwise 
wish and therefore acts as a limit to rent-dissipation.Figure 11.1 illustrates this effect for a
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a perfectly open-access fishery. Without locational constrainrs, resource-users increase 
their effort until total cost (TCI) equals total revenue (TR) and rents are exhausted. With 
crowding externalities creating a limit upon effort, however, the TC curve becomes 
vertical (TC2). With effort thus constrained to e*, rents o f TR* minus TC* are produced.






Table 11.12 shows how closed seasons would affect employment and incomes with a 
binding crowding constraint upon employment (effort). Comparing Tables 11.11 and 
1 1 .1 2 , we see that the locational constraint scarcely affects the lessee's income because he 
recoups from stock conservation most o f what he loses from effort restriction. For fishing 
labour, however, the combination o f a closed season and a locational constraint is 
calamitous. Their period o f employment is reduced without any corresponding increase in 
their level o f employment.
Table 11.12. The effects o f closed seasons upon employment and discounted incomes, 


























We have seen that lessees in open water-bodies tend to engage large numbers of 
fishermen in order to catch fish before they migrate into neighbouring jalmohols. Whilst 
this is rational for the individual lessee, it depresses the incomes of the class o f lessees as 
a whole because they are engaging more fishing effort than the Clark and Munro stock-
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cash arbitrage condition would recommend. As Table 11.13, indicates, therefore, lessees 
would profit from some kind o f collective limit upon effort. In other words, lessees o f 
open jalmohols like government effort controls because they ensure a more profitable 
outcome than lessees could obtain by limiting effort individually. The effects of 
government effort controls are regressive, however. They harm fishermen by reducing the 
demand for their labour. In brief, effort controls benefit the sub-lessees, lessees and 
government officials who receive fisheries rents, but at the expense o f fishing labour.
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The benefits to lessees from government effort limitation become even larger if  the 
stocks o f large species have been enhanced artificially. Table 11.14 repeats the 
simulation o f effort restriction with an initial stock of large species o f 1 2 0 0 kg, twice that 
o f the baseline run. The lessees' gain from effort limitation is now 30% instead o f 24% 
and its absolute value has risen from Tk 28,000 to Tk 48,000.
Table 1 1.14. The vet more regressive effect of government effort limitation after 
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This constrained optimisation model has provided analytical confirmation o f fishermen's 
complaints about current policy in Bangladesh. It has found that the effect o f artificial 
stocking, closed seasons and effort controls is to increase the resource rents accruing to
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sub-lessees, lessees, government officials and the government. Fishermen’s incomes are at 
best little changed and at worst significantly depressed by official management policy.
Artificial stocking enhances resource rents but does not significantly increase the demand 
for labour. Indeed, in a closed jalmohol it will decrease employment because lessees will 
place more emphasis upon stock conservation than before.
Closed seasons, as enforced by the Third Fisheries Project and attempted by Hail Haor's 
Fisheries Officer, raise resource rents spectacularly. Fishermen can just be compensated 
for the shortening of the season by a subsequent increase in employment. This, however, 
is unlikely because employment is limited by lack of space so closed seasons will most 
probably reduce fishermen's discounted income.
Effort limitation, the leitmotif of government management philosophy, raises resource 
rents and lowers labour income. Lessees in open water have an incentive to press the 
Fisheries Department for effort controls because they cannot achieve stock conservation 
by individual action. Effort controls become yet more profitable for lessees if the 
population of large species has been raised by artificial stocking. As was observed in Hail 
Haor, artificial stocking re-activates the regressive operation of the Fisheries Act. These 
results go some way towards explaining the political economy of fisheries management in 
Bangladesh.
It should be emphasised, however, that the tables above are not intended to be 
quantitatively representative of Hail Haor or any other water-body in Bangladesh. The 
aim of the model was to show analytically why fishermen were complaining about 
government policy. There are too many uncertainties about biological and economic 
variables for such simulation models to replace direct interviewing as a means of 
assessing management interventions.
Conclusions
This chapter has used two bio-economic models to analyse the effects of current fisheries 
management upon the welfare of poorer fisherfolk. The first model showed that the 
principal effect of effort management was upon the distribution of output rather than 
upon its overall level. It suggested that closed seasons during the growing season, gear 
bans and effort limits in general would tend to shift fish sales away from the labour- 
intensive gears used by poorer fishermen towards the capital-intensive gears used by 
richer people at low-water. Although the first-round effects of such interventions would 
probably be regressive, the model could not predict what would happen after lessees had 
altered effort levels and tolls in response to the new pattern of profitability. The second
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model looked at these questions and found that, after lessees' response had been taken 
into account, the effects of artificial stocking, closed seasons and effort limits would tend 
to be regressive. Closed seasons and effort limits would benefit rich people by raising the 
value of rents, whilst harming poor people by reducing the demand for their effort. A 
particularly interesting result was that lessees in open jalmohols had little incentive to 
limit effort themselves but did have an incentive to press for government-imposed effort 
limits.
Three important themes emerge from the models' results. Firstly, because the response of 
physical yields to effort-limitation is minimal, the main effects of effort management are 
upon the distribution of income rather than its total value. Second, a distinctive effect of 
effort controls is divert fish from the gears of one socio-economic class into the gears of 
another. Thirdly, there is a structural conflict of interests between rentiers, who benefit 
from less effort, and fishing labour, which benefits from more.
The author is not aware of any existing models that explicitly simulate the distributional 
effects of fisheries policy in this way. This chapter has shown conclusively, however, that 
it is very important for fisheries managers to be conscious of the distributional 
implications of their work. Without this awareness, one is likely to harm poorer fisherfolk 
in the name of productivity.
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Chapter 12
The impact upon income distribution of an intensification of inland 
fisheries in developing countries: three theorems.
Background
It has become a commonplace that inland fisheries in developing countries are suffering 
from the degradation of fish habitats. The response of many governments and donor 
agencies has been to attempt to compensate for a reduction in the extent of inland 
fisheries by increasing the productivity of those that remain, using aquaculture and 
artificial stocking to restore their yields. This chapter investigates whether a shift from 
extensive to intensive fishing systems will tend to raise the incomes of poor fisherfolk in 
a world of fishing leases and scarce capital.
Three economic theorems are applied to this question. They model socio-economic 
phenomena that have been observed by this study and by other social scientists studying 
inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh (Blanchet and Talukder 1992; Rahman, Azad, 
Rathyit and Habib 1992a; Rahman, Azad, Rathyit and Habib 1992b, Wood 1990). They 
derive changes in labour's income from changes in a fishery's ecology. In economic 
language, they predict how rational agents with given factor endowments will respond to 
a shift in the production possibility frontier and what will be the consequences for factor 
incomes. Before presenting the models, therefore, the salient ecological and institutional 
features of the model's fishery must be presented. They will constitute the assumptions.
Labour, equipment and access to water (de facto, if not de jure) are required for the 
exploitation of a fishery, and the way in which these factors are brought together in 
Bangladesh's inland capture fisheries has been described in earlier chapters. Those with 
enough capital to purchase fishing-rights from the government and to provide equipment 
to fishermen become the effective masters of the resource. They sub-let these water- 
rights, either directly to fishermen or to Team-leaders, who recruit the labour that will 
fish the water-body. The lessee (ijaratdar) maintains control over the resource at his own 
expense by means of a team of water-bailiffs (lathial, paharadar). Because this is costly, 
controls are most tightly enforced when the fishery is at its most profitable, which is 
when the floodwaters have retreated, fish are concentrated and fish size is at its seasonal 
maximum. In this paper, organisation of the fishery will be modelled in terms of a profit- 
maximising Master, the lessee, employing unorganised labour to exploit the fishery. This 
is economically equivalent (Kremer 1992) to the lessee's charging user-fees.
2 0 0
The total extent of Bangladesh's inland fisheries is currently being reduced by the 
implementation of a Flood Action Plan (FAP), which is transforming former floodplains 
into enclosed polders. It is the aim of the Government of Bangladesh to compensate for 
the reduction in the area of fish habitats by artificially stocking the remaining water­
bodies with hatchlings and fingerlings (Sklar 1992), mainly of quick-growing carps such 
as Katla, Rohu, Mrigal, Silver Carp, Common Carp and Grass Carp. Government policy 
in other countries, for example Indonesia and Thailand (Hardjamulia and Rabegnatar 
1987; Paweputanon 1987) appears also to be based on the belief that restocking will 
compensate for a reduction in fish habitats. As a starting-point for the first theorem, 
therefore, this optimism will be taken at face value and it will be assumed that an x% 
reduction in the extent of a fish habitat is counter-balanced by an aquaculture-induced x% 
increase of the fish population density of the remaining waters, and that the shrinkage of 
the fish habitat does not materially affect that population's rate of growth and 
reproduction.
A defining ecological feature of Bangladesh’s inland capture fisheries is their seasonality. 
The fish habitat is replenished by the monsoon rains (June-September) which permits a 
rapid growth of fish biomass. Between December and March the waters recede and fish 
concentrate in the remaining depressions, which may be natural (beel) or man-made 
(kua). With large fish concentrated in small areas at this time of year, fishing is more 
profitable than at the height of the flood, when fish are still small and dispersed over a 
wide area. The second theorem will show that this has important implications for the 
distributive impact of artificial stocking.
In Bangladesh, fishermen and entrepreneurs compete for sub-leases. The former have 
more difficult access to capital but the latter have to bear the costs and risk of 
management and supervision. These observations constitute the assumptions of the third 
theorem.
Theorem 1: a surplus production analysis of artificial stocking.
As explained above, it is assumed that a reduction in the extent of the fishery has been 
"cancelled out" by a corresponding increase in the productivity of the remaining waters. 
This ecological change may be described in terms of Schaefer's "Surplus Production" 
model of the fishery (Schaefer 1957). He derived the following relationship from 
empirical fisheries data:
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f(P) = kxP(M - P) (1)
where P is fish biomass
f(P) is the natural rate of growth of fish biomass
M is the non-zero biomass at which f(P) = 0.
k1 is a constant
The rate o f growth o f fish biomass is an inverted-U function of the current stock o f fish 
biomass. At very low biomass levels, biomass growth is restricted by low population. At 
very high biomass levels, biomass growth is restricted by a shortage o f nutrients.
We may restate the policy-maker's optimism about the effectiveness o f artificial stocking 
by assuming that it restores k( and M to the initial values that they held before the 
ecological change.
Schaefer's second equation described the response of a fishery to fishing effort:
L = k2EP (2)
where L is the weight of landings.
E is a measure of fishing effort.
k2 is the "catchability co-efficient".
In other words, the probability of any one kilogramme of fish being caught and landed is 
a direct multiple (k2) of the amount of fishing effort applied to the water. The catchability 
co-efficient may be conceptualised as follows:
k2 = vr
where v is the fraction of the total fishery covered by one unit o f effort.
r is the probability that any kilogramme of fish finding itself in that fraction o f 
the fishery will be caught.
Seen thus, it appears reasonable to reflect the fall in the extent o f the fishery by a rise in 
v, which is tantamount to a rise in k2. Maintaining the parameters o f equation (1) 
unchanged whilst raising k2, one is effectively stating the aim of artificial stocking, that 
the fishery's productive capacity be maintained, but in a smaller body of water.
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Unless the fishery is over-exploited to the extent that it is heading towards extinction, it 
will tend towards an equilibrium where landings, L, are equal to biomass growth, f(P). 
Substituting landings for biomass growth and
 L for P (from equation 2)
k2E
into equation ( 1), landings are derived as a quadratic function o f effort:
L = k2EM - (k22E2/k1)
(3)
Schaefer simply specifies fishing costs as a linear function o f effort:
C = gE
where g is the unit cost of effort.
This model, however, divides fishing costs into wage costs and equipment costs. If the 
labour and equipment markets are competitive and constant factor proportions are 
maintained, then:
C = HQE + WIE (4)
where q is the ratio of equipment to effort.
h is the cost o f using one unit o f equipment, 
i  is the ratio o f labour to effort, 
w is the market wage rate.
If the fish market is competitive and the water-estate is small enough to be a price-taker, 
then the lessee's gross revenue is given by:
Y = pL (5)
where y is the lessee's gross revenue, 
p is the market price of fish.
The lessee's operating profits (Y -  c) are therefore described by the expression:
R = pk2EM - (pk22E2/k1) - HQE - WIE ( 6 )
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Differentiating with respect to e, the response o f the lessee's profits to a unit increase in 
the application of effort is obtained:
dR = pk2M - (2pk22E/k1) - HQ - WI 
dE
d2R = - 2pk22/kx 
dE2
The negativity of the second derivative indicates that the lessee's profits are at a 
maximum when dR/dE is equal to zero. Defining e* as the level o f effort that maximises 
the lessee's profits,
E* = kxM - kx(HQ + WI)
2k2 2Pk22 (7)
Defining labour's income when the lessee is maximising his profits as (wie*) ,
WIE* = WIkxM - WIk1(HQ + WI) (8)
2k2 2pk22
The intensification o f the fishery was described above as a rise in k2. The impact o f the 
intensification upon labour's income may therefore be expressed as:
d (WIE*) = -Wlk-jM + WIk1(HQ + WI)
dk2 2k2 2 Pk23 (9)
It can be shown that this term is negative (i.e. the intensification lowers the wage bill) 
whenever:
HQ + WI < PK2M
2
What does this condition mean? The left-hand side o f the expression represents the 
constant average cost o f effort. The right-hand side represents average revenue when the 
fish stock is at the level (m /2) that produces the maximum sustainable yield (MSY). The 
inequation says, therefore, that labour will lose from intensification if average cost is less 
than average revenue at MSY. In other words, fishermen will lose from intensification if
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the fishery is profitable at MSY. One may assume from their susceptibility to over-fishing 
that most developing-country fisheries fall into this category1.
The shift from an extensive to an intensive fishery is illustrated in Figure 12.1. The effort- 
yield relationships before and after the change are illustrated by two inverted parabolas. 
By subtracting total costs from the yield curves a pair of lessee profit curves are obtained. 
It is apparent that the curve representing profits after the shift peaks at a lower level of 
effort than the curve representing profits before the shift. This suggests that the lessee 
will apply a lower level of effort to the fishery, which would imply a lower level of 
labour income.
Unlike Theorem 1, which describes a change in a fishery's multi-year equilibrium, 
Theorems 2 and 3 look at how the pattern of fishing changes within the year itself.
Theorem 2: The time-distribution of managerial controls.
The theorem above assumes that the lessee exercises control over the water-estate at no 
cost to himself. In reality, however, the lessee must police the water. He must not only 
ensure that only fisherfolk contracted to him exploit the fishery. He must also ensure that 
they only operate in the specified areas with the specified gears. Where the lessee's rent is 
determined as a share of the catch, or the agreement specifies that all fish must be 
marketed by the lessee, as is frequently the case, the lessee must monitor the catch as well 
as the effort.
In Bangladesh, therefore, managerial control is costly for the lessee. Ullah (1985) reports 
that the cost of creating a team of water-bailiffs (lathials/paharadars) in the Jamuna river 
fishery constitutes such a significant sunk expense that it prevents competition between 
prospective leaseholders. Blanchet and Talukder report that the leaseholder of the 
Bogiani jalmohol in Shanir Haor in north-east Bangladesh employed a team of fifty 
paharadars for wages of around Tk900 per head per month. With the leaseholder 
responsible for their food, his policing bill could amount to around Tk67,500 (US$1,690) 
per month. This may be compared with an annual lease value of Tk475,300 for the same 
fishery.
It is evident, therefore, that the lessee will be least willing to incur these policing costs 
when the fishery offers tow rents, that is when fish are small and dispersed during the 
flood season. He will be most willing to incur them when the fishery is at its most
1 If a fishery had average revenue less than average cost at MSY it would be immune to over-fishing, even 
under open-access, because it would not be profitable to take the effort level beyond that which produces 
MSY.
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profitable, after the water's retreat. The inter-action o f this process with the artificial 
introduction o f fast-growing fries is likely to reduce the income of poor fisherfolk. This 
may be illustrated by a simplified model o f the fishery.
The fishery starts the beginning of the season with an exogenously-determined biomass of 
fish. This biomass has a natural rate of increase across time. The fisherfolk around the 
water-body apply a constant level of effort to the fishery (assuming no feedback from 
biomass to effort), which generates a constant level o f fishing mortality in the way 
described by Schaefer's equation (2) above. These assumptions generate an expression for 
fish biomass.
Pt = A (1+G)(1 - X ) (10)
Where Pt is fish biomass at time t.
a is the stock at the season's beginning (t=0) .
G is the rate o f natural biomass growth (net of natural mortality), 
x is the rate o f fishing mortality.
The value o f the catch at any time is given by
Lt = 7CXPt  = XA(1+G) (1-X) (11)
Where Lt is landings at time t.
k is the price o f fish, assumed constant
In reality the fish stock would grow geometrically (equation 10), but, for the sake o f 
algebraic simplicity, a linear approximation will be used to analyse the relationship 
between the introduction of a more rapidly-growing fish population and the income of 
fisherfolk across the season. Supposing that the catch is increasing at a constant rate over 
time, such that
Lt = M + tN
where n is the increase in the value o f landings between t and t-i. 
m is the initial level of the value o f landings
By inspecting equation (11) one surmises that a rise in a or g would lead to an increase in 
the absolute rate of change ofthe value o f landings for all time periods. Increases in t and
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n describe the effects o f artifical stocking upon the initial value o f the catch and its rate of 
growth.
The lessee will assume control of the water-estate at t*, which is when the estate's profits 
start to cover the cost o f enforcing his ownership.
M + t*N - WIE* = C
where:
c is the cost o f enforcing his ownership.
(Equipment costs are omitted for ease of analysis.)
Fisherfolk will receive the catch until t* and wages thereafter, so their total income for 
the season will be:
t=t' t=t*
f { Ft} = f{Lt} + WIE* (t' - t*)
J dt J dt
t=0 t=0
where:
t 1 denotes the time at the end of the season 
Ft is fisherfolk's income at time t
The path o f F t across time is illustrated in Figure 12.2 by income line 1. As the graph 
indicates, fisherfolk's income may be divided into three components, the basic catch until 
t*, the catch increase until t*, and wages after t*.
or
t* - C + WIE* ~ M 
N
t=tf






r{Ft} - (M+C-WIE*) (C+WIE*-M) + WIE*t'J dt 2N
t=0
The first derivative o f this expression with respect to n describes the impact o f the 
introduction o f faster-growing species into the water-estate.
This effect is represented in Figure 12.2 by the shift from income line 1, with an initial 
income growth rate of N, to income line 2, with the faster initial income growth rate of 
N'.As stocking tilts the income line upwards, fisherfolk receive higher incomes at the start 
but lose direct access to the water and become hired labourers at an earlier date (t*!). 
Their gain from the increased initial rate o f growth is represented by the shaded triangle 
x. Their loss from moving earlier to hired employment is represented by the shaded 
quadrilateral y.
The denominator expression 12 will be positive so long as landings are growing across 
the season.
(M-c-wie* ) will be negative for all fisheries in which enforcement is unprofitable at the 
start o f the season. This implies that, for the fisheries that interest us, artificial stocking 
will raise fisherfolk's incomes if and only if
WIE* > M + C
In other words, wage earnings must be higher than the sum o f the initial catch and the 
leaseholder's control costs. By increasing the value o f the fishery, artificial stocking has 
brought forward the date upon which the water-lord decides to enforce control. This will 
lead to a reduction in fisherfolk's incomes unless the leaseholder's wage bill is 
substantially higher than the initial value o f the catch.
In order to reach this conclusion two approximations were made; first, the level of effort 
applied to the fishery was fixed irrespective of the fishery's profitability; secondly, 
landings were assumed to increase arithmetically rather than geometrically. There is no 
prima facie  reason, however, to believe the conclusion to be dependent upon these 
approximations. Inspecting Figure 12.2 it is clear that an upward shift in the income line, 
no matter what its shape, will bring forward the time when it crosses the wie*+c line.
t=t*
dN
t^O ( 1 2 )
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T heorem  3: T he tim e distribution o f  costs and benefits.
This theorem starts with two observations; that the government, in order to avoid default, 
collects fishing lease payments before the start o f the fishing season and that, with an 
imperfect capital market, poorer people tend to have a higher marginal subjective rate of 
discount than richer people (in other words, they would be prepared to pay a higher 
interest rate for credit). These phenomena inter-act with a water-leasing system and an 
artificial stocking programme to reduce the incomes of self-employed fishermen. The 
theorem goes on to predict that restocking will induce a shift in the fishery from self- 
employment to hired fishing gangs.
Some inland, open-water fisheries in Bangladesh are open to exploitation by richer 
entrepreneurs using hired labour. The maximum price such an entrepreneur would offer 
for a water-estate lease would be:
V = (Y - wL - C) - M 
(1 + r ±)
Where:
v is the lease price, including any bribes, 
offered by the entrepreneur 
y is the value of fish yields
w is the wage rate for hired labour
l is profit-maximising labour use
c is profit-maximising non-labour costs
m is the entrepreneur's margin for his time,
risk-taking and control costs 
r j is the rate at which the entrepreneur discounts 
costs and benefits from the fishing period back to 
the lease payment date
The analysis continues by considering a water-estate exploited by self-employed 
fishermen. They can only have obtained the lease by outbidding the entrepreneur. Thus, 
they must pay at least V in official transfers and bribes to gain access to the water.
Having gained access, therefore, their net income, discounted to the date o f lease 
payment, will be:
I = Y - C - V
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(1 + r 2 )
or
I = Y - C + fwL + C - Y) + M
(1 + r2) (1 + rjL) (13)
where:
i is the discounted net income of self-employed 
fishermen
r2 is the rate o f discount o f self-employed fishermen 
By assumption:
r 2 > r 1 (the fisherfolk have a higher subjective rate 
o f discount than the entrepreneur.)
The effect o f restocking on the self-employed fishermen may be expressed as the rate of 
change o f self-employed fishermen's net income with respect to the value of fish yields. 
By differentiating (13) the following expression is obtained:
dl = 1 - 1
dY (1 + r2) (1 + rx) (14)
The right hand side o f this equation is always negative because the rate o f discount of 
self-employed fishermen is greater than the rate o f discount o f richer entrepreneurs. In 
other words, the income o f self-employed fishermen will tend to be reduced by artificial 
stocking if  they are competing with entrepreneurs for leases.
Stocking raises the lease price. (This was observed in two water-bodies stocked by the 
Third Fisheries Project in 1992. In one the artificial stocking led to a significant rise in 
the lease price. Another, for which access had been open, had its dormant leasing system 
revived.) Because the entrepreneur has a lower subjective rate of discount, restocking has 
a higher net present value to him than to the fisherfolk. The fisherfolk have to bid for the 
lease at the entrepreneur's valuation (much higher than before stocking) but they only 
benefit at their own valuation (a little higher than before stocking). They therefore lose 
more than they gain.
This theorem could in fact be applied to any situation where people o f differing economic 
status are bidding for a factor of production in fixed supply. It could, for example, be
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used to describe the effect upon income distribution of the arrival of high-yielding 
varieties into a land-scarce economy.
There is, moreover, a point at which self-employed fishermen will no longer compete 
with entrepreneurs for access to water. If their opportunity cost o f labour ("shadow wage 
rate", "reserve wage") is w*, then they will be happy to compete for a lease so long as the 
present value o f net fishing incomes is greater than w *l. The point at which self- 
employed fishermen are indifferent between fishing and withdrawing is that which only 
permits them to earn the opportunity cost o f labour, or:
reserve wage = income - lease price
w*L = Y - C  + (wL + C - Y) + M
(l+r2) (1 + r2) (1 + rL)
or
w*L - wL 1 1  (15)
-----  = (Y-C) (-------------- )+ M
(l+r2) (l+rx) (l+r2) (l+rx)
Bearing in mind that r2 is greater than r,, two conclusions becomes apparent from 
expression (15). Firstly, higher levels o f y, which are the goal of artificial stocking, only 
permit fishermen with lower opportunity costs o f labour to remain in self-employment. 
Those with higher opportunity costs o f labour will not outbid the entrepreneur and will be 
replaced by his hired hands. Secondly, the higher m is, the easier it is for fishermen to earn 
more than their reserve wage.
This theorem therefore suggests that artificial stocking will induce two changes in the 
pattern o f fisheries exploitation. In some fisheries the incomes o f self-employed 
fishermen will be eroded. In others, self-employed fishermen will be replaced by 
entrepreneurs using hired labour. This could conceivably create a small increase in labour 
income, but only if fishermen were earning less than the hired labour wage before the 
increase in fish yields.
Conclusions
This paper has described the socio-economic processes that one might expect to follow 
fish stocking in a leasehold fishery. The lines of causation were not identified by means 
o f the economic theorems above. On the contrary, they were described to the author by
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fishermen themselves and it then only remained to translate their complaints into the 
language of neo-classical economics.
The first theorem above suggests that artificial stocking is unlikely to compensate poor 
fisherfolk for a decline in the area of fish habitats; the size of the habitat determines the 
demand for labour whereas the intensity of stocking determines profits. The second 
theorem goes on to argue that artificial stocking might aggravate the exclusion of poor 
fishermen from fishing grounds. If stocks are improved the leaseholder will assert control 
over the fishery earlier in the season. The third predicts that artificial stocking will reduce 
the incomes of self-employed fisherfolk, sometimes to the extent that they are replaced 
by hired labour. Re-stocking raises the lease value beyond what fisherfolk can afford.
Taken together, these theorems suggest that employment, labour income and labour's 
access to fish stocks may be reduced by artificial stocking. One concludes with the well- 
worn observation that project design should not only consider technical aspects of 
production but also the economics of the allocation of benefits.
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Pauperised by empowerment: renewable resource reform without capital- 
market competition.
0 Introduction
The control of renewable resources in developing countries by an elite is often cited as an 
obstacle to equitable development. A substantial literature (for example: Bailey 1982, 
Feeny et al. 1990, Panayotou 1982, Runge 1986, Dryzek 1987, Buck 1989, Ostrom 1990, 
Redclift 1992) argues that collective management by communities can provide a more 
equitable outcome. It argues, moreover, that collective resource management will prove 
as least as effective as private ownership in preventing Hardin's (1968) "Tragedy of the 
Commons", the depletion of the resource's physical productivity through uncontrolled 
access. The implied policy prescription is a transfer of control over resources from elites 
to local communities.
An illustrative example is provided by Bangladesh where "water-lords" control access to 
inland fisheries, frequently financing their operations with development-bank loans at a 
low nominal (McGregor 1989) or even negative real (Ahmed 1989) interest rate (Ahmed 
1989). Bangladesh's New Fisheries Management Policy attempted from 1986 onwards to 
shift control over fishing rights from lessees to fishermen's collectives. Commentators 
(World Bank 1991, Rahman 1989, Siddiqui 1989, Naqi 1989) have approved the policy's 
design. They note, however, that implementation has been accompanied by social 
problems, to wit "leaseholder interference", "non-coherence of co-operatives", 
"domination of co-operatives by elites", "rivalry between fishermen", "restriction of credit 
availability by middlemen". They conclude nonetheless that unequal power relationships 
are an obstacle to equitable development and that the transfer of water-rights is a step in 
the right direction.
The model below explores the economic processes that follow the transfer of a natural 
resource from a rich owner to a poorer user group when the users remain dependent upon 
the ex-owner for capital. It predicts that the transfer of natural resource property rights in 
such circumstances will not help and is likely to harm the intended beneficiaries. It 
provides an analytical explanation of the persistence of vertical social alignments after 
the resource transfer. In brief, it qualifies the case for renewable resource reform.
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1 Assum ptions
1.1 P rod u ction  fu n ction
There is a renewable natural resource, in this case a fishery. Output is produced by 
applying labour ( i)  to it, but the labour cannot work without equipment, such as fishing 
boats and nets, and working capital for wage advances and food. The value o f equipment 
and capital at any one time constitutes the capital stock (k) applied to the natural
resource.
This model uses the classic Schaeferian (Schaefer 1957) inverted-U renewable resource 
production function; as effort is applied to the resource, total production first rises 
because of increased exploitation and then falls because o f stock depletion. The inverted- 
U is expressed in quadratic form, but the results hold so long as the marginal reponse of 
the renewable resource to inputs is always falling.
In this model it is difficult to substitute labour for capital or vice-versa. Remaining with 
the fisheries example, one could think of a varying number o f fishing teams each 
operating with a fixed amount of labour, boats, nets and working capital. That is to say 
that the capital stock can stand as a measure o f effort and the amount o f labour used is 
also a constant multiple (x) o f the value of the capital stock.
i  = i k  (1)
The maximum value o f the renewable resource's yield is A. The value o f the capital 
required to produce A is M. The value o f actual output is y. If the actual amount o f capital 
applied is more or less than A7, then y  is always less than A. This relationship can be 
expressed as a quadratic function. Since labour use is a fixed multiple o f the capital 
stock, the production function can be written in terms of capital alone.
y  -  A - B (M-k) 2 
1 = I k
A b, and Mare all positive, b  is a technically-determined constant. The production 
function can also be written as follows:
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y  = A - BM2 -  B k2 + 2BMk (2)
1 = I k
If we differentiate with respect to k, we obtain:
d y  = 2 B{M-k)
dk  (3)
1 = I k
and
dly =  - 2B
d k 2
1 = I k
(4)
In other words, the additional value (marginal value product) produced by each unit of 
capital is - 2 b less than the additional value produced by the previous unit. This might be 
due to resource depletion or price effects or both.
1.2 O rg a n isa tio n  o f  th e  reso u rce
Three management regimes will be modelled as three different scenarios. In Scenario 
One the "Master" leases the water-body to fishermen. In Scenario Two any fisherman can 
use the water-body. In Scenario Three "community resource management" prevails. The 
fishermen control their own fishing effort so as to maximise profits. In all three scenarios, 
however, the Master is the fishermen's sole source o f capital.
1.2.1 S cen a r io  O n e
The model contains three groups o f actors.
First, there is the Master, who has used his political influence to acquire not only 
proprietary rights to the renewable resource but also access to a source of cheap capital. 
McGregor (1989) describes how influential people in rural Bangladesh are able to obtain 
subsidised development bank credit. For analytical simplicity this paper models the
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Master's cost o f capital as zero. The results, however, only depend upon the Master 
having a lower opportunity cost o f capital than the fishermen.
He works the renewable resource by hiring members o f the second group, Labourers who 
have no capital o f their own and can only work with capital provided by the Master. At 
the moment, however, the Master hires them at Labour's standard wage (w).
i
The variables for this scenario will be indicated by . Thus,
k '  is the stock o f capital in use. 
y is the value o f output.
R' is the Master's income from this renewable resource. 
l  ' is Labour's income from this renewable resource.
1.2.2 Scenario Two
If the government reforms the management of the renewable resource, we may come to 
Scenario Two. The Master can no longer control entry to the renewable resource, but he 
still has a monopoly of capital. In this scenario, the Team-leaders determine how much 
labour is applied to the renewable resource, but they do so individually, not collectively. 
In other words, a classic "open access" situation exists.
The variables for this scenario will be indicated by °. Thus,
k G is the stock of capital in use. 
y° is the value o f output.
r °  is the Master's income from this renewable resource. 
l °  is Labour's income from this renewable resource. 
t°  is the Team-Leaders' non-Labour income.
1.2.3 Scenario Three
If the government removes the Master's power to control entry to the renewable resource, 
it may be transferred to a collective of Team-leaders, somehow selected from among 
what was formerly the Master's pool o f hired labour, producing a situation o f "community 
resource management". If there are different exploitation technologies the Team-leaders 
will commit themselves collectively to the most profitable option.
The variables for this scenario will be indicated by * . Thus,
k* is the stock of capital in use. 
y*  is the value of output.
r* is the Master's income from this renewable resource. 
l * is Labour's income from this renewable resource. 
t*  is the Team-Leaders' non-Labour income.
1.3 Government objectives
The government (or its donors) was dedicated to "development with equity" and the 
improvement of the welfare o f "the poorest o f the poor". In practice, it wished to improve 
the welfare of Labour, and especially those labourers without the capacity to become 
Team leaders.
It therefore decided to deprive the Master o f the right to control access to the natural 
resource. The analysis below will show that the effect was not what the government 
intended.
2 Scenario One
The Master's revenue is determined by the production function. Equation (2) above. His 
capital costs are zero and his labour costs are given by:
L = Wl
or l  = w i k  (5)
So his net income (R ) is given by:
R = A -  BM2 -  B k 2 +  2 BMk -  W ik  (6)
The marginal return to him of each additional unit o f capital investment is given by:
dR =  2BM -  2 BK -  WI 
dK
That r  is at a maximum when d R / d K  =  o is confirmed by:
d 7R =  -2B < 0 
d K 2
To maximize his net income (profits), the Master therefore sets
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k '  = M -  WI 
2 B (?)
In other words, he decides to obtain less than the maximum sustainable yield in order to 
reduce his labour costs.
We can obtain total output ( y '), the Master's income (r  ) and Labour's income ( l  ') by 
substituting into Equations (2), (5) and (6 ) above. In this Scenario, it will be remembered, 
potential Team-leaders receive the standard wage from the Master, so t  =  o .
y '  = A -  W21 2 
4 B
R r = A -  WIM + IV2 J 2 
4 B
l '  = WIM -  W2I 2
2 B ( 8 )
Total output ( y ') is shared between the Master (r ')  and Labour (L '). This is an 
allocatively efficient outcome in the sense that the Master has maximised fishery rents. It 
is an objective of distributive policy, however, that these rents should go to Labour. The 
government decides, therefore, to abolish the Master's control and the effects o f this are 
considered in Scenarios Two and Three.
3 Scenario Two
The Master no longer controls access to the renewable resource and an "open access" 
situation exists. So long as average revenue is greater than average cost, Team-leaders 
have an incentive to work the resource with more labour and more capital. The Team- 
leaders do not only pay wages. They must also pay a rental to the Master for his capital. 
This rental amounts to rk , where r is the effective rate o f interest charged by the Master. 
So, Team-leaders will add labour and capital until
y = r k  + Wik
Substituting into the production function (2), we obtain:
r k  — A - BM2 -  B k 2 + 2BMk -  Wik  (9)
Now that the Master does not manage the resource, his only source of income is interest 
income. In other words,
R = r k
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So we find that the Master's income function for the open access fishery (9) is exactly the 
same as that for the fishery under his own management (6 ). He therefore supplies the 
same quantity of capital:
k  = k °  =  k '  = M -  WI 
2 B
Because Team-leaders under open access add inputs until their rents are dissipated, 
Team-leaders' non-Labour income is zero, as before. The same value o f capital is 
supplied as before, employing the same amount o f labour at the same wage. It is therefore 
inevitable that the incomes of all three parties are the same as before.
y° = A - W2I 2 
4 B
R° = A -  WIM + W21 2 
4 B
L° = WIM -  W21 2 
2 B
T° = 0
The Master's share o f output is unchanged, the only difference being that it is now 
represented by a rate o f interest instead of a rate o f return on capital.
A - WIM + W21 2 
4 B
r ° = R° = RJ_ = -------------
k °  k '  M - WI
2 B
The sociological phenomena that accompany natural resource reform may be described in 
economic terms. Labour is now paying an effective interest rate o f r ° / k °. This is the 
"persistence of exploitation." The Master maximises his income by restricting the supply 
o f capital, giving it to some teams and not others, effectively deciding who works. This is 
"domination of collectives by the elite." Individuals vie for access to the Master's limited 
supply of capital; this is "factionalism". The government may observe these phenomena 
and conclude that a promising reform was undermined by unfavourable social factors. In 
fact, natural resource reform alone was not sufficient to transfer resource rents to the 
fishermen because it only cut one strand of the multi-stranded relationship between the 
Master and Labour.
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4 Scenario T hree
The government has again removed the Master's power to limit access to the renewable 
resource, but that power is now vested in a collective o f  Team-leaders. They make profits 
(r) from the sale o f  fish (y) less labour costs ( w i k )  and the rental o f  capital ( r k ) .  By 
Substituting into (2), we obtain their profit function.
T = A -  BM2 -  B k 2 + 2 BMk - Wik -  k r  (10)
We can differentiate this function with respect to k  to obtain the incremental (marginal) 
profit to the Team-leaders from employing an incremental unit o f  capital.
dT  = 2BM -  2 BK -  r  -  WI 
dk
That t  is at a maximum when d T / d k  = o is confirmed by:
d 2 T =  - 2 B < 0 
d k 2
Team-leaders will employ capital until the marginal profit from employing it is zero 
(d T / d k  ■- o). We thus obtain the profit-maximising level o f  capital use for any given 
interest rate or, in other words, the demand curve for capital.
k = M - ( r  + WI)
2 B (11)
or r = 2BM -  2 BK -  WI
After the government reform, the Master's only income is from capital rental:
R = r k  = 2 BMk -  2 B k 2 -  Wik (12)
The rental o f  an incremental unit o f  capital will bring him an incremental income of:
dR = 2 BM -  4Bk -  WI 
dk
That r  is at a maximum when d R / d k  = o is confirmed by:
d 2R =  - 4 B < 0
dk2
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In order to maximise his income, the Master will supply capital until dR/dk =  o, so he
sets:
k* = M - WI
2 4B (13)
Total output (y*), Labour income (L * ) , Team-leaders' non-wage income ( t*)  and the 
Master's income (R*) are obtained by substituting k* (13) for k into equations (2), (5), 
( 1 0 ) and ( 1 2 ).
y *  = A -  BM2 - MWI - W2I 2
4 4 16B
L* = MW I  -  W2! 2
2 4 B
T* = A - 3 BM2 -  MW I  + W21 2
4 4 16B
r * = BM2 -  MW I + W2! 2
2 2 SB
Once again, a comparison with the results o f Scenario One shows that the architects o f 
the natural resource reform were disappointed. Although Team-leaders are now receiving 
resource-rents, Labour's income has been halved by a fall in employment, producing an 
unequivocal reduction in income for those not in a position to manage a team, (l is 
always reduced, but only by exactly 50% if the biological response function is quadratic.) 
The total effort applied to the resource has been halved. Since k was less than m before 
the reform, a reduction in k necessarily produces a reduction in total output.
In fact, it can moreover be shown that open access (Scenario Two) is superior to this 
community resource management, both in terms o f allocative efficiency and equity. Since 
the result o f open access was identical to that of management by the rent-maximising 
Master the open access result is also rent-maximising. The community resource 
management option, being different, is therefore necessarily allocatively inefficient. A 
comparison of l * with l °  also shows that the employment prospects o f Labour are worse 
under collective resource management than under open access.
Figure 13.1 provides a visual illustration of the three scenarios. As it shows, communal 
resource management restricts the Master's access to the marginal product o f capital and 
thus provides him with a motive to restrict the supply o f capital. It also illustrates the 
vanity of hoping that resource rents will simply be transferred with the resource. For 
resource rents to be at a maximum under communal management as they were under
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private ownership, the Master's income must be zero; in other words, he must provide 
free credit.
(Proof: The hoped-for outcome is one where r  = R '.  The only way to produce resource 
rents (y - L ) as high as r  • is for output to be y  ', which in turn requires capital use to be 
k  \  This requires labour use to be i ' and therefore Labour income to be l  '. Since y  = 
l + t+r  and y  and l are unchanged, the only way for t  to rise from 0 to r ' is for r  to fall 
from r  ’ to 0.)
Once again, it is possible to put an economic interpretation upon the sociological 
phenomena that accompany natural resource reform. Under collective resource 
management the Master continues to draw an income by restricting the supply o f capital. 
This appears as "domination o f collectives by the elite" and the competition among 
Team-leaders for capital manifests itself as "factionalism". Moreover, the excluded 
Labour and the Master have an incentive to ally themselves to destroy the collective and 
move to open access (Scenario Two). The excluded Labour could appear as a rival 
faction. Once again, the government might conclude that a promising reform was 
hindered by unfavourable social factors. The weakness o f the reform was that it distorted 
Labour's dependence upon the Master without destroying it.
5 C on clu sion
A set of strong predictions has been derived from the assumptions o f a quadratic 
production function and a monopolistic money-lender with relatively cheap access to 
capital. The predictions, like the assumptions, will describe different situations to 
different degrees. Where empirical research shows the assumptions to be relevant, this 
model constitutes a qualification o f the case for collective resource management.
Collective resource management is currently in vogue. Its proponents argue that it is as 
allocatively efficient as private ownership whilst being distributively superior. The 
conversion of private property rights to collective resource management is therefore a 
popular policy prescription. This model has shown, however, that the presence o f a 
monopoly of capital, a common occurrence in some countries, reverses the policy 
prescription. In this case, collective resource management is probably less allocatively 
efficient, more exclusive and therefore less favourable to those with only their labour to 
sell than private ownership
The proponents of collective resource management argue that, as a replacement for 
private property', it is at least superior to open access. This model has shown, however,
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that open access with a monopoly of capital produces exactly the same outcome as 
private property.
These findings are of importance both for the analysis of past events and for the appraisal 
of future policies. Students of development and economic history often wish to deduce 
why some land reforms succeed and others fail. This model suggests that the 
competitiveness of the capital market is a determinant. Contemporary policy-makers 
should also be advised by this model that natural resource reform may be counter­
productive unless undertaken within a liberalised capital market.
Lastly, the model illustrates that a policy process relying solely upon social observation 
and a commitment to equity will not necessarily attain its objectives. The methodologies 
grouped under the title "participatory development" are based upon the belief that 
policies are improved by consulting and empowering local people (see for example 
Redclift 1992). This model shows, however, that the removal of perceived "exploitation" 
may be counter-productive. Where there are multiple ties between patron and client, the 
cutting of one strand refashions the client's dependence without destroying it. There is no 
a priori reason to believe that the remoulded relationship will be superior to the old one. 
This paper suggests one way in which it could be inferior. It is therefore essential for 
policy-makers to supplement their desire for social equity with an understanding of the 
nature of economic subordination. Otherwise they may unwittingly bring about 
pauperisation by empowerment.
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Figure 13.1. Three scenarios o f  tenurial reform
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Chapter 14
Implications of the study for the management and assessment of inland 
capture fisheries in Bangladesh
Introduction
This thesis started, in chapters 1 and 2, by posing an number of questions about the 
impact of inland capture fisheries policy upon poorer people. Although government and 
donors were actively intervening in the sector in the name of poverty-alleviation, there 
was little understanding of how their interventions were affecting different groups of 
participants in the fishery. It was true that a number of studies of Bangladeshi inland 
capture fisheries were available but they did not address the question of how fishery 
economies worked and how policy affected them. In chapter 2, therefore, the thesis set 
itself the goal of describing how fisheries incomes were created and allocated and how 
policy interventions would affect their value and distribution. Chapter 3's review of 
fisheries management literature found that there was a lack of established theory upon the 
distribution of benefits, with existing models concentrating upon rent-maximisation 
rather than poverty-alleviation; new assessment methodologies would therefore be 
needed.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 set about addressing the research problem with a qualitative 
description of how incomes were created and allocated in the Hail Haor fishery. Chapters 
5 and 6 laid out the factors of production, water, fish, gear and people, and chapter 7 went 
on to explain the transactions whereby they are combined to make livelihoods of differing 
quality for each group of fishery participants. Then chapters 8, 9 and 10 quantified the 
economic outcome. They showed how incomes were divided between labour and rentiers 
and between richer and poorer fisherfolk and used micro-economic theory to explain the 
pattern of allocation. Chapters 11, 12 and 13 modelled how policy interventions such as 
artificial stock enhancement and effort controls would affect the distribution of income.
At this point, therefore, one is finally in a position to say how fisheries management 
affects poor people. The aim of this chapter is to bring together the findings of the study 
and, referring back to the initial questions posed in chapter 2, to their implications for the 
management of Bangladesh’s inland capture fisheries. Firstly, to address the specific issue 
of how donors should intervene in this sector, the distributional impact of various policy 
interventions will be discussed. After that, the second part of the chapter will broaden the 
scope of enquiry to consider how such fisheries should be assessed in general. The 
chapter's main theme will be that current fisheries policy is distributionally regressive and
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that a new approach to fisheries assessment could open the way for more progressive 
policy interventions.
Qualification of the study's findings
Before analysing the effects of specific policy measures it is first necessary to ask how far 
the study's findings from Hail Haor are applicable to other water-bodies in Bangladesh. 
There are two possible obstacles to generalisation: Hail Haor could be a special case 
because of its physical ecology or because of its social systems. It if is, the study's general 
applicability should be qualified.
As a broad ecological generalisation, the haors of Greater Sylhet are different from 
floodplains elsewhere in Bangladesh in that they tend to retain water for longer after the 
end of the monsoon. This has implications for the pattern of effort. Whereas Hail Haor 
supports labour-intensive, moveable gears such as hooks, traps and gill-nets throughout 
the year, it is common for other floodplains to stop fishing altogether around January or 
February. This was confirmed quantitatively by a catch-effort study of Third Fisheries 
Project water-bodies (BCAS 1992). The Hail Haor results therefore probably describe a 
fishery with a relatively important "thinning gear" sector as defined in Chapter 11.
What then would a comparatively long floodplain season imply for the economics of 
income-distribution? Both the bio-economic models in Chapter 11 showed that, the 
shorter the floodplain season, the more incomes a redistributed away from poorer, self- 
employed fisherfolk with cheap gears towards fisheries rents and the owners of brush- 
piles and dewatering areas. This study of Hail Haor probably therefore describes an 
unrepresentatively labour-intensive and low-rent fishery.
Turning to the question of whether the social systems of the Hail Haor fishery are typical 
of Bangladesh's floodplain fisheries, the FAP 17 Project found a huge variety of 
contractual arrangements in inland capture fisheries across the country. Although the 
control of the economic surplus by local influential people was almost universal, it was 
expressed in different ways in different water-bodies (P. Townsley per s. comm.). Hired 
fishing labour was predominant in many floodplains, in contrast with the mostly toll- 
paying, self-employed labour of Hail Haor. One reason may have been that Hail Haor had 
longer moveable-gear fishing seasons and that the supervisory cost of employing 
dispersed fishermen on the floodplain would have been prohibitive.
What does the variation in contractual arrangements imply for the general applicability of 
the Hail Haor results? It has been shown elsewhere (Kremer 1992) that the economic 
outcome would be identical whether rents are appropriated via labour hire, toll-
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collection, a marketing monopsony or a capital equipment monopoly. The variety of 
contractual arrangements across the country could therefore be determined by differences 
in the technological efficiency of supervisory systems rather than substantive differences 
in the economics of surplus-allocation.
In brief, then a few points can be made about the application of this study's findings to 
other water-bodies. Firstly, because different fisheries have different ecologies, it should 
not be assumed that the level or distribution of output in other water-bodies will resemble 
this study's quantitative estimates for Hail Haor. Second, any observations made about the 
exclusion of poorer people from fisheries benefits are likely to be even clearer in other 
fisheries than in Hail Haor because of the shorter labour-intensive season. Thirdly, the 
economic principles of fisheries benefit allocation are likely to be similar across the 
country.
Critique of policy interventions
It is now possible to answer the questions about fisheries policy that were originally 
posed in chapter 2. They shall be considered in turn:
What are the effects o f  effort management upon incomes, employment and the 
distribution o f income?
Chapter 10 described how self-employed fishermen perceived effort controls to be 
affecting their livelihoods. They disliked gear bans and closed seasons because they 
reduced their ability to maintain a flow of income from fishing. They did not perceive 
themselves to be benefiting from the yield gains that are supposed to follow from effort 
controls because they did not think they had access to the combinations of gear, season 
and location whereby the larger fish would be caught.
Chapter 1 l's bio-economic models confirmed the fishermen's perceptions of effort 
controls. MRAG's (1994) multi-guild, multi-gear, yield-per-recruit model of the Hail Haor 
fishery predicted that total yields would not exhibit a positive response to reductions in 
effort. A multi-fishery surplus production ("Schaefer curve") plot did not show any 
evidence that the high density of fishing effort in Hail Haor was depressing yields. The 
principal impact of effort controls, therefore, could be upon income-distribution rather 
than total productivity.
A bio-economic model based upon MRAG's simulation predicted that the principal 
immediate effect of effort controls, whether in the form of bans upon moveable gears, 
closed seasons or overall effort reductions, would be to shift incomes away from poorer
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fishermen and towards richer brush-pile owners. A bio-economic simulation of lessees' 
decision-making similarly predicted that closures during the growing season would at 
best not benefit fishing labour and would at worst, if there was a locational constraint 
upon fishing effort, harm labour severely.
Two economic processes explained these findings about the distributional impact of 
effort controls. Firstly, as chapter 8 modelled, there is a Ricardian trade-off between 
rents, which accrue to lessees, sub-lessees, venal officials and the government, and labour 
income, which accrues to fishermen. The former derives from the margin between sales 
and costs, which will be an inverse function of effort in a fishery like Hail Haor where 
total sales are unresponsive to effort. The latter depends upon employment, which is a 
direct function of effort. Second, as chapter 9 explained, a household's choice of 
technique is determined by its economic status. Growing-season effort controls preserve 
fish from techniques that are labour-intensive and therefore essential to poorer people for 
techniques that are capital-intensive and therefore dominated by richer people.
There is legitimate concern that over-fishing may be causing recruitment failure for larger 
species such as the major carps. There is therefore an economic case for creating reserve 
areas or restricting the use of gears that catch sexually immature major carps. This would 
imply bans on brush-pile fishing, which would be opposed by politically-powerful local 
elites.
To sum up, the finding of this study is that effort controls have little effect upon yields 
and enhance rents at the expense of income from employment. They are therefore 
distributionally regressive.
Licensing is intended to transfer fishing rents from the lessee to the fisherman. Does this 
occur? Is the lessee's current share high enough to justify the programme's 
administrative costs?
The theoretical discussion in chapter 13 predicts that a shift from leasing to licensing will 
not transfer resource rents from the lessee to fishing labour if the lessee retains control of 
the supply of capital. RRA findings from two New Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) 
jalmohols (Appendix 6) show that the NFMP simply operated as the leasing system by 
another name. This was because the existence on paper of the NFMP failed to break the 
venal link between the lessee and government officials on the one hand and because the 
lessee retained factional support from fishermen in his own community on the other. (An 
explanation of the resilience of patronage relations in fishing factions was presented in 
chapters 7 and 9.) The evidence of this study therefore strongly suggests that a shift from 
leasing to licensing alone will not transfer fishing rents from lessees to fishermen.
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Chapter 2 described the Target Group Approach used by NGOs to confer water-rights 
upon fishing labour. The justification for such interventions is that group action with 
NGO support can undermine the vertical patronage alignments that maintain the leasing 
system. The question then arises: "Is the share of tolls sufficient to justify the 
administrative costs of transferring water-rights?"
Chapter 8 presented this study's findings upon the potential value of rent redistribution. 
One important result was that, contrary to popular opinion, poorer fishermen paid a very 
low share of their gross income as tolls and most of this was attributable to lessees’ 
intermediation costs. The effect of a cancellation of tolls upon poverty in the fishery 
would thus be insignificant. This policy probably receives political support because it 
would benefit the richer people who pay high tolls to use profitable gears such as brush- 
piles and pump-dewatering. The implication is that a shift from leasing to licensing 
would only raise the incomes of poorer fisherfolk if an NGO not only supported the 
Target Group's claim to water-rights but also assisted the Target Group to take over the 
capital-intensive gears previously owned by richer people.
To what extent does the leasing system encourage or prevent over-fishing?
The previous discussion of effort controls is of course relevant here. Their main effect 
was found to be the regressive redistribution of income rather than the prevention of 
biological overfishing. So far as the reduction of poverty is concerned, therefore, any 
policies, such as the extension of lease periods, which encourage lessees to restrict effort, 
are likely to be counter-productive.
Both sides in the debate over leasing use stock management arguments in support of their 
case. Opponents of leasing say that the lessee, unlike fishing labour, only has a short-term 
interest in the water-body and will therefore tend to over-exploit fish stocks. Supporters 
of leasing, on the other hand, argue that lessees can expect to hold a lease for many years, 
especially now that 8-10 year leases are available, and will therefore control over-fishing.
The finding of this study is that lessees' management of effort depends upon the 
hydrology of their jalmohol. If the jalmohol is closed then the benefits from effort 
management can be internalised. If the jalmohol is open and fish can swim in and out, on 
the other hand, lessees have no incentive to conserve fish biomass. The bio-economic 
model of lessee decision-making in chapter 11 showed that the openness of a jalmohol is 
a major determinant of the level of effort employed. The prediction is backed up by a 
comparison between effort management in Hail Haor, where the use of many gears is
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limited only by lack of space (chapter 7), and effort management in closed jalmohols, 
where lessees themselves shut down the fishery during the growing season (Appendix 6).
To sum up the study's findings on leasing and over-fishing, rent-maximising stock 
management should not be an objective in the design of property rights for these 
fisheries. Lessees use effort-limitation to shift income from labour to rents, not to 
increase yields, and their propensity to do so is, in any case, largely determined by their 
jalmohol's hydrology.
What are the effects o f artificial stocking upon incomes, employment and the distribution 
o f income?
One justification for the programme of artificial stock enhancement in Bangladesh was 
that it would raise the incomes of poor flsherfolk. Aid donors usually state that most of 
their projects should improve the livelihoods of poor people and that they would reject an 
otherwise viable project if it disrupted the livelihoods of poorer people. This study has 
found that artificial stock enhancement does not benefit poorer flsherfolk and may in 
certain circumstances cause them hardship.
Chapter 10 described how Hail Haor's poorer fishermen perceived the ADPII's stocking 
programme to be affecting them. They believed that they did not have access to the 
combination of location, season and gear that would enable them to catch the stocked 
fish. Some thought they were being harmed by the stocking programme because it led to 
an intensification of effort controls. Chapter 1 l's bio-economic model of lessees' 
decision-making predicted that almost all the benefits from artificial stocking would 
accrue to lessees, sub-lessees, officials and the government as rents. Any benefits to 
fishing labour through changes in the level of employment would be minimal, even for 
very high levels of stocking, and would be negative for closed jalmohols where the lessee 
was able to internalise the benefits of reducing effort. The model's simulation of closed 
seasons predicted that lessees with open jalmohols would be induced by artificial 
stocking to put pressure upon the government to restrict effort, which would reduce 
labour incomes by lowering the level of employment.
Two economic processes explain the regressive action of artificial stocking. Firstly, a 
Ricardian model of factor share determination predicts that a rise in the value of output 
will enhance rents rather than labour income if the derived demand for labour is inelastic 
with respect to the value of sales; the inelasticity could be caused by locational 
constraints upon employment or, in the case of a closed water body, a low internalised 
marginal value product of labour. Secondly, as chapter 9's account of choice of technique
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predicts, poorer flsherfolk will tend to be excluded from those combinations of location, 
gear and season where the stocked major carps will be caught.
The finding of this study is therefore that artificial stocking is a strategy for rent- 
enhancement rather than poverty-reduction. It may harm poorer fisherfolk’s livelihoods if 
it creates stronger incentives for effort controls, which could be imposed directly by the 
lessee and sub-lessee or indirectly, on their suggestion, by the government and its donors.
I f  flood control embankments reduce the area o f the floodplain, how will this affect 
fishing income and employment?
Chapter 7's study of effort-determination found that the level of effort, and therefore of 
employment, in the Hail Haor jalmohols was limited by lack of space. It described how 
competition for fishing space over supposedly open-access flooded private land had led to 
the establishment of territorial property rights. It is therefore highly probable that a 
reduction in the area of the floodplain would lead to a proportionate fall in labour use and 
therefore in the incomes of poorer flsherfolk. Chapter 8 estimated that Hail Haor 
supported 77 work-hours per hectare-month of flooding. With the average fishing 
household fishing for around 300 work-hours per month, one can estimate very 
approximately that the loss of four hectares of floodplain in a particular month would 
deprive one fishing household of its livelihood for that month.
What role could NGOs' Target Group Approach play in fishery development?
The role of NGO Target Groups in development in Bangladesh has been discussed in an 
extensive academic and professional literature. There is a consensus that they can give 
poorer people economic security and a greater share of the product of their labour by 
giving them direct access to productive assets. The question then arises of what role this 
approach could play in the inland capture fisheries sector.
As the preceding paragraphs upon licensing explained, self-employed fishermen in Hail 
Haor generally receive almost the entire value of their output after the costs of production 
have been taken into account. This is in marked contrast to agriculture, where the rent 
share is much more important, with sharecropping landowners appropriating around half 
of gross output as rents (Jansen 1987). Chapter 7 reported that fishermen usually own 
their own gear and sell their fish into a competitive market. The use of Target Groups to 
create new market relations within the existing productive system would therefore 
probably not improve fishing households' income. It would conceivably be possible for 
Target Group participants, with NGO support, to move into the more profitable late- 
season fishing activities from which they are currently excluded. This alone, however,
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would involve no net increase in the level of employment or the value of output because 
one set of operators was simply being replaced by another.
There are therefore a very restrictive set of conditions under which the NGO Target 
Group Approach could improve employment or productivity in the fishery in an equitable 
manner. Firstly, it must give Target Group participants effective ownership of the 
jalmohol. Without this, any increase in productivity will accrue to the leasing system 
through tolls. Second, it must allow Target Group participants to operate the more 
profitable, rent-producing sub-fisheries. Without this, any increase in productivity will 
accrue to the existing operators of capital-intensive gears. Third, it must raise the 
productivity of the fishery, probably by artificial stocking since that is the only 
intensification technology currently available. Without this, as chapter 8 demonstrated 
quantitatively, the value of rents available for transfer to fishing labour will be negligible. 
Finally, it must operate in a closed jalmohol. Without this, any of the new rents available 
because of intensification will be externalised through fish out-migration. Taken together, 
these four conditions are challenging to say the least. They have been met for some 
jalmohols in the IFAD/DANIDA/BRAC Ox-Bow Lakes Project in S. W. Bangladesh, 
which explains its partial success in creating equitable fishery development. The 
ecological and social difficulties of meeting these conditions in more open water-bodies 
which are exploited by many fishing factions mean that its success may not be replicated 
elsewhere.
Methodologies for the poverty-oriented assessment of tropical inland capture 
fisheries
Chapter 3's review of the literature upon fisheries management found a consensus upon 
the procedures that the economic assessment of fisheries should follow. Gulland's FAO 
Fisheries Circular (Gulland 1983) summarises the orthodox approach to fishery 
assessment: the assessor's task is to use biological stock assessment techniques to advise 
the administrator of the pattern of effort that will maintain the fishery's productivity. The 
orthodox model of assessment can therefore be typified as "productivity-driven". It is also 
technocratic, in the sense that it assumes that an "administrator" has the intention and the 
ability to control the activities of fishers so as to secure the desired pattern of production. 
Fisheries management economics has remained firmly within the same productivity- 
driven, technocratic framework. Its contribution, as outlined in chapter 3, has been to 
emphasise economic rents as the most appropriate productivity target variable and to 
describe ever more complex relationships between effort management and rents.
Figure 14.1 stylises the orthodox approach to fisheries assessment. A biologist assesses 
the catch-effort relationship by means of surplus production or yield-per-recruit analysis.
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This is transformed by an economist into a rent-effort relationship. The assessment team 
recommends a new pattern of effort, which the administrator enforces. Monitoring 
reveals new effort levels which necessitate ongoing assessment.
Figure 14.1. The orthodox model of fisheries assessment (simplified from Gulland 1983) 







There are three important reasons why this model of fisheries assessment is not suitable 
for the management of inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh. Firstly, the use of rents as a 
target variable is inappropriate. Chapters 1 and 2 explained that income-distribution was 
a key issue in rural development in Bangladesh and that the stated intention of the 
Government of Bangladesh and its donors was to make fisheries management an 
instrument of poverty-reduction. As chapter 7 describes, rents accrue to richer members 
of society so a rent-maximising strategy would enrich the rich yet further. The incomes of 
fishing labour or of poorer households would therefore be a more suitable target variable. 
Second, the technocratic model of effort control is inappropriate. It should be accepted 
that fisheries officials do not have the resources to finance programmes of effort control 
and that most direct interventions will therefore be in response to political or financial 
incentives from local influential people. Third, the emphasis upon rigorous biological 
stock assessment is not cost-effective. As chapter 8 explained, total yields are likely to be 
fairly unresponsive to fishing effort in such multi-gear, multi-species, highly "r-selected" 
fisheries. The main impact of management measures is therefore likely to be upon 
income-distribution rather than yields. Yield-per-recruit or surplus production assessment 
typically requires accurate biological samples to be taken at least every month for a 
period of several years and data analysis requires skills that are currently scarce or 
unavailable in developing countries. An assessment which concentrates upon formal 
stock-assessment techniques is therefore likely to produce little policy guidance at a high 
cost.
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Some alternative methodological approaches to the poverty-oriented assessment of 
tropical inland fisheries will be discussed below. The first, unattractively named "socio- 
ecological niche analysis", attempts to highlight the distributional impact of policy 
interventions by identifying relationships between economic status and resource use. The 
second, "factor-share analysis", applies Ricardian theory to the same question. The third, 
Participatory Resource Assessment, is already a key element in RRA and social 
anthropology toolkits. It will be argued that special care must be used in applying it to 
common-pool resources.
Socio-ecological niche analysis
Chapters 9 and 10 applied socio-ecological niche analysis to the Hail Haor fishery. The 
author has also applied it to the Lempuing River fishery in S. Sumatra, Indonesia and the 
Thale Noi fishery in the Songkla Lakes, Thailand. The theory underpinning this resource 
assessment methodology is that poorer people occupy a "socio-ecological niche", a 
particular locus, in the resource use system. This concept is analogous to that of an 
"ecological niche", the position in the ecosystem to which an organism is specifically 
adapted. Just as a guillemot, for example, is only physically and behaviourally capable of 
exploiting certain foods, poorer people are often only entitled by society and the market 
to exploit the common-pool resource in certain ways.
Poor people's socio-ecological niche will be determined by a combination of economic 
and social factors, including:
* the cost and riskiness of different techniques of resource-exploitation
* the cost of access to different parts of the resource-exploitation system
* the social links required for access
* cultural beliefs relating resource-exploitation to socio-economic status
* the skills or education required for different techniques of exploitation
The methodology for the socio-ecological niche assessment of renewable common-pool 
resources falls into three steps. The first is to disaggregate the resource-use system into its 
component activities. A renewable biological resource, for example, could be broken 
down by species exploited, season, location and technique of exploitation. The second 
step is to identify the socio-ecological niche occupied by poor people in these 
dimensions. An important possibility is that poorer people may be excluded altogether. 
The final step is to assess how resource management policies operate, not upon the 
resource system as a whole, but upon poor people's locus within that system.
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Factor share analysis
This assessment methodology is based upon the conceptual division of sales into three 
components, non-labour costs, the opportunity cost of labour and economic rents. The 
value of output accruing to resource-poor participants will be the opportunity cost of 
labour multiplied by the level of employment plus whatever their entitlement to rents may 
be. Economic theory predicts that the allocation of rents will be determined by the 
property-rights regime. Under open-access, rents will be dissipated by an expansion of 
non-labour costs and the opportunity cost of effort. Under private property, rents will be 
appropriated by the owner. Chapter 7 described how Hail Haor exhibited a regime of 
insecure private property, where the owner allowed labour to receive a portion of rents in 
order to secure their political support for his property rights.
The factor share analysis methodology attempts to predict what factor shares will accrue 
to resource-poor participants in different policy environments. To do so, it needs to 
assess:
* how policy interventions will affect the level of employment, because one component 
of the resource-poor's income is the opportunity cost of labour multiplied by the level of 
employment
* how policy interventions will affect the value of resource rents accruing to resource- 
poor participants
This thesis has illustrated the application of factor shares analysis. Chapter 10 used 
quantitative data to apply it to the Hail Haor fishery and Chapter 11 built a factor-share- 
determination model into a bio-economic simulation of the impact of policy 
interventions upon lessee decision-making.
Participatory Resource Assessment
Chapter 10 of this thesis used Participatory Resource Assessment, the identification of the 
impact of policy interventions jointly with resource-users themselves by means of 
informal discussion and structured interviews. Participatory Resource Assessment has 
several potential advantages over orthodox assessment methodologies. It uses Indigenous 
Technical Knowledge (ITK), and is therefore sometimes able to obtain information more 
cheaply and more accurately than formal scientific methods. It involves resource-users 
and is therefore more likely to produce recommendations that they will support. Thirdly, 
when income-distribution in an issue, Participatory Resource Assessment is able clearly 
to identify the interests of different socio-economic groups. Its long-term goal is often a 
system of "Co-Management" (Berkes, George and Preston 1991), where the flsherfolk 
manage the fishery with legal and technical support from the state.
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Although Participatory Resource Assessment is a promising methodology for the poverty- 
oriented assessment of tropical inland capture fisheries, the experience of this study 
(chapter 4) highlights some possible problems:
a) There can be a lack of congruence between what fishers and policy-makers are trying 
to obtain from the assessment. Fishers are aiming to increase their share of a biomass 
yield that they cannot improve through their own individual actions. Policy-makers, on 
the other hand, are aiming to increase the biomass yield itself. This is different from the 
case of RRA in agriculture where both farmers and policy-makers intend to improve 
yields.
b) There may be a lack of ITK on biomass production. Fishers, unlike farmers, have little 
incentive to acquire knowledge about biomass production because they are not in a 
position to affect it; they take it as given. Secondly, fishers, again unlike farmers, cannot 
see how biomass is produced because the production takes place out of sight under the 
water.
c) Since one fisher's harvest subtracts from that of others, there is an economic 
disincentive to share technical knowledge. Acheson (1981) found secretiveness to be a 
general characteristic of fishing societies.
These characteristics of common-pool resources imply that the practice of Participatory 
Resource Assessment may be rather different from that in the agricultural sector. The 
assessment is likely to produce zero-sum recommendations, where the participant 
suggests a change that will benefit some people while creating an equal and opposite loss 
for others. An example of this is the case of the Bangladesh NGOs who respond to 
fishermen's requests for credit to buy gear. With fishery benefits limited by fish stocks 
and fishing space, the purchase of gear by an NGO target group is likely to drive another 
group off the water without raising either yields or employment. Such zero-sum 
recommendations are likely to be discriminatory, where the participant suggests a change 
that will benefit him by harming another socio-economic group. Brush-pile owners' calls 
for closed seasons fall into this category, as do the caste fishermen's demands that "non­
fishermen" should be excluded from some jalmohols.
In short, the finding of this study was that Participatory Resource Assessment was a 
quick, cheap and effective way of identifying the response of different socio-economic 
groups to the various policy interventions on offer. It was essential, however, not to take 
the respondents' recommendations at face value. The same conclusions emerged from the 
author's RRA studies of floodplain fisheries in Indonesia and Thailand.
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Final conclusion
This chapter has summarised the findings of the 1992-4 study of the Hail Haor fishery in 
N.E. Bangladesh. A qualitative account of social, economic and institutional transactions 
in the fishery had been quantified with formal survey data and analysed by means of 
micro-economic models and simulation programmes. The final product was a reasoned 
analysis of the distributional impact of fisheries policy in Bangladesh. Policy 
interventions were found to be distributionally regressive. They worked to enhance the 
resource rents accruing to local influential people, government officials and the 
government. As a side-effect, they often harmed poorer flsherfolk. There was a conflict of 
interests between rentiers and labour because reductions in effort simultaneously raised 
rents and depressed labour income.
Orthodox approaches to fisheries assessment have not served poorer flsherfolk in tropical 
inland capture fisheries well because they have targeted rents, which accrue to richer 
people, rather than the income of poorer people. They have also ignored the political 
economy of policy-formation, which tends to be rent-led rather than labour-income-led. 
Alternative fisheries assessment methodologies have been proposed to redress this 
imbalance. "Socio-economic niche analysis", "factor share analysis" and Participatory 
Resource Appraisal are capable of delineating the distributional impact of policy 
interventions.
There are many reasons to be pessimistic about inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh. 
The competition for fishing space will become ever more acute as population increases.
At current rates of growth, the fishing population of Hail Haor will have risen by over 100 
households, the equivalent of a small fishing village, since the field research began.
Higher competition for fishing space will strengthen the social and economic position of 
lessees and sub-lessees over fishing labour. The less powerful Hindu fishermen are likely 
to be displaced yet more from the floodplain and jalmohols as Muslim communities 
expand. The likely effects of flood control schemes upon fisheries are still unknown and 
there is a risk of increasing use of destructive fishing techniques such as dewatering, 
explosives and poison. The argument that "something must be done" about inland capture 
fisheries is bound to become ever more compelling with time. If fisheries policy 
continues to be driven by a mixture of the economic interests of lessees and the 
professional interests of biologists, the call will probably be for more of the same: more 
artificial stocking, more major carps, more closures. It will therefore become increasingly 
important for poorer flsherfolk that there should be a countervailing concern for the 
distributional impact of fisheries management.
Appendices
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Appendix 1. Glossary o f  acronyms and Bengali terms
ADB Asian Development Bank
adhika patro fishing licence
ADPII Second Aquaculture Development Project
aman autumn rice crop
arotdar wholesaler
aus monsoon-season rice crop
baor ox-bow lake
bel jal lift net
ber jal seine net
beel water-filled depression
BBS Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BCAS Bangladesh Centre for Advanced Studies
bel jal lift net
beel natural water-filled depression
BIDS Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies
boshni a fish trap
BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
chora stream
current jal monofilament gill-net
dalal tied credit-auction contract
DANIDA Danish International Development Authority
DC Deputy Commissioner
DOF Department of Fisheries
dol (kata) brush-pile
dori a fish trap
ENIMOF Experiments in New Approaches to Management of
Fisheries
fai jal gill net
FAD fish aggregation device
FAP Flood Action Plan
faron a fish trap
FCD flood control and drainage
felun jal push net
FIVDB Friends in Village Development in Bangladesh
FSR farming systems research
ghor house
gram administrative / vernacular village
haor floodplain in N.E. Bangladesh
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IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
ijaratdar leaseholder
IMOF Improved Management of Fisheries
JMS Jatiya Motshojibi Somity
jotedar zamindar's lessee
jolmohol fishery leasing unit
kanj a manual dewatering
koin a fish trap
lama para waterside quarter
lunga a fish trap
Maimal Muslim fishing caste
mokha jal tana jal or felun jal
MSS Motshojibi Somobaya Somity (fishermen's association)
mut 60 yards
NFMP New Fisheries Management Policy
NGO non-governmental organisation
nikari fish retailer
Nomosudra Hindu fishing caste
ODA Overseas Development Administration
paiker fish porter / trader
panga fishing by means of macrovegetation
RRA rapid rural appraisal
shudhi simple interest credit
taki jal lifting seine net
tana jal seine net
Thana Sub-District (formerly Upazila)
TFO Thana Fisheries Officer
TFP Third Fisheries Project
Tk taka (1993: US$1.00 = Tk25)
TNO Thana Nirvahi (executive) Officer
Union administrative area below Thana
USAID United States Agency for International Development
zamindar landlord paying tribute to British Indian Government
Zila District
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Appendix 2. Catch, effort, income and cost panel survey form.
VISIT SHEET 
______ NAME Father's name: . N o ^ Date
A. What work was each hh member doing YESTERDAY?
Sex Aae Activity x hours
Permits:(since LAST VISIT)
Tk ° jalmohol______° gear °monthstart °duration






HH HH income 
share 
■+  + ----------------------------
D. Fishing activities YESTERDAY: 
Sex Age Gear x hours set hh/
(place) group type x amount
 +  + --------------------------------------
E. Home consumption y'day: 
value 
C aught S mall Tk
B ought 0 ther
F. Notes.
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Appendix 3. Brush-pile survey form.
Name:_____________  Village:__________  Date:___/__/-- ---
IDolsI
No. in group:____ How shared?___________________________
How many dols has your group built this year?______
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ f-








I Jalmohol cost: Tk  Paid in the month of________  I B
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------+ ----------------------------------------------------------- +
IBuilding costs month of I I
I I I
ILabour: IBamboo: I C
I I I





+ ------------------------------------------------------------------+ ----------------------------------------------------------- +
+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
I I
IFinance: Tk_______  from arotdar for  % of sales I
I I D
I Tk______  interest loan at  % per month I
I I
+ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4-
IDol jal: Month (s) purchased/hired I I
X   E
ICost of dol jal (Tk / Tk per month) I I
+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ +•
IDol fishing until now: I I
IArea IDays ILab. IRui katol, Iother Isales I
Iydxyd I Icost(Tk) Imrigal silver Ifish ITk net ofl
I______I____ I________ Icarfu kg______Ikg____ Idalal I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I F
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
I I I  I I I  I
+  + ----------+ ---------------------+ --------------------------------- + ----------------+ ----------------------+
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Appendix 4.2. Effort and catch per household for villages fishing north o f the main 
embankment
Fai Felun Bel Ber Taki
ThYdH kg NtH kg NtH kg NtH kg NtH kg
Dec 110.3 26.3 14.0 3.8 .0 .0 1.8 2.1 .0 .0
Jan 138.0 15.6 28.5 6.9 .0 .0 1.6 7.7 .0 .0
Feb 48 .0 8.0 21.0 3.9 .0 .0 .9 1.0 .0 .0
Mar 56.5 3.2 27.5 4.9 .0 .0 .3 .2 .0 .0
Apr 93.5 12.2 34.7 10.3 .0 .0 2.3 2.3 .0 .0
May 84 .1 15.3 40.3 28.5 .0 .0 2.6 2.5 .0 .0
Jun 83.9 21.0 21.8 14.3 .0 .0 2.0 7.4 .0 .0
Jul 38.4 10.6 23.7 14.3 .0 .0 8.5 20.0 .0 .0
Aug 63.4 20.7 20.7 16.3 .0 .0 6.6 9.2 .0 .0
Sep 65.0 14.1 19.2 12.8 .0 .0 2.4 3.0 .0 .0
Oct 50.7 17.2 12.9 6.5 1.8 .9 6.1 11.9 .0 .0
Nov 96.4 15.3 3.3 1.6 1.2 .4 5.0 8.6 1.4 .9
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Hook BHook Kotch Dori Far on
ThHkH kg ThHkH kg KchH kg DiH kg FrnH kg
Dec 10.2 3.0 21.0 5. 6 5.1 1.1 2039 7.4 1728 4.1
Jan 16.5 3.2 .0 .0 13.2 2.0 3689 6.7 6300 9.5
Feb 54.6 6.5 .0 .0 4.8 .5 6242 7.1 7632 8.3
Mar 90.6 22.3 .0 .0 5.7 1.5 7612 10.9 9639 18.5
Apr 43.6 11.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 8084 21.6 9718 14 .2
May 24.2 11.8 .0 .0 .0 .0 5069 18.5 2459 4.2
Jun 45.0 15.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 1037 2.0 720 .7
Jill 45.7 21.7 9.4 2.9 .0 .0 1349 2.0 1306 1.2
Aug 37.3 26.8 15.2 10.4 .0 .0 4694 7.1 1008 .3
Sep 33.9 17.9 12. 6 4.4 .0 .0 3682 9.8 0 .0
Oct 42 .8 19.2 11.5 9.5 .0 .0 4563 12.8 144 2.4
Nov 47.1 16.3 12.9 8.2 .0 .0 5698 14 . 0 484 1.5
Bosni Dol Jhaki Dry
BosH kg kg NtH kg kg
Dec .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 2.1
Jan .0 .0 17.0 2.9 .3 2.4
Feb .0 .0 19.4 14.0 2.1 13.6
Mar 14.4 .3 4.1 13.5 4.2 8.9
Apr 223.2 .9 .0 1.2 .0 3.8
May 28.8 .2 .0 .0 .0 .0
Jun 28.8 .2 .0 .0 .0 .3
Jul 9.6 . 6 .0 4.8 1.8 .6
Aug 28.8 .3 .0 .0 .0 2.2
Sep 36.0 . 6 .0 .0 .0 .0
Oct 14.4 .2 .0 .0 .0 .5
Nov 36.0 .5 .0 .0 .0 .1









Appendix 4.3. Catch com position bv species
(per cent: indicates missing observation.)
Jun-Aug Baim Baliara Bera Boal Boisa Carp Chanda
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori . 0 .0 2.5 .0 32.5 .0 9.3
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun .9 .0 3.2 .0 10.9 .0 5.7
Gill 1.2 .0 6.1 2.4 1.2 3.5 .6
Hook .9 .0 .3 5.0 .0 .0 .4
BHook .0 .0 .0 35.0 .0 .0 .0
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine 1.6 .0 . 6 .0 5.0 .0 30.5
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki - - - - - - -
ChingreeDarkina Go jar Gonia KakiyaKalbaush Kalna
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori 24.5 3.8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun 45.9 .0 6.6 .0 .0 .0 .0
Gill .0 .0 .0 1.0 1.2 1.6 7.1
Hook .0 .0 2 . 6 .0 4.1 .0 16.7
BHook .0 .0 51.4 .0 .0 .0 .0
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine 16.8 1.6 .0 .6 2.6 .0 . 6
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki — _ _ — _
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Kawa Katla Koi Koia Magur Mrigal Mokha
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.3
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun .0 .0 .0 .9 .0 .0 .4
Gill .0 3.8 30.9 1.8 1.2 1.5 .0
Hook .0 .0 5.0 .0 1.1 .0 .0
BHook .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine .0 6.9 .8 .9 .0 .0 13.4
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki - - - - - - -
Pabda Puti Rui Shing Shol Silver Taki Tengra
Bosni - - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - - -
Dori .0 26.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dry - - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - - -
Felun .0 1.1 .0 .5 22.1 .0 1.6 .  1
Gill 2.8 17.6 1.8 .6 . 6 .0 11.1 . 6
Hook 4.7 .9 .0 7.5 1.3 .0 40.3 9.1
BHook .0 .0 .0 .0 12.1 .0 1.4 .0
Lift - - - - - - - -
Seine .6 4.5 9.4 .3 .6 .0 1.5 1.3
Spear - - - - - - - -
Taki - — - - _ — _
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Sep-Nov BaimBaliara Bera Boal Boisa CarpChanda
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori .5 .0 .0 .0 25.5 .0 24.7
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun 2.4 .0 .1 .0 7.5 .0 11.8
Gill 1.4 .0 21.7 2.0 .0 .0 .2
Hook 4.3 .1 5.8 2.5 .0 .0 .1
BHook .0 .0 .0 65.0 .0 .0 .0
Lift .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 7.6
Seine .4 .0 .0 .0 1.3 .0 16.0
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki - - - - - - -
ChingreeDarkina Goj ar Gonia KakiyaKalbaush Kalna
Bosni - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - -
Dori 30.3 3.0 .0 . 0 .0 .0 .0
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun 43.0 .0 12.6 .0 .0 1.0 .0
Gill 4.9 . 0 .7 1.0 1.3 1.0 4.0
Hook .0 .0 5.4 .2 3.8 .0 23.7
BHook .0 .0 21.4 .0 .0 .0 .0
Lift 60.8 2.6 .2 .0 1.6 .0 1.0
Seine 7.8 9.6 .0 .0 .6 .0 .0
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki - — - - - — —
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Kawa Katla Koi Koia Magur Mrigal Mo kha
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.5
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - -
Felun .0 .0 .0 7.5 .0 .0 .0
Gill .0 2.9 30.9 2.1 1.8 .0 .0
Hook .0 .0 1.2 5.8 2.9 .0 .0
BHook .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Lift .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .2
Seine .0 .0 .0 10.7 .0 .0 41.9
Spear - - - - - - -
Taki - - - - - - -
Pabda Puti Rui Shing Shol Silver Taki Tengra
Bosni - - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - - -
Dol - - - - - - - -
Dori .0 14.8 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dry - - - - - - - -
Faron - - - - - - - -
Felun .0 .6 .0 10.3 .8 .0 2.5 .0
Gill .7 12.8 .5 2.1 . 1 .0 7.0 1.0
Hook .7 .6 .0 3.0 2.2 .0 35.8 2.1
BHook .0 .0 .0 .2 13.5 .0 .0 .0
Lift .2 24.0 .4 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .8
Seine .0 10.6 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.1 . 1
Spear - - - - - - - -
Taki - - - — _ - _
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Dec-Feb BaimBaliara Bera Boal Boisa CarpChanda
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - -
Dol .0 .0 .0 5.0 .0 20.0 3.0
Dori .7 .3 .8 .0 21.1 .0 .4
Dry .0 .4 4.5 .0 .5 .5 .0
Faron .0 .0 4.9 .0 1.3 .0 .3
Felun .0 .0 5.0 .0 .0 .0 5.0
Gill .5 .0 5.9 .0 .8 .0 1.5
Hook .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift 1.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .1
Seine .0 .0 1.5 5.1 28.1 .0 .0
Spear .4 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Taki - - - - - - -
ChingreeDarkina Go jar Gonia KakiyaKalbaush Kalna
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol 20.0 2.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dori 60.8 .2 .0 .0 .1 .0 .0
Dry .5 .0 15.1 .0 .0 .0 10.8
Faron 1.8 . 6 .0 .0 .1 .0 24.3
Felun .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 5.0
Gill .9 .0 3.0 .6 .2 .0 11.7
Hook .0 .0 .9 .0 .0 .0 7.2
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift 50.7 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Seine 4.0 .0 9.6 .0 .0 .0 2.0
Spear .0 .0 40.1 .2 13.5 .0 5.2
Taki - - — - - — _
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Kawa Katla Ko i Koia Magur Mrigal Mo kha
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dori .0 .0 .0 3.5 .0 .0 .2
Dry .0 .5 5.0 13.4 5.3 .0 .8
Faron .0 .0 1.4 10. 8 5.9 1.9 .0
Felun .0 .0 5.0 .0 .0 .0 10.0
Gill .0 1.0 10.4 1.4 2.6 .1 .4
Hook .0 .0 .8 .0 11.5 .0 .0
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift 5.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Seine .0 .0 1.5 .0 .0 .0 1.5
Spear .0 3.4 .0 .0 1.0 .0 .0
Taki - - - - - - -
Pabda Puti Rui Shing Shol Silver Taki
Bosni - - - - - - -
Cast - - - - - - -
Dol .0 8.0 40.0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dori .0 9.9 .0 .0 .0 .0 .5
Dry .0 8.5 .5 12.5 8.6 .0 11.3
Faron .0 9.8 14 .8 8.8 2.3 .6 7.5
Felun .0 45.0 .0 5.0 5.0 .0 15.0
Gill .4 20.9 8.7 11.1 3.8 6.1 7.5
Hook .0 .1 .0 22.6 5.8 .0 50.7
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift .0 24.7 .0 3.3 .0 .0 14.3
Seine .0 1.5 37.3 .0 2.5 .0 5.5
Spear .0 .0 14.2 1.0 2.4 14.5 4.2
Taki — _ _ _ _ _
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Mar-May BaimBaliara Bera Boal Boisa CarpChanda
Bosni 8.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Cast .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori 1.0 .6 .3 .0 27.9 .0 1.9
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron .0 3.0 4.5 .0 .0 .0 .0
Felun .0 .0 .0 .0 8.4 .0 4.0
Gill 2.0 1.0 13.8 .0 .0 .0 3.4
Hook 4.3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine - - - - - - -
Spear 4.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Taki .0 1.5 .0 .0 7.5 .0 .0
ChingreeDarkina Go jar Gonia KakiyaKalbaush Kalna
Bosni 30.0 50.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Cast .0 .0 20.0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori 51.3 2.2 .0 .0 .0 .0 .7
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 25.0
Felun 79.6 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Gill .0 .0 3.0 .0 .0 .0 5.8
Hook .0 .0 .4 .0 .0 .0 23.6
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine - - - - - - -
Spear .0 .0 24.0 .0 .0 .0 32.5
Taki 2.5 83.5 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
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Kawa Katla Koi Koia Magur Mrigal Mokha
Bosni .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Cast .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Dol - - - - - - -
Dori .0 .0 .4 .2 .0 .0 .0
Dry - - - - - - -
Faron .0 .0 .0 1.3 2.5 .0 .0
Felun .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Gill .0 .0 2.0 1.4 4.0 .0 .0
Hook .0 .0 .7 .0 8.6 .0 .0
BHook - - - - - - -
Lift - - - - - - -
Seine - - - - - -
Spear .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 . 0 .0
Taki .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Pabda Puti Rui Shing Shol Silver Taki Tengra
Bosni .0 8.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 4.0
Cast .0 .0 .0 .0 80.0 .0 .0 .0
Dol - - - - - - - -
Dori .0 12.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.1 .3
Dry - - - - - - - -
Faron .0 1 . 8 .0 14.0 1.0 .0 46.3 .8
Felun .0 8.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Gill .0 42.0 1.0 4.6 .0 .0 14.0 2.0
Hook .0 .0 .0 4.3 2.1 .0 5 5 . 3 .7
BHook - - - - - - - -
Lift - - - - - - - -
Seine - - - - - - - -
Spear .0 .0 2 5 . 0 .0 14.0 .0 .0 .0
Taki .0 5.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
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Appendix 4.4. Income o f  fishing households (Tk/household/month)
Fish Fish hired
Sales (Costs) Aqr. trade craft labour
Dec 1903 1429 139 108 120 218
Jan 2405 1160 16 80 143 158
Feb 2463 642 26 31 167 274
Mar 2680 525 16 48 135 189
Apr 2344 462 16 60 126 210
May 2194 255 3011 56 100 78
Jun 1558 308 111 23 83 27
Jul 2001 313 0 0 105 42
Aug 2510 386 0 68 83 54
Sep 1738 429 1386 160 99 66
Oct 2241 553 0 158 59 56
Nov 1712 838 53 150 67 141
Total 25747 7298 4772 940 1284 1511
Appendix 4.5. Labour use o f fishing households (Work-hours/household/monthY
Fish labour labour
Fish supprt Aar, trade craft total fishing
Dec 306 51 88 18 47 29 25
Jan 303 15 133 13 43 30 14
Feb 270 9 106 7 65 36 25
Mar 374 19 62 12 40 28 14
Apr 364 20 115 8 39 44 7
May 286 33 99 7 14 29 7
Jun 225 7 61 7 6 28 0
Jul 299 53 48 0 7 40 0
Aug 323 58 19 26 9 26 0
Sep 261 24 86 24 12 35 5
Oct 311 47 31 19 10 28 2
Nov 271 45 35 20 29 30 18
Total 3592 380 880 159 320 382 115
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Appendix 4.8. Breakdown o f  catch value: total o f  60 sample households CQOOTk/month')
Fishing Hired Traps & Other
Revenue labour Tolls baskets costs
Dec 114 12 5 15 54
Jan 144 5 5 19 41
Feb 148 4 14 5 15
Mar 161 3 5 4 19
Apr 141 3 3 9 13
May 132 2 0 5 8
Jun 93 2 0 1 15
Jul 120 2 0 1 16
Aug 151 1 1 2 19
Sep 104 1 1 1 22
Oct 134 2 8 1 21
Nov 103 2 12 4 31
sum p .a. 1, 107 41 55 66 276
/hh p.a. 18.45 .68 .92 1.10 4.59
/2033hh 37,506 1, 392 1, 869 2,238 9, 338
Appendix 4.9. Brush-pile cashflow and catch
90% conf. int. 
for mean
Variable mean s .d. n min max
Leasing cost (Tk/ha) 11709 8329 11 7158 16261
Building cost (Tk/ha) 5572 2666 10 4027 7118
Fishing cost (Tk/ha) 6071 3857 10 3836 8307
Shudhi principal (Tk/ha) 2946 3213 10 1083 4809
Dalai principal (Tk/ha) 5264 4143 10 2683 7666
Revenue after dalal (Tk/ha) 31743 9752 10 26090 37396
kg/ha 575 182 11 476 674
% stocked species 63 14 10 55 72
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Appendix 5 .1. GW-BASIC listing of bio-economic simulation of effort management in a 
leasehold fishery.
10 REM: Dimension statements
20 DIM BIGSTOCK(10):DIM SMALLSTOCK(10):DIM RBIGSTOCK(10):DIM 
RSMALLSTOCK(10)
30 DIM BIGGROW(9):DIM SMALLGROW(9)
40 DIM BIGPRICE(9):DIM SMALLPRICE(9)
50 DIM BIGCTY(9):DIM SMALLCTY(9)
60 DIM LESSEEY(9):DIM LABOURY(9):DIM RLESSEEY(9):DIM RLABOURY(9)
70 DIM BIGCATCH(9):DIM SMALLCATCH(9):DIM RBIGCATCH(9):DIM RSMALLCATCH(9) 
80 DIM ESC (9) :DIM A$(9)
90 DIM BIGINFLUX(9):DIM SMALLINFLUX(9)
100 REM: Data entry
110 CLS: PRINT 1'Hail Haor Bio-economic model 7"
120 PRINT:PRINT: PRINT
130 FOR X%=1 TO 9
140 READ A$ (X%)
150 NEXT X%
160 DATA Sept:.,Oct.,Nov. ,Dec.,Jan.,Feb.,March.,Apri1.
170 INPUT "What file contains data (biodata.?) 11;FILE$
180 OPEN "I", #1, FILE$
190 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,BIGGROW(X%):NEXT X%
200 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,SMALLGROW(X%):NEXT X%
210 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,BIGPRICE(X%):NEXT X%
220 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,SMALLPRICE(X!):NEXT X%
230 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,BIGCTY(X%):NEXT X%
240 FOR X%=1 TO 9:INPUT #1,SMALLCTY(X%):NEXT X%




270 CLOSE #1 




900 REM: Input employment levels
905 INPUT "How many closed months"/CLOSURE!
910 INPUT "What is maximum employment until December";AA%
920 INPUT "What is maximum employment after January";BB%
923 INPUT "What is step";STP
927 REM: Influx iteration loop starts here
928 BESTARGET=0
930 FOR EMP1=0 TO AA% STEP STP 
940 EMP2=EMP1:REM FOR EMP2=0 TO BB% STEP STP 
2000 REM: September to January 





LESSEEY(X%) = (BIGCATCH(X%)*BIGPRICE(X%) )+(SMALLCATCH(X%)*SMALLPRICE (X%)) 
(THINCOST*EMP1/THINLAB)-LABOURY(X%)
2055 IF X%<=CLOSURE% THEN
BIGCATCH(X%)=0:SMALLCATCH(X%)=0:LABOURY(X%)=0:LESSEEY(X%)=0 
2060 BIGSTOCK(X%+1)= (BIGSTOCK(X%)*(1+BIGGROW(X%)-ESC(X%) ))- 
BIGCATCH(X%)+BIGINFLUX(X%)
2070 SMALLSTOCK(X%+1)=(SMALLSTOCK(X%)*(1+SMALLGROW(X%)-ESC(X%)))- 












4000 REM: March to May 





LESSEEY (X%) = (BIGCATCH (X%) *BIGPRICE (X%) ) + (SMALLCATCH (X%) * SMALLPRICE (X%) ) 
(THINCOST*EMP2/THINLAB)-LABOURY(X%)
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5000 REM: Calculate markers 
5010 TARGET=0
5020 FOR X%=1 TO 9:TARGET-TARGET+(LESSEEY(X%)/((1+R)AX%)):NEXT X%
5030 IF TARGET<BESTARGET THEN 6000 
5040 BESTARGET=TARGET 
5045 PRINT INT(BESTARGET)
5050 FOR X%=1 TO
9:RBIGSTOCK(X%)=BIGSTOCK(X%):RSMALLSTOCK(X%)=SMALLSTOCK(X%):RLESSEEY(X%) 
=LESSEEY(X%):RLABOURY(X%)=LABOURY(X%):RBIGCATCH(X%)=BIGCATCH(X%):RSMALLC 




6000 REM: End employment loop here
6010 PRINT
6020 REM NEXT EMP2
6030 PRINT
6040 NEXT EMP1
7000 REM: Model influxes here 
7010 FOR X%=1 TO
9:BIGINFLUX(X%)=RBIGSTOCK(X%)*ESC(X%):SMALLINFLUX(X%)=RSMALLSTOCK(X%)*ES 
C(X%):NEXT X%
7020 PRINT " Iteration:";ITER%;"complete."
7030 ITER%=ITER%+1: IF ITER%>10 THEN 8000
7040 IF ABS(RBIGSTOCK(10)-LASTBIGSTOCK)>.01 THEN
LASTBIGSTOCK=RBIGSTOCK(10):GOTO 927
7050 IF ABS(RSMALLSTOCK(10)-LASTSMALLSTOCK)>1 THEN
LASTSMALLSTOCK=RSMALLSTOCK(10):GOTO 927
8000 REM: Print out results
8010 CLS
8020 PRINT "month","big","small","labour","lessee"




Appendix 5.2. Exogenous variables used in the baseline run of the bio-economic 
simulation of effort management in a leasehold fishery.
Month net growth price ca tchabi1i ty
big small big small big small
species species species
1 .35 .35 60 20 .02 .02
2 .35 .35 60 30 .02 .02
3 .35 .35 60 30 .02 .02
4 .25 .25 60 30 .02 .02
5 .13 .13 60 30 .02 .02
6 . 13 .13 60 30 .03 .03
7 .08 .08 60 30 .03 .03
8 .08 .08 60 30 .03 .03
Initial stock(kg): large species 600, small species 4200 
Gear cost(Tk/m): thinning gear 450, clearing gear 7000 
Wage(Tk/m)1200
Clearing gear catchability (kg/kg/m): large species .95, small species 
. 1
Labour requirements/unit gear: thinning gear 1, clearing gear 10 
Discount rate (%/m): 10
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Appendix 6. Two New Fisheries Management Policy flSTFMPl jalmohols
Beri Beel is a U-shaped, enclosed body of water 149 acres in area, around 25km north of 
Moulvi Bazar. It became a NFMP jolmohol in 1988. License fees were set to total 
T kl28,750 (US$3,200) in that year and have risen by 10% per year until the time of 
writing. Licenses are issued annually to 433 fishermen in 24 groups. The District (Zila) 
fisheries officer possesses a list of their names and village of residence. Each group has a 
named leader.
A series of visits to Beri Beel in late 1992 revealed the reality of the New Fisheries 
Management Policy. A syndicate of 24 local merchants and landowners controlled the 
fishermen's association. Their leader was a video-renter and fish-merchant. They were 
listed as the leaders of the 24 fishing-groups; the 409 "group members" were listed solely 
for cosmetic purposes. A dispute within the syndicate reduced its membership to 16. A 
second round of expulsions brought it to its final level of 12. In accordance with the 
rhetoric of the New Fisheries Management Policy, those remaining described those 
expelled as "non-fishermen".
Confident of its ownership of the natural resource, the syndicate invested in the fish 
stock. It did not catch fish during the growth period (July to November), it built brush- 
piles to encourage the growth and aggregation of larger species and it established a 
reserve fishery to ensure the following year's breeding stock. The syndicate hired two 
water-bailiffs at a total cost of Tk3,000 (US$75) to exclude self-employed fishermen. 
Their efforts were directed against 17 fishermen living in villages around Beri Beel who 
had resorted to working their long-lines and gill-nets clandestinely by night. The 
syndicate members explained that these villagers were "non-fishermen" and had therefore 
to be prevented from reducing the catch of the "genuine fishermen" of the "Fishermen's 
Association".
When the fishing season (December to February) arrived, the syndicate's control over the 
jolmohol ensured that profits were not dissipated through excessive effort. 12 hired 
labourers, two boats and a single seine net sufficed. The labourers were brought in from 
distant villages and lived in a temporary hut beside the water.
Buruburi Beel is another NFMP jolmohol in Moulvi Bazar district. Two villages lie on its 
southern shore, one Muslim and one Hindu. Under the old system, fishermen from both 
villages bought fishing rights from the lessee. Fishermen can not afford to pay NFMP 
license fees in advance of the fishing season. A landowner from the Muslim village 
therefore named himself Chairman of the "Fishermen's Association", registered his 
fellow-villagers as his membership and paid the license fees on their behalf. He collected
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tolls from Muslim fishermen throughout the fishing season and fished the deepest water 
in his own name by means of hired labour. He employs 5 water-bailiffs to prevent "non­
fishermen" from fishing.
The Hindu fishermen, however, complain that the Fishermen's Association is restricted to 
Muslims and that they have been excluded from Buruburi Beel by the NFMP. They still 
have access to Jolwa Beel, a lease held by a syndicate of 6 fellow-Hindus, but they know 
that the Muslim landowner is lobbying for Jolwa Beel to be registered as a NFMP 
jolmohol. They fear that they would again be excluded from the resulting Fishermen's 
Association.
Both Beri Beel and Buruburi Beel are managed by members of the local community. In 
both cases, however, the local community exhibits a high level of economic inequality, 
and this inequality was carried over into the management of the natural resource. Over­
fishing in Beri Beel was prevented by the exclusion of self-employed fishermen. In 
Buruburi Beel the same goal was achieved by the exclusion of a religious minority. 
Neither of these two management practices could be described as "equitable". Indeed, the 
Beri Beel syndicate's oligarchic control was a pre-condition for its far-sighted 
management of the fishery.
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